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Preface
T h e 1976 Touche Ross/University of Kansas Symposium on A u d i t i n g Problems constitutes the third offering i n this biennial series of symposia designed to
bring practitioners and educators involved i n the field of auditing together to
study matters of mutual interest and concern. O n the assumption that the series
is now firmly established, I have chosen to identify this volume of the proceedings
both simply and explicitly as Auditing Symposium III.
A s before, planning efforts were directed toward a balance between practitioners and educators i n the preparation of papers, w i t h the discussant for each
paper from the opposite group, and w i t h a similar balance i n the invited participants. A l l papers, except for the traditional evening address on a more general
topic, were distributed i n advance, m a k i n g it possible for the preparer to limit
comments to summary remarks or observations about the paper and leaving more
than an hour for the discussant's remarks and the ensuing open discussion.
Although no attempt has been made to summarize the informal discussions, both
the preparers and the designated discussants were afforded the opportunity to
modify their papers and remarks to reflect matters that arose during the general
discussion.
T h e inclusion of the paper " A n A u d i t i n g Perspective of the Historical Development of Internal C o n t r o l " extends m y endeavor to assemble a series of
papers that w i l l eventually provide a comprehensive dissertation o n the development and heritage of the auditing segment of the accounting discipline. T h e
additional papers reflect a unifying theme only i n that they were chosen w i t h
the expectation that the subject would be of current interest to the participants
and to the readers of this volume of collected papers.
A s has been true for each of these symposia, I take full responsibility for the
selection of topics for both the invited and the submitted papers, but the views
expressed i n the papers are those of the preparers, and, of course, not necessarily
those of the organizations w i t h which they are affiliated. Those interested i n these
auditing symposia are once again invited to submit papers, w i t h a cut-off date of
September 1, 1977 for papers to be considered for the 1978 symposium.
A u d i t i n g Symposium III for 1976 and the printing of these Proceedings would
not have been possible without the financial support of Touche Ross Foundation,
and i n that connection I also wish to acknowledge the gracious personal assistance
of Jerry Jackson, managing partner of the Kansas City office of Touche Ross & C o .
HOWARD F.

October, 1976
University of Kansas
Lawrence

STETTLER
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An Auditing Perspective of the
Historical Development of Internal Control
Willie Hackett and Sybil C. Mobley
Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University
It is conceivable that internal control preceded auditing and other elements of
the accounting profession. Internal Control emerged as a common-sense, natural
product of the profit motive. A s soon as the first entrepreneurs contrived a
method for m a k i n g a profit, they contrived ways of controlling and protecting
that profit. A s soon as it was determined that profits could be expanded by the
employment of others, i t was recognized that complete trust was not the most
profitable policy and that some form of control should be established.
T h i s paper recapitulates the findings of accounting historians who have studied
the historical development of internal control; however, it should be recognized
that the history of internal control is still being researched and documented.
Early Beginnings
Kenneth M o s t 1 has stated that there is concrete evidence that internal control
existed i n the Mesopotamian civilization as early as 3600 B . C . Most points out
that the Sumerians recorded commercial transactions o n stone dating back to
3600 B . C . and 400 years later o n clay. It was customary for summaries to be
prepared by scribes other than those w h o had provided the original lists of
payments. Further, the documents of the period reveal tiny marks, dots, ticks,
and circles at the side of the figures, indicating that checking had been performed.
W i l l i a r d Stone noted 2 that i n ancient Egypt, i n the Pharaoh's central finance
department, the "house of silver of the treasury," internal control and auditing
were i n use. Scribes prepared records of receipts and disbursements of silver,
corn and other commodities. O n e recorded on papyrus the amount brought to
the warehouse and another checked the emptying of the containers on the roof
as it was poured into the storage building. A n audit was performed by a third
scribe who compared these two records. A n official order was required for withdrawals and the scribe i n charge of the storehouse recorded the disbursements
and retained the order. H i s records of receipts, disbursements and inventory
balances were periodically audited by another scribe or his superior.
Stone gives an account of internal control i n the Persian civilization of 549 to
330 B . C . H e reports that Darius (521-486 B . C . ) used government scribes, called
the " K i n g ' s eyes and ears," to perform an important function i n the control of
his extensive empire. F o r convenience of administration the empire was sectioned
into satrapies each w i t h a "satrap" as the civil administrator and tax collector.
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Government of these provincial units was divided; the troops were under a
general, and a royal secretary performed the duties of an internal auditor, reporting to the K i n g ' s minister on the activities of the satrap and the general. The
royal secretary accounted for taxes collected and remitted to the K i n g .
T h e " K i n g ' s eyes and ears," accompanied by a military escort, made surprise
audits of the affairs of the provinces. These traveling government auditors were
empowered to examine all records, question the satrap, the royal secretary, or any
other officials and to take immediate corrective action if it was believed to be
necessary.
Extending his historical account, Stone points out that like the Persian Empire
before it, the Roman Empire made effective use of accounting and auditing to
control the generals of conquered territories. T h e counterpart of the " K i n g ' s eyes
and ears" were the "quaestors," who came into being about 200 B . C . They were
financial officers responsible to Rome, who had custody of the treasury, supervised the scribes i n their duties of recording treasury receipts and disbursements,
and examined the accounts of the governors of subjugated countries. T h e
quaestors were required to report periodically to Rome and to have their records
heard by an examiner. T h e word "auditor" came into use through this practice.
T h e Roman Empire made use of a complete system of checks and counterchecks. They separated the duties of collecting revenue, authorizing expenditures,
maintaining custody of cash, and recording financial transactions. Expenditures
were required to be supported by documents disclosing the identity and title of
the creditor and attesting the completion of the work or receipt of the goods
called for by the order. Magistrates authorized payment on the basis of these
documents and after disbursement, treasury scribes recorded all transactions.
Quaestors supervised and audited all government financial transactions. T a x
examiners also were used i n Rome and played a prominent role i n the collection
of government revenues.
T h e H o l y Roman Empire under the leadership of Charlemagne followed the
example of the Persian and Roman Empires i n using government auditors to
control the affairs of state. Missi dominici, "emissaries of the master," were sent
to review the affairs of the various administrators. T h e emissaries carried instructions from Charlemagne to local officials, made audits of their records, reviewed
their actions, and reported the results to the K i n g . Unfortunately for the Empire,
after the death of Charlemagne (825 A . D . ) no strong organizer appeared to take
his place and within one generation the missi dominici were disbanded, control
of the local rulers was lost, and the Empire disintegrated.
In the middle ages, accounting, along w i t h the other arts, suffered a decline
because of the general disorganized condition of government and the economy
throughout Europe. Gradually, however, accounting was reestablished.
R. Gene B r o w n 3 has pointed out that prior to 1500, accounting was concerned
primarily w i t h governmental and family units. T h e practice of internal control
was evidenced by the use of two scribes who kept independent records of the
same transactions designed to prevent defalcations within the treasuries of the
ancient rulers. A secondary objective was assurance of accuracy i n reporting.
Inventories were periodically taken to prove accountability and to establish the
accuracy of the accounting records.
D u r i n g the period 1500-1850, which L . Fitzpatrick, B. F . Foster and W i l l i a m
2

Jackson 4 have identified as the period i n which a standardized system of doubleentry accounting became regarded as necessary, the recognition of the i m portance of internal control also gained acceptance.
1850 to 1940
F r o m 1850 to 1905, the rise of the large corporation to permit exploitation of
the technology produced by the Industrial Revolution was seen. T h e operation
of the principal enterprises passed from the hands of the owners to those of the
managers. T o protect the interest of the absentee owners a new professional class
of auditors emerged, the independent auditors.
R. Gene B r o w n 5 points out that although internal control was recognized as
existing i n standardized systems of accounting, little interest was shown i n any
systems of controls for assets other than that for cash, and not much attention
was paid to internal control by the independent auditors. T h e built-in control
inherent i n double entry accounting was often the only cross-check recognized as
significant for all acounts. Because of this, the audits during the period 1850 to
1905 usually involved rather complete reviews of transactions and the preparation
of corrected accounts and financial statements. T h i s was inefficient, expensive,
and d i d not satisfactorily provide for strengthening of weak areas i n subsequent
periods. T h e need for changes i n the accounting system to improve the accuracy
of reported amounts and reduce the possibilities for fraudulent acts was obvious.
A s the accounting system and the organizational structure were strengthened,
and as the volume of transactions continued to grow, the technique of sampling
became accepted practice for auditors.
B r o w n points out that prior to 1905, a natural basis for limiting the amount of
testing to be done i n auditing would have been the improvements i n accounting
systems, and consequently i n internal controls, which existed i n the larger corporations. However, it was not until the period 1905 to 1933 that auditors fully realized
the importance of internal controls and the relation of strengths and weaknesses
therein to their testing programs.
D u r i n g this period the literature began to reflect more fully the importance of
internal control and its relation to the extent of audit testing to be done. Montgomery and other authors including E . V . Spicer, E . C . Pegler, F . R. Carnegie
Steele and D e W i t t C a r l Eggleston referred to the system of internal control as of
primary concern to the independent auditor i n accepting the accounting data as
being reliable, subject to the testing process. B r o w n notes that the literature was
far ahead of actual practice. Practitioners continued to expand use of the technique of testing, but the decision as to the extent of testing was seldom directly
tied to an appraisal of internal controls.
In 1926, the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange's special Committee on Stock List
campaigned for improvements i n auditing. In 1929, the then American Institute
of Accountants (now A I C P A ) undertook to revise the 1917 Federal Reserve
Bulletin, "Approved Methods for the Preparation of Balance Sheet Statements."
O f special significance i n this revision, which was titled Verification of Financial
Statements, was the requirement that the extent of testing used i n an audit be
based on an evaluation of the effectiveness of the system of internal control. In
1930, the Institute established a Committee on Cooperation with Stock Exchanges
3

to formulate methods that would avoid a future repetition of the misleading financial reporting practices and poor quality of auditing that were a factor i n the
1929 stock market crash.
A subsequent revision of the 1929 A I C P A pamphlet by a special Institute
Committee, was issued under the title, Examination of Financial Statements by
Independent Public Accountants, i n 1936. It included important sections o n the
philosophy of financial statements, their significance and limitations, and broad
responsibilities of the auditor and the propriety of reliance on effective systems
of internal control.
However, the great impetus for the development and elaboration of the system
of internal control came from those practicing as independent auditors, spurred
by the fear of legal liability. U n l i k e the jurisdictions under the British Legal
System, the cases decided i n the United States held that although management
has primary responsibility for the system of internal control, the auditor has a
duty to review the client's system. T h i s duty was firmly established i n the
investigation of the M c Kesson and Robbins case by the S E C . T h e Summary of
Findings and Conclusions (Accounting Series Release N o . 19) stated i n part:
W e are convinced by the record that the review of the system of internal
checks and controls at the Bridgeport offices of M c Kesson and Robbins was
carried out i n an unsatisfactory manner. The testimony of the experts leads
us to the further conclusion that this vital and basic problem of all audits
for the purpose of certificating financial statements has been treated i n
entirely too casual a manner by many accountants. Since i n examination of
financial statements of corporations whose securities are publicly owned, the
procedures of testing and sampling are employed i n most cases, it appears
to us that the necessity for a comprehensive knowledge of the client's
system of internal check and control cannot be overemphasized.
T h e M c Kesson and Robbins case prompted great disagreement as to the
auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud and the significance of fraud
detection as an audit objective. D u r i n g this period of disagreement, the use of
testing as an audit procedure became generally universal and internal control
gained wide acceptance as a basis for determining the extent of examination
required.
1940 to the Present
T h e importance of internal control has continued to grow. Some of the contributing factors have been:
1. T h e increasing impossibility of a detail audit due to the high volume
of transactions
2. T h e need to reduce the cost of the external audit
3. T h e increasing complexity and size of business required more sophisticated control techniques to
a. provide timely feedback on errors and fraud
b. provide special analyses
c. insure internal administrative controls
4. T h e needs imposed by the multi-plant and branch nature of operations to
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a. insure uniformity of accounting procedures and consistency of applications
b. verify interplant transactions and profit center reports
5. The external audit procedure has shifted from a review of past operations to a review of the system of internal control. A s a result, the
reliance on the system of internal control continues to increase.
Conceptual Development of Modern Internal Control
A study of auditing textbooks over the past half century reveals that the conceptual development of internal control has kept pace w i t h developments i n the
concept and practice of management and i n the complexity of the firm. Excerpts
from several editions of Montgomery's Auditing are presented i n an effort to
trace that development.
T h e 2nd Edition of Montgomery's Auditing (1912) made no mention of the
terms "internal control" or "internal auditing." However, the related term, i n ternal check, was discussed. T h e emphasis was that of reliance on internal check
by external auditors. It stated that "Such a system consists i n the accounting
records, methods and details generally of an establishment being laid out i n such
a way that no part of the accounts w i l l be under the absolute and independent
control of any one person; that, on the contrary, the work of one employee w i l l
be complementary to that of another; and that a continuous audit w i l l be made
of the details of the business." T h i s description identifies the scope of internal
check as including both internal accounting controls and internal auditing. Six
pages were devoted to a discussion of the system of internal check.
Twenty-two years later, the 5th Edition of Montgomery's Auditing
(1934)
devoted seven pages to the discussion of the system of internal check and the
internal auditing department. T h e term "internal control" was not yet i n use.
T h e definition of the system of internal check was substantially the same, encompassing both internal accounting controls and internal auditing. T w o pages
were devoted to internal auditing under a separate subheading. T h e verification
of detailed records and the safeguarding of assets was considered the function
of the internal auditing department. T h e author's interest i n this area continued
to be the need to avoid a detailed audit. The independence of the audit department was discussed. However, concern was only to the extent independence
assures a system of internal check on which the external auditor can rely.
Montgomery's 6th Edition (1940) introduced the word " c o n t r o l " as an extension of the term internal check and devoted six pages to the discussion of the
system of internal check and control and to the internal audit department. I n the
6th edition, internal check was defined as the "arrangement of bookkeeping
methods and procedures so that no part is under the absolute control of one person; and the work of each person is complementary to that of another." T h i s is
a narrower definition than that given i n the 5th edition as it excludes internal
auditing. A g a i n , internal auditing is discussed under a separate subheading. I n
discussing independence, the 6th edition recognized that, although theoretically
internal auditing should be independent of the accounting department, i n practice
the internal auditor generally reported to the chief accounting officer. The author's
concern was again with the use of the internal check and control system as a basis
for limiting the scope of the audit.
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Internal Control was the topic of an eight-page chapter i n the 7th Edition of
Montgomery's Auditing (1949). A Statement of A u d i t i n g Standards had been
issued by the Committee on A u d i t i n g Procedure of the American Institute of
Accountants i n 1947 which established the evaluation of the client's system of
internal control as one of the standards of field work. T h e standard stated:
There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing internal control
as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of the resultant
extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be restricted.
In addition, the following formal definition of internal control was published
i n 1949:
Internal control comprises the plan of organization and all of the coordinate methods and measures adopted within a business to safeguard its
assets, check the accuracy and reliability of its accounting data, promote
operational efficiency, and encourage adherence to prescribed managerial
policies . . . a "system" of internal control extends beyond those matters
which relate directly to the functions of the accounting and financial
departments. 6
These events i n part probably account for Montgomery's 7th edition treatment
which reflected a broadening of the scope and function of internal control. T h e
discussion covered such topics as budgetary and cost accounting systems, and the
enhanced status of the internal auditor including the dual reporting responsibility
to the controller and to the board of directors. In commenting on the growth of
internal auditing, the 7th edition reported that " A s business expanded, the need
was seen for centrally controlled policing of the accounting function of many
organizations composed of numbers of dispersed units. This need is filled by the
internal auditor's department. . . . T h e internal auditor also acts as the direct
representative of the controller to investigate and report whether prescribed
accounting policies, procedures, methods, and routines are followed."
T h e internal auditor is presented as "an important element of internal control. . . . Internal control is greatly strengthened by a well-operated internal
auditing group."
The 7th edition substitutes the term "internal control" for the term "internal
check." Absolutely no reference is made to internal check. T h e 7th edition also
introduced the standard questionnaire for the evaluation of internal control as a
"practical and useful device for investigating and recording the auditor's inquiries
into the system of internal control." 7
In the 8th Edition of Montgomery's Auditing (1957), the treatment of
internal control accounted for twelve pages. Based on the definition of the
A u d i t i n g Procedure Committee of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, the concept of internal control was classified into three areas: i n ternal administrative control, internal accounting control, and internal check.
The authors cautioned that the committee's definition was "very broad" and
questioned whether the independent auditor should be concerned with internal
administrative control.
W i t h the 8th edition, terminology becomes definitive i n ways markedly different from earlier editions. The term "internal control," having first been introduced i n the sixth edition (1940) as an extension of the already established term
6

"internal check," is now presented as the broader term. Internal accounting control and internal check are considered as components of internal control. A s an
auditing text, the interest i n internal control continued to be its adequacy for
reliance on by independent auditors. Internal administrative controls are considered to be beyond the responsibility of the independent auditor i n an examination leading to an opinion on the financial statements.
T h e impact of the work of the internal auditor on the quality of the accounting data is recognized: " I n weighing the effectiveness of internal control,
he (the independent auditor) w i l l give due consideration to the w o r k of internal
auditors. H e w i l l , of course, investigate procedures of the internal auditing group,
just as he investigates other features of its control." 8 However, the principal
thrust of the discussion on internal control was the concern of the independent
auditor for all three areas of internal control and the similarities and differences
i n the roles and approaches of internal and independent auditors.
T h e chapter on internal control i n the 9th Edition of Montgomery's
Auditing
(1975) is 25 pages long. T h e fact that the concept of internal control has changed
is acknowledged. According to this edition, however, internal control still consists
of internal administrative or operational control, internal accounting control and
internal check.
In this edition, internal control is presented i n a logical structure. Systemization, competence and integrity, and documentation are named as the three conditions of control. T h e forms i n which basic control operations appear are stated
as outlined below:
Forms of Validation
Authorization
Comparison
Validity checking
Forms of Completeness Checks
Numerical sequencing
Control totals
H o l d i n g files
Reminder files
Forms of Reperformance
Double-checking
Pre-audit
Disciplinary controls are listed as segregation of duties, restricted access, supervisory controls, and internal audit (optional).
In this edition, as i n the other editions, the concern is for determining the
extent and nature of the audit by independent auditors. It is suggested that
effective internal control may transform auditing from tests of underlying data to
tests of controls.
T h e term "internal operational control" is introduced as synonymous w i t h the
term "internal administrative control." It is very likely that it w i l l become the
more widely used term. Whereas, i n the 8th edition, the authors are explicit i n
stating that internal administrative control is not the responsibility of the independent auditor, they question the wisdom of this position i n the 9th edition.
7

In support of their opinion that someday the independent auditor w i l l be expected
to evaluate operational controls, they state:
There are many instances i n which operational controls affect the reliability
of accounting data i n direct and indirect ways; . . . Since operational controls can have a profound effect on financial position and results of operations and can, on occasion, substitute for accounting controls, they are an
appropriate subject of interest to an auditor. . . . If he does understand
operational controls, however, he w i l l be able to plan a more efficient and
effective engagement by relying on the controls, where appropriate, and by
recognizing the potential for problems if controls are weak. 9
Internal audit, as a part of internal control, is deemphasized i n this edition.
One paragraph is devoted to internal audit as a disciplinary control. However, a
more lengthy discussion is provided i n a chapter entitled " W o r k i n g with a Client."
Development of the Internal Audit Function
T h e internal auditing function, which had its beginning as an internal check
procedure used to avoid the necessity of a detailed audit by external auditors, has
exploded. Once defined as "the verification of detailed records and the safeguarding of assets," it is now defined thus:
Internal auditing is an independent appraisal activity within an organization for the review of operations as a service to management. It is a
managerial control which functions by measuring and evaluating the
effectiveness of other controls. 1 0
T h i s growth has been described by Brink, Cashin and W i t t :
T h e first internal auditing assignments usually originated to satisfy very
basic and sharply defined operational needs. T h e earliest special concern of
management was whether the assets of the organization were being protected, whether company procedures and policies were being complied w i t h ,
and whether the financial records were reliable. . . . Over a period of time,
however, this situation has changed a great deal. T h e operations of the
various organizations were increasing steadily i n volume and complexity.
T h e managerial problems thus created have resulted i n new pressures on
higher level management. . . . A t the same time, the internal auditors
themselves were perceiving the existing opportunities and were more and
more initiating new types of service. Thus, internal auditors took on a
broader and more management-oriented character. Because the earlier
internal auditing was very much accounting oriented, this upward trend
was felt first i n the accounting and financial control areas. Subsequently,
however, it was extended to the non-financial areas. 1 1
T h e establishment of the Institute of Internal Auditors (1941) and the publication of Internal Auditing by Victor Z . B r i n k (1941) must be viewed as
significant events i n the growth of internal auditing as a unique function practiced
by a large group with its o w n professional organization, code of ethics and other
pronouncements, and professional certification. Once viewed only as a part of the
internal control system, but now constituting a system within itself, internal
auditing promises to become "the tail that wags the dog."
8
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Auditing:

An

Discussant's Response to
An Auditing Perspective of the
Historical Development of Internal Control
Rodney J. Anderson
Clarkson, Gordon & C o .
By way of explanation relative to my remarks as discussant, please consider
that it was only yesterday that this paper reached my hands.
The paper may be said to consist of three elements:
1. A n overview of the historical development of auditing and internal
control,
2. T h e development of N o r t h American thinking on internal control
during the 20th century, and
3. Present thinking on internal control and internal auditing.
I w i l l organize my comments with respect to each of these three elements
and finally use the third as a jumping off point for a few other related thoughts
about control.
Overview of Historical Development
The first eight pages, indeed half the paper, deal with an overview of the
historical development of auditing and control. I found this interesting and
readable. I think it gives a good summary of the early beginnings. Perhaps it
could have gone a little more into the big jump from Charlemagne to the
Industrial Revolution—a period where, I think, the roots of many of our present
practices may be found. I w i l l refer again to this presently. T h e authors state
that control was the natural product of the profit motive. In the general sense of
human acquisitiveness ("Let's protect what we've got."—and what we're getting),
I agree. But i n the narrower sense, profit motive suggests commercial transactions.
In contrast, it was more commonly the wealth and the taxing power of the ruler
or government which was being protected i n those precursory days. A s an oversimplification, we might say that control i n auditing began w i t h public funds
(if one may use that euphemism for the ruler's hoard). A n d perhaps if the government take of the G N P continues at its present rate, we w i l l soon come full
circle. A n d future historians may look wistfully back at the 19th and 20th centuries as the age of private enterprise. However, that's not the subject for this
conference.
In any case, whether the very beginnings were private-commercial or rulerpublic is always a little difficult to tell from the literature. Certainly the examples
of Egypt, Persia and Rome are all public funds examples. O n the other hand, it
10

may simpy be that such archeological records survive more easily. T h e references
to Sumerian transactions i n 3600 B . C . may indeed be commercial. Similarly, I
located an interested excerpt from one of the provisions of Hammurabi's code
from Babylon of 2200 B . C . Article 105 read: " I f an agent has forgotten and
has not taken a sealed memorandum of the money he has given to the merchant,
money that is not sealed for, he shall not put i n his accounts." T h i s w o u l d certainly seem to be commercial and would suggest the keeping of commercial
accounts and rudimentary elements of internal control.
A n d yet, one can find conflicting quotations. D r . Budge of the British
Museum was quoted as saying i n 1905: "There is no reason for thinking that
they (the Babylonians and the Syrians) managed their money affairs as we do.
There are many contract tablets k n o w n , and hundreds of records of commercial
transactions, but I know of none which could be considered as accounts i n the
modern sense of the w o r d . "
Be commerce as it may, the control and audit of government funds was surely
the predominant influence on early developments.
Mention is made of the division of duties among the Pharaoh's scribes—and
certainly division of duties is still an important element of internal control. Likewise, mention is made of the Persian surprise audits. Similarly, one might add,
the Greeks had a group of checking-clerks to check public officials' accounts.
T h e paper goes on to refer to the quaestors and the division of duties over the
Roman funds—and the source of the word audit as a hearing. Indeed, the division
of duties there saw legislative control over public revenues and expenses vested i n
the Senate, the power to order payments vested i n the censors, the farming of
tax collection rights to publicans by the censors i n the presence of the quaestors,
and the actual handling of receipts and payments by the quaestors. Certainly
this was an elaborate system of control.
The account then touches on the H o l y Roman Empire and Charlemagne—
and again this involves control and audit of government funds.
T h e n comes the gap—a jump to 1850 and the Industrial Revolution. But it is
during this gap that we see the main switch from control and audit of government alone, to control and audit of commerce—at least more as we k n o w it today.
T h e authors merely refer to the period of 1500 to 1850 as a birth of double
entry. I think this might have been explored further since double entry has
surely become one of the most important, though rudimentary, elements of i n ternal control. T h e first evidence of double entry seems to be i n Genoa i n 1340
and involved the stewards to the local authority (again government). F r o m
there it moved to Venice and became k n o w n as "method of Venice." Later it
moved to Florence. W h y this growth? O f course, it was due to the Italian maritime expansion. W e all remember that it was during this period that the Italian
merchant fleets spread all over the world—indeed, providing the source of the
name " A m e r i c a . " Ships coming from the East and from the N e w W o r l d were
financed principally as joint ventures, and pre-eminent among these were the
Venetian fleets. A n d so, i n 1494 i n Venice we have the first treatise on bookkeeping.
T h e treatise was by a mathematician, L u c a Paciolo (the spelling of his name
varies), whose book Summa de Arithmetica, Geometria, Proportioni et Proportionaiita included a section of 36 chapters on bookkeeping entitled " D e Computis
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et Scripturis" ( O f Reckonings and W r i t i n g s ) . Paciolo recommended the method
of Venice. Three different accounting books were suggested. The first was a
"memorial" i n which one converted all the transactions to a consistent coinage
(showing that foreign exchange translation problems d i d not originate with the
F A S B ) . The. second was a journal to enter the converted amounts. The third
was a ledger for posting. Other writers added to the literature on accounting
and control i n Venice i n the following years.
Reference to England might have been mentioned before arriving at 1850—if
only because it leads to the birth of our modern profession. Some authorities
maintain that the English royal revenue was audited from the reign of W i l l i a m
the Conquerer. But generally the establishment of the English Exchequer is
assigned to the reign of Henry I ( i n 1100). Three independent records were
maintained and were checked to each other at the end of the year. Originally
they were audited by justices or barons (or their clerks) and later by official
auditors. In England during the feudal ages auditors w o u l d travel on circuit to
the manors and estates to check the accounting for disbursements and revenues.
Indeed, there was a tradition that the best ale i n the house was opened on such
occasions. Whether or not this contributed to clean opinions is no longer k n o w n ,
but the beverages were referred to as "audit ale."
Some writers have argued that the stable financial controls i n Elizabethan
England can be attributed, i n part, to auditors appointed by the C r o w n .
A n d that leads us to the 17th and 18th centuries and the growth of common
law corporations i n place of one-time joint ventures. Some of the bad speculative
practices of this period led to the South Sea Bubble i n 1720. D u r i n g this period,
therefore, the practice of accountancy developed further i n order to accommodate
the investigation of bankruptcies and other disasters.
Finally, we arrive at 1850—or perhaps more specifically 1844 with the passage
of the English Joint Stock Companies A c t . T h i s A c t provided for the appointment of auditors, though they were not independent. It generally ignored internal
control, despite the earlier urgings of Paciolo, and during this period auditing was
basically done on a 100% basis and was largely fraud-oriented.
By the early 1900's, the paper points out, auditors were still doing 100%
checking for clerical accuracy plus some examination of internal documentary
evidence. Testing was not used and little, if any, external evidence was examined.
Comparative Development of Thought on Internal Control in
England and North America in the 20th Century
T h e authors refer to the growth of the control concept from 1905 to 1933.
I think it might be interesting to compare the trends i n the United States, E n g land, and Canada during his period. D u r i n g the early 1900's, the statutory audits
i n Canada and the U . K . led to 100% checking. However, by 1930, the concept
of testing had begun, though little attention was being paid to internal control.
A slight amount of external evidence was being examined.
Meanwhile, i n the United States, audits were being performed not for statutory
purposes but for credit-granting purposes. This led to the idea of the balance
sheet audit as opposed to the clerical checking of Canada and the U . K . Subsequently, the idea of the balance sheet audit spread to Canada. A t the same time
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there was a move toward fairness of presentation. I n 1913 and 1917 we have the
advent of income taxes i n the United States and Canada with the result of
further emphasis being given to earnings. T h e n came the stock market crash of
1929 and following that more emphasis being placed on presentation, earnings,
and the income statement as opposed to the balance sheet. I n the 1930's with the
formation of the S E C , the United States became, for those of us i n Canada, the
dominant influence replacing the U . K .
In 1934 we have the beginning of the examination of external evidence i n any
quantity. I n 1939, the McKesson & Robbins case provided further impetus to
these developments (I thought the quote i n the paper on control was interesting
here as we usually think of this case as just being related to inventory observation).
T h e n i n 1941 generally accepted auditing standards were called for by the S E C
and i n 1948 promulgated by the A I C P A . I'm afraid i n Canada, we d i d not arrive
at a statement of generally accepted auditing standards until the 1960's at the
provincial level and not until 1975 at the Canadian Institute level.
I think it's interesting to note that with the gradual addition of external evidence to Canadian auditing practice (following English precedents) and w i t h the
gradual addition of checking of transactions to U . S . auditing ( i n order to justify
reliance on control) the two audit streams i n N o r t h America moved together.
Meanwhile, the U . K . also shifted from fraud detection to assurance of fair
presentation w i t h due reliance being placed on control. A l l these trends are
difficult to assess i n retrospect, as what historical writers now say and what
actually took place may often be two different things.
I thought it was an interesting idea to follow the changing views i n the
successive editions of Montgomery's Auditing.
I don't have any particular comment on this part. A lot of the material involves questions of semantics. Finally,
w i t h the 9th edition of Montgomery's Auditing i n 1975 we are up to "where
we are n o w . "
Present Thinking on Internal Control and Internal Auditing
T h e 9th Edition of Montgomery's Auditing presents a more elaborate analysis
of the components of internal control and I think this is useful. It has become
now not just an excuse for reducing tests but something that auditors have
decided they really must study i n a systematic manner. W i t h the A I C P A
Statement on A u d i t i n g Procedures N o . 54, we have the introduction of the concept of compliance tests and with that another dimension was added. I might
use these ideas as a jumping off point to discuss a few comments on internal
control classification.
Internal Control Classification
Several different methods of classifying controls exist, some of which are suggested i n the quotation from Montgomery's
Auditing.
A m o n g the possible
methods are:
1. By attest or non-attest significance.
2. By objective of the controls.
3. By accounting controls versus administrative controls.
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4. By preventive controls versus detective controls.
5. According to the general nature of the control technique.
W i t h respect to the attest versus non-attest significance, I think it is important
to emphasize that internal control is primarily a management tool and only secondarily of audit use. It follows, therefore, that some controls w i l l be important
for management but have no influence on the auditor's work and some controls
w i l l be as good as it is practical for management to make them but still not
sufficient to permit significant reliance by the auditor.
W i t h respect to classification of controls by objective one could talk about
safeguarding of assets, reliability of accounting records, the timely preparation
of reliable financial information, profitability and minimization of unnecessary
costs, the avoidance of unintentional exposure to risk, the prevention of detection
of errors and irregularities, the assurance that delegated responsibilities are being
properly discharged, and the discharge of statutory responsibilities by the management group. O f course, some of these objectives overlap. In any case, this matter
of classification is not particularly helpful i n analyzing control techniques since
the same technique can often serve several different objectives. F o r example,
perpetual inventory records independent of the storekeeper may help to (a) safeguard inventory, (b) ensure accurate inventory records, (c) detect inventory
shortages, and (d) prevent irregularities.
T h e split of accounting controls and administrative controls has been i n
professional literature for some time. Originally, accounting controls were said
to be related to safeguarding assets and influencing the reliability of financial
reporting while administrative controls were concerned w i t h promoting operational efficiency and adherence to prescribed management policies. However,
some administrative controls affect the reliability of financial reporting as well.
I confess I do not find it a very useful distinction. I rather think that the auditor
must look at any type of internal control which could have a bearing on his
expression of opinion on the financial statements.
T h e distinction between preventive controls and protective controls can be a
useful one. T h e idea was incorporated i n a recent Canadian Institute publication
"Computer Control Guidelines" though no doubt it has been discussed many
other places as well. Preventive controls prevent errors or reduce the chance of
error occurrence. Detective controls detect errors or increase the chance of their
detection. O f course, usually one must have both types of controls. Preventive
controls are perhaps what the 9th Edition of Montgomery's Auditing refers to as
disciplinary controls. One distinction between the two types of controls is their
auditability. T h e auditor can observe preventive controls relatively easily, though
it may be hard to evaluate their effectiveness. T h e operation of detective controls,
on the other hand, is very difficult to prove. That they are operating when an
error is caught is clear. But whether they were really operating i n between the
catching of successive errors is less clear. One can only assume that if another
error had occurred it would have been caught but one cannot really prove that
the detective control was functioning i n those cases.
Perhaps the most useful method of analyzing internal controls from the
auditor's point of view is by the general nature of the control technique. There
are many different ways i n which such an analysis can be made. One way would
be as follows.
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Organization
controls may be said to deal with honesty and competence
(hiring, supervision, training), segregation of functions (custodial versus reporting versus operating functions) and the overall plan of organization together
with the accounting/financial organizational plan. Systems development controls
deal with the development, approval and revision of systems—and must be considerably more formal i n the case of computer systems. Authorization and reporting controls deal with authorization, comparison, validity checking, budgets,
responsibility reporting, etc. Accounting systems controls deal w i t h initial recording (document design), general ledger and account organization and balancing routines. Additional safeguarding controls cover things such as restrictive
access, protection of records, periodic count and comparison, insurance, etc.
Management supervisory controls deal with the personal supervision by management, the monitoring of controls and the detecting of errors, and the internal
audit program. A n d finally, documentation controls cover manuals of policies
and procedures and, i n the case of computer systems, more elaborate documentation of systems and programs.
The Wagging Tail
O f the foregoing seven different types of controls, one can see that internal
audit is but a part—though admittedly a very important part. I believe it is
logical to view internal auditing as a part of internal control. It is the delegation
of the management monitoring function to a separate internal audit group. I
don't think one should view this as a tail wagging the dog. Indeed, i n large
systems the monitoring system may grow almost as complex as the system it
monitors. But this is merely analogous to E D P housekeeping controls using up
almost as much space as the actual w o r k i n g program they are controlling.
Conclusion
In summary, I thought the paper gave an interesting overview of the historical
development. A s i n all overviews, it is something that could also be expanded—
and indeed, might be of considerable interest i n a more expanded form. T h e
principal areas where some expansion might be of interest would be, as I have
suggested, feudal England, Renaissance Italy, and the coming of Companies Acts
to England, together with a comparison of the subsequent developments i n the
United States, England, and Canada.
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Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon
W. Donald Georgen
Touche Ross & C o .
T h e independent accountant has—and always had—a responsibility to look
for management fraud and illegal acts. Less clear is the auditor's responsibility to
discover these activities if they have occurred. T h e professional literature is
ambiguous, and the recent Supreme Court ruling i n the Hochfelder case did little
to resolve the uncertainty. Speaking practically, however, the profession must face
up to the expectations of the public. T h e question is not whether we have any
responsibility i n these areas—the real questions today are, h o w far does that
responsibility go, and how should the independent accountant go about executing
that charge.
W h i l e not new, this responsibility is being given considerable attention by
practitioners, academicians, and regulatory agencies, as well as the courts, because
of the sensational disclosures recently regarding implied improprieties (most of
which have not been proved conclusively), management fraud, and illegal payments. T h e public is concerned and dismayed, not only that such events could
have happened, but also that they were not detected and reported on a timely
basis. Ultimately, that concern focuses on the independent accountant. In the
public view, the independent accountant has the best opportunity (and therefore
the responsibility) to determine that proper controls are operative to prevent such
events, or where those controls fail, to timely detect and report the events. T h e
public must acknowledge that independent accountants w i l l never be able to
guarantee that all instances of management fraud and other illegal acts have been
detected—but on the other hand, it is my opinion that our detection " h i t rate"
must be substantially improved.
Attributes of Management Fraud and Other Illegal Acts
Before we attempt any analysis of the auditor's responsibility, we have to
examine the attributes of management fraud (and analogously, illegal acts). Also,
we must look at the traditional audit approach to see how it might be changed.
Fraud, very simply, is a deceptive practice—one where the perpetrator hopes
to avoid detection. ( A r m e d robbery is not a fraud, because the overt act is
obvious.) Frauds in the business environment fall into two broad categories—
those occurring at the employee level and those occurring at the management
level.
Employee frauds generally have two basic characteristics:
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— T h e object of the fraud is to convert cash or merchandise to the individual's benefit.
—The activities of the employees are or should be covered by an effective
system of internal control. Although an effective system w i l l not prevent
all acts of employee fraud, it should provide for early detection and
preclude frequent repetition.
The characteristics of management fraud are significantly different:
—Generally, fraud at the management level does not involve direct theft of
cash or merchandise; instead, it often involves "performance" fraud—the
deceptive practices result i n high reported earnings or they forestall the
recognition of a decline.
—Indirect benefits accrue to management from the fraud—salary, bonus,
profit sharing, a n d / o r value of stock options may be improved or preserved, and the likelihood of continued employment is increased.
—The fraud is likely to operate outside of established business systems and
related internal controls—in other words, the bosses are not subject to
the system.
—The nature of the deceptive act is not always apparent, for it may be
difficult to determine whether deception or error i n judgment is involved.
I would particularly like to emphasize the last two points. Management most
often has the ability to operate outside the system, simply because it is generally
the top point of control i n the system. A n d the independent accountant is often
unable to distinguish deception from an "honest mistake"—at least until subsequent discernments provide a clue to management's motives. These two points
underscore our dilemma. T h e traditional auditing approach is not really effective
against management fraud. Also, the traditional audit approach, which is independent and neutral, does not focus on the judgments necessary to evaluate the
qualitative aspects of management activity.
The Audit Approach
Given the characteristics of management fraud, let us take a critical look at
the usual audit approach. Traditionally, generally accepted auditing standards
have allowed the independent accountant to assume that management's behavior
w i l l conform to a predictable, set pattern. In other words, although he should be
alert to fraud opportunities, the auditor's primary objective is the gathering of
sufficient evidential material to form a series of judgments leading to the expression of a professional opinion on the financial statements—not the detection of
fraud. T h e auditor's conventions tell h i m to gather "enough" of the "right k i n d "
of audit evidence. Although there are conventions which give guidance to the
determination of "enough" and "right k i n d , " the auditor's judgment i n the
particular situation is the principal determinant of audit scope.
Does this suggest that the auditor's scope or approach has to be changed to
improve the fraud detection rate? T h e answer is probably yes. Does it suggest
that all audits should be performed i n the fraud mode—where you turn over
every stone and peel every grape? T h e answer is categorically N O ! T h e cost to
society would be prohibitive, given the relative number of actual frauds perpe17

trated. A n d more importantly, given a dishonest management, the independent
accountant would never be able to do enough work to satisfy himself—or anyone
else—that all acts of fraud were detected. W e simply cannot assume the total
responsibility for fraud detection, if we are to be honest w i t h ourselves and
society. However, i n the same breath I have to admit that we have to be concerned w i t h the consequences of the relatively few frauds. A n d even though we
can't catch them all, I a m convinced that we can catch substantially more than
we have i n the past.
Coping with Fraud
In my judgment, it's a matter of w o r k i n g "smarter" rather than "harder." W e
say that the auditor's responsibility i n the attest environment is to make an
"informed judgment"—and I think the way to improve detection of fraud lies
in that phrase. Further, I don't believe exponentially exploding the number of
transactions tested and accountabilities verified necessarily results i n a more
"informed judgment." Although the scope of the evidence gathering is always
important, the quality of the information gathered, how it is obtained, how it is
correlated, and the overall evaluation process are equally important i n arriving
at an "informed judgment."
O u r firm has spent considerable time and effort i n developing an approach
which we believe w i l l make us more effective i n the detection of management
fraud. T h e procedures are not new, but the emphasis is. T h e program has
basically three features; and they are all related:
—an effective client investigation program before we commence a new
engagement and a similar periodic update on continuing engagements;
—an in-depth understanding of the client's business—the economic conditions, the inherent control problems, the peculiarities of the industry; and
—concentration on material transactions—to determine their true nature
and their arm's-lengthness, and to determine the proper accounting and
the required disclosures.
Client Investigation
The client investigation feature of this approach puts emphasis on determining
the reputation of the company and, i n particular, its management. T h e questions
asked and the information gathered are intended to answer the question—is this
a company and are these people w i t h w h o m we want to professionally associate?
Is there any reason we should not associate?
Some w i l l argue that this "exclusiveness" is socially irresponsible. Some w i l l
argue that a l l public companies are entitled to the services of an independent
accountant. However, society has decreed that an independent accountant's
investigative tools are to be limited—there is no subpoena power and no right to
take testimony under oath. Instead, society has inculcated that there be a professional relationship between independent accountant and client. W i t h i n that
structure, I believe the independent accountant is entitled to accept professional
associations with care—indeed, I believe care is essential.
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Understanding the Client's Business
Understanding the business is part of the client investigation routine which
carries over into the establishment of scope or depth of the audit. Here we
concentrate o n :
— w h o is management, or who can make the business decision (Appendix
A);
— i n what roles does the management group operate (Appendix B ) ;
—what economic factors are present i n this industry—in this company—
which w o u l d be conducive to encouraging or enhancing the fraud opportunity (Appendix C ) ;
—what is the business structure, and would it facilitate or prevent the
management fraud act (Appendix D ) .
W h e n we have gathered, correlated and evaluated this information we then
identify the areas of risk and set the scope of our audit procedures relative to the
degree of risk. The evaluation is a professional judgment—but a professional
judgment based on the relevant facts. Occasionally, based on our evaluation, we
w i l l say that the business factors individually or collectively present a risk situation
which we cannot audit. In these circumstances we should—and have—withdrawn from the engagement.
Material Transactions
T h e third feature of our approach is a concentration on material transactions.
A g a i n , this part of our approach carries over from the client investigation and
our efforts to understand the client's business. W e do not pick a random selection of transactions and accountabilities and look for management fraud. Rather,
we first identify all material transactions and accountabilities and then analyze
those transactions i n depth, for management involvement and its consequences.
In the absence of direction from the profession, the regulatory agencies, or the
courts we have established the following standards of "materiality" for this
process:
—balance sheet items—measured at 5 percent of total assets
—shareholders' equity items—5 percent of total shareholders' equity
—income statement:
—sales or purchase items—10 percent of total sales or purchases
—operating income or expense items—5 percent of income before extraordinary or unusual items
—nonoperating items—5 percent of pre-tax income
W h e n we have identified a material transaction i n which management or a
related party is involved, we audit to evaluate the transaction and the nature of
the management involvement. W e study the transaction so that we can ask for
and obtain the relevant documentation—we want documentation, not conversation. W e then go one step further and request independent confirmation of the
details behind the transaction. T h i s is an important distinction from the traditional approach. W e go beyond the normal confirmation of transaction timing,
amounts involved, balances due or owing, and terms. W e specifically ask for
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confirmation of all of the facts—previous, continuing, and prospective—which
are conditions of the transaction. T h i s procedure is intended to determine if there
might be additional documentation or even unwritten understandings which override the available records.
A Professional Overview
O u r approach, although now i n effect for 18 months, as a "state of the art" is
still i n the development stage. Other firms are experimenting with their programs
under the general guidance of S A S 6 of the A I C P A on "Related Party Transactions." T h e usefulness of this approach to fraud detection w i l l evolve as we
all gain more experience. I seriously doubt if any "brand n e w " audit procedures
w i l l come out of these efforts, but the auditor's attention w i l l be directed more
explicitly. A management fraud approach must put emphasis on informed judgment, insist on substantive rather than mechanical analysis, encourage probing of
material transactions for a better understanding of the facts, and i n general
promote a "healthy skepticism."
In the late '60s and the early '70s a number of famous management frauds
surfaced. More recently, another, more wide-spread form of illegal activity has
come to the fore. The press has been full of stories of illegal political payments,
slush funds and apparent bribes. A g a i n , the public is asking, where was the
independent accountant?
Illegal Payments
As I indicated earlier, it is my judgment that this illegal payment problem is
analogous to the larger management fraud problem, insofar as it challenges the
role of the independent accountant. T h i s is true because illegal acts are often
the product of management's direct involvement or indirect forebearance because
of industry practices, economic conditions, or systems and control weaknesses.
But let's put these problems i n their proper perspective. T h e public arousal
over illegal payments and the cries for disclosure and "cease and desist" are i n my
judgment a product of the Watergate environment. Illegal payments are not a
new phenomenon on the business scene, as evidenced by present disclosures. Many
of the news stories report questionable payments, covering an extended prior
period. W h y was there not earlier concern over these practices—by the public,
the regulatory agencies and independent accountants? W h i l e many w i l l profess
ignorance—and I suspect most people were not aware of the widespread nature
of the practice and the huge sums involved—I believe that, as a result of the
concept that these payments are "accepted business practice," the problem was
generally ignored.
Without going into the developing morality or flailing ourselves for past
omissions, I am w i l l i n g to say that I believe it is our responsibility, as independent
accountants, to be satisfied that our clients' audited financial statements taken as
a whole contain adequate disclosure, and provisions for the financial effects (where
applicable) of illegal payments. In the absence of direction or standards from the
profession and the regulatory agencies, however, the specific ground rules for
accomplishing this responsibility are very unclear.
Rather than philosophize as to the ultimate direction the profession w i l l
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take, I would like to share with you the policies and practices that we have
adopted, i n our firm, to deal with the subject of illegal payments.
W e have decided that we cannot define illegal payments per se. W e say this
determination is ultimately a judicial question and an opinion—as to legality or
illegality—can only be given by competent legal counsel. W e then treat the subject
based on defined illegal payments and "possibly" illegal payments. A s i n our
approach to management fraud, we have identified possible situations where
illegal payments may be expected. T h e purpose of this initial analysis is to direct
the audit emphasis. F o r example, the independent accountant should be alert for
the possibility of illegal payments when the client sells i n countries where those
business practices are expected, or where there are substantial cash transactions, or
where there are significant "soft expenses." W e have also developed standards of
materiality i n determining the scope of our examination for such payments.
Where we have knowledge that an illegal or possibly illegal payment has
occurred, we require:
—that the matter be discussed with the client's board of directors;
—that an opinion be requested from the client's legal counsel as to the
legality/illegality of the payment, the requirements for disclosure under
the securities acts, and the form and content of that disclosure;
—consultation w i t h our national technical staff; and
—finally, an objective evaluation of all the information and the legal opinions to determine the propriety of financial presentation and disclosure,
and the impact, if any, on our auditor's report.
Although we are once again i n a "state of the art" situation without specific
direction from the profession, regulatory agencies or the courts, we believe our
program is focused on the essentials of the problem—detection and disclosure.
Some Concluding Observations
In talking with you about management fraud and illegal payments, I have
tried to avoid any suggestion that we were talking about specific procedures or
standard steps. A n d I particularly want to emphasize that we are talking about an
integrated whole. O r said a different way, we think this approach is simply a
re-emphasis of the business approach to auditing—defining the "business approach" i n the broadest possible terms.
A s a result of thinking through the approach to management fraud and illegal
payments, we have given more thought to our overall audit objective. It is
apparent that a successful audit depends on more than program details. It is
apparent that a proper attitude or philosophical audit approach is necessary. F o r
the last several years, we have summarized these "truths" i n a year-end audit
reminder to our professionals, and I would like to share them w i t h y o u :
• O u r assignment is to independently challenge and evaluate, not to rationalize.
• W h e n we say we want to emphasize the "business approach" to auditing,
we mean do the reported facts make business sense—not can we support
what management has concluded.
• O n each engagement, we have to ask the question—-are the statements
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auditable? W e have to make a rational judgment; the conclusion is not
a given assumption.
• Emphasis has to be placed on a basic evaluation of evidentiary material—
not a mechanical analysis of reported transactions and accountabilities.
• A u d i t evidence must be based on factual documentation, not conversation.
• Accounting and reporting matters are governed by generally accepted
accounting principles. In many areas G A A P parameters are fairly broad.
In the application of accounting principles we have the responsibility to
determine the appropriateness of the principles i n the circumstances.
• T h e responsibility to perform an effective audit of the facts is just as
important as the proper resolution of accounting and reporting issues.
W e have to guard against a preoccupation with the solution of accounting and reporting issues to the exclusion of the audit of the underlying
facts.
• W e need the appropriate level of audit management involved on all
audits. A significant part of the audit process is evaluative and judgmental. The skills necessary to execute these qualitative factors are
developed largely through experience. W e cannot delegate experience.
W e cannot delegate these judgments i n the critical areas of the engagement.
• T h e development of audit skills requires a basic methodology; a disciplined approach and experience. T h e methodology can be taught and
experience is a product of time and variety of engagement assignments.
Development of a disciplined approach is dependent on the environment
i n the office i n which the professional works and the perceived attitudes
and work habits of those for w h o m he works. T h e development of a
proper disciplined approach from the bottom up can happen only if we
have a properly disciplined approach at the top—in the management
group.
In my opinion, the problem of illegal payments w i l l largely disappear i n a
relatively short time. T h e public outcry, the pain and embarrassment of public
disclosure and censure, tighter corporate policies and controls, closer scrutiny by
boards of directors and others, and specific Federal regulations w i l l effectively
limit these practices.
Management fraud, on the other hand, is with us and is not going to go
away, i n the absense of any moral uplifting. T h e pressure for earnings growth
has been a catalyst for management fraud i n a stable or accelerating economy;
the pressure for survival i n uncertain economic times may be an even greater
stimulant. W e can say that other disciplines—the board of directors, the audit
committee, the public and the regulatory agencies—have a responsibility to force
management integrity. But we cannot deny our o w n responsibility. W e can say
that we can't catch them all—and this is true—but we have to catch more of
them. Some w i l l say that m a k i n g an independent accountant look for fraud is an
unreasonable burden; I would suggest to you that a properly balanced responsibility offers us an opportunity to attain top professional status.
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Appendix A
W h o is management?
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Officers
Directors
Associates
Affiliates
Trustees
Partners
Co-venturers
Principal Stockholders
Others

Appendix B
•
•
•
•
•
•

Management Involvement Role
Buyer
• Debtor
Seller
• Creditor
Guarantor
• Nominee
Lessee
• Franchisee
Lessor
• Franchisor
Forebearer
• Licensee
• Licensor
N o t intended to be all-inclusive

Appendix C
Some Conducive Economic Factors
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Insufficient w o r k i n g capital or credit
Urgent desire for good earnings to support stock price
Developing industry—massive demand for new capital
Dependence on a very few products, customers or transactions
Debt restrictions binding
A declining industry with many business failures
Company with excess capacity
Many lawsuits, especially from shareholders
Rapid expansion or numerous acquisitions, especially i n diversification
Collection difficulties from key customers, for instance, R E I T s
Inventories requiring non-auditor expertise
Long-term manufacturing cycle
Unrealistic sales projections
Obsolescence danger—high technology industry

Appendix D
Examples of Conducive Business Structure
• Dispersal of locations, documents, evidence
• Diversified company and accounting systems
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Management dominated by one or few
Divided audit responsibility
Inadequate internal audit function
Extreme mobility i n key financial positions
Mobility or lack of outside legal counsel
Constant crisis mode i n accounting function
Numerous substantive adjusting entries i n audit closing
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Discussant's Response to
Management Behavior—An Auditing Horizon
Robert L. Grinaker
University of Houston
Although I am pleased to comment on Donald Georgen's paper, I also have
something of a problem because, to a large extent, I agree w i t h most of the things
he has to say. It's a little difficult to discuss a paper that I wish I had written
myself. Hence, I would like my remarks to be considered complementary to,
rather than critical of, those presented i n the paper. M y discussion w i l l be directed
to the following specific topics:
A . Under the broad area of auditor's responsibility, I shall make a few
comments on management fraud and illegal payments.
B. I shall address the following three additional topics:
1. Evaluation of traditional auditing procedures.
2. Understanding the client's business.
3. Scientific research design—a prototype for auditing procedures.
Auditor's Responsibility for Management Fraud
Let me first comment that D o n Georgen makes a very useful distinction between employee and management fraud. Furthermore, I agree w i t h h i m that
most instances of management fraud are "performance" based rather than involved
i n the direct theft of assets. However, certain classical cases—notably McKessonRobbins—did involve massive thefts of company assets.
I further agree that the profession is becoming increasingly aware that it has
significant responsibility for the discovery of management fraud. I also am convinced that this awareness stems principally from public expectations which are
reflected i n actions of regulatory agencies and the courts. T h e processes appear to
be by-passing the auditor, thus posing some significant dangers. T o me, the
danger is that the auditor's responsibility for fraud losses may be completely disassociated from financial statements and their fair presentation. In my judgment,
the only perspective that makes sense i n defining the auditor's responsibility for
fraud is its relationship to the fair presentation of the financial statements. In this
regard, our professional literature, characterized i n the paper as ambiguous, has
been something less than helpful. Consider the following from A u d S E C ' s
Statement on A u d i t i n g Standards N o . 1:
In m a k i n g the ordinary examination, the independent auditor is aware of
the possibility that fraud may exist. Financial statements may be misstated
as the result of defalcations and similar irregularities, or deliberate misrepresentations by management, or both. The auditor recognizes that
25

fraud, if sufficiently material, may affect his opinion on the financial statements, and his examination, made i n accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, gives consideration to this possibility. (§ 110.05)
T h e foregoing seems to be a very clear statement right on issue. F r a u d is identified as a source of error and the auditor is aware of the fact that any material
error, including fraud, can have an impact on the fairness of the financial statements. If this be so, the auditor's opinion and his responsibility are affected. If
the statement stopped here, I would conclude that the auditor's responsibility for
fraud is no different than for any other source of misstatement. I could then
argue w i t h force that, although the auditor must conduct his examination w i t h
due professional care, he is not a guarantor. Hence, despite an examination conducted i n accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, material error
may nevertheless remain undetected. Whether the source of the misstatement is
fraud or honest error should be irrelevant.
Unfortunatly, A u d S E C ' s statement continues, and like negative assurance, the
meaning of an otherwise clear statement is considerably blunted. T h e next three
sentences read as follows:
However, the ordinary examination directed to the expression of an opinion
on financial statements is not primarily or specifically designed, and cannot
be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar irregularities,
although their discovery may result. Similarly, although the discovery of
deliberate misrepresentations by management is usually more closely associated with the objective of the ordinary examination, such examination
cannot be relied upon to assure its discovery. T h e responsibility of the
independent auditor for failure to detect fraud (which responsibility differs as to clients and other) arises only when such failure clearly results
from failure to comply w i t h generally accepted auditing standards.
W h a t are these latter sentences attempting to say? A r e they saying that the auditor
is not responsible for detecting immaterial fraud? O r , are they saying that the
auditor's responsibility for detecting error arising from fraud is different than for
other kinds of error? F o r example, is the responsibility different i n the case of an
honest error arising from the failure to account for obsolete inventory compared
to an error arising from management deceit? If so, the auditor's opinion should
be redrafted. O n the other hand, the statement may simply be pointing out that
the auditor is not infallible. Hence, errors of any k i n d may remain undetected
even though the auditor has conducted an examination i n accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 1
In any event, the statement as now drafted is ambiguous. Hence, any position
inferred from this statement may be totally right or totally wrong. A clearer
statement may not help, but I believe it would have a better chance than the
current one.
A s to whether the auditor should specifically search for fraud, or any other
source of error, I would assert that the audit mode should always be applicable to
the circumstances. I believe that this statement simply generalizes from D o n
Georgen's position that his firm would audit i n the fraud mode only i n warranted
circumstances—i.e., where the economic and other conditions may be conducive
toward fraudulent activities. Rightly so, extensive tests are made i n the fraud
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mode only i n those circumstances where fraud is likely. But surely the general
position also is right; i.e., extensive special tests of any k i n d should be warranted
by the circumstances. F o r example, if I am auditing a highly technical industry,
characterized by ever-changing product specifications, I w i l l certainly apply rather
special, and perhaps costly, tests for inventory obsolescence. Such tests w o u l d be
totally unwarranted i n other circumstances. I make this point not to be pedantic,
but to support the position that fraud should be classified together w i t h all other
possible source of financial statement error.
The Auditor's Responsibility for Illegal Payments
W i t h respect to the auditor's responsibility for illegal payments, I hesitate to
speak other than to confess my confusion. I am not greatly helped by recent
court decisions or by statements of S E C Chairman H i l l . I could, perhaps, understand the auditor's responsibility if it were related to either of the following
circumstances:
a) If failure to disclose such payments would cause financial statements to
be materially misstated, or
b) If the auditor had witnessed a crime and the failure to disclose were
viewed as a conspiracy to cover-up.
Thus, I find myself i n agreement with D o n Georgen that our responsibilities i n
this area remain unclear. In the meantime, I believe his firm's position is exactly
appropriate—i.e., audit i n the "illegal payment mode" i n those circumstances
where illegal payments are likely to have occurred.
Evaluation of Traditional Auditing Procedures
In any consideration of the auditor's responsibility for the discovery of fraud,
traditional auditing procedures warrant some attention. A number of traditional
auditing procedures are directed to fraud detection. F o r example, since 1940, as
the consequence of a classic case of massive management fraud, at least a portion
of almost every audit is conducted i n the fraud mode. In my judgment, a critical
review of traditional auditing procedures would prove fruitful i n suggesting
modifications which could materially enhance the probability of discovering management fraud. I would like to use confirmation procedures as a caged example.
In discussing auditing procedures, we often speak of independent confirmation, i n which we represent that testimony is communicated directly from an
independent third party to the auditor. T o assure such independence, we take
some pains with the processes involved. A s a personal indication of these concerns, I once received some pointed criticism as a young auditor from a partner
who observed my intention to m a i l out confirmation letters i n the client's envelopes. Never—before or since—have I heard such a lucid explanation of the
importance of assuring independence i n the confirmation process. N o w , i n the
Equity F u n d i n g case, we find revealed another significant "hole" i n the process
of independent confirmation. A l t h o u g h E q u i t y F u n d i n g was replete w i t h questionable auditing, the case also contains some significant lessons.
Y o u w i l l recall i n the case that the auditor attempted to confirm the existence
of securities i n the custody of a bank. However, he got burned by a very simple
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ploy, totally unrelated to such traditional controls as "using the right envelopes"
or "delivering of confirmation requests directly to the postal authorities." T h e
special A I C P A Committee investigating Equity F u n d i n g describes the ploy as
follows:
A t the end of 1972 the auditors' request for confirmation of certain securities represented as being held i n safekeeping by the bank was addressed by
company personnel to a mail drop set up under a name similar to the bank
so company personnel would receive the request, sign the confirmation and
return it to the auditors. 2
I wonder, are traditional auditing procedures adequate with respect to this matter?
T h e special committee concluded on the issue with the following statement:
W h i l e this points up the need for auditors to ascertain that valid addresses
are used, such a step is already a customary and integral part of confirmation procedures. 3
Frankly, I would like to see the empirical evidence which supports the foregoing
conclusion. M y own evidence, while admittedly limited and informally gathered,
indicates that tests of the validity of confirmation addresses generally is limited to
data contained i n the client's records. If so, I suggest that such tests are inadequate to assure independent confirmation.
In summary, based on my admittedly caged example, I suggest that traditional
auditing procedures be subjected to continuing critical review on two fronts:
first, we should test the logical connection between each link i n the evidential
chain, and second, we should study subsequently discovered misstatements not
revealed i n the auditing process. If auditing weaknesses are revealed, normal
audit procedures should be corrected.
Understanding the Client's Business
A so-called "through the business approach" has been discussed i n auditing
literature, and particularly by Touche, for a number of years. I am pleased to note
that the client investigation routine discussed by M r . Georgen places special emphasis on "understanding the client's business." I have come to believe that
thorough prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is absolutely essential to
effective auditing and, hence, to the discovery of material error—whether the
source is fraud or an honest mistake.
M y conviction on this point finds clear support i n philosophical literature
dealing w i t h the theory of knowledge. Marhenke states as follows, " Y o u cannot
devise an observation test until you k n o w the meaning of the sentence you are
going to test." 4 F o r example, w i t h respect to auditing, consider the following
sentence: " T h e inventory value on the balance sheet is fairly stated." T o test this
sentence, the auditor must know not only the general meaning of inventory and
inventory accounting, but also the special environment i n which this particular
inventory is contained. Many special problems such as identification, physical
condition, or obsolescence may be involved. If such special problems do exist,
they form part of the meaning of the sentence to be tested.
In discussing the nature of scientific inquiry, Susan Stebbing reinforces the
point w i t h the following statement:
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A n examination of the examples we have given shows that a considerable
amount of previous knowledge relevant to the situation is required before
a problem can even be stated. Still more knowledge is required i n order
that fruitful suggestions as to its solution should occur to the thinker. 5
One may rightfully question why I a m belaboring such an obvious point.
Consider the following statement by the S E C i n A S R N o . 173 issued i n July, 1975:
Another lesson appears . . . where the auditors accepted assertions by management concerning the special circumstances of the business involved
although presentation of the supposed results presented unusual accounting
and auditing problems. In considerable measure this occurred because the
auditors were not sufficiendy familiar w i t h the business context to assess
the representations of management. Auditors should be particularly careful
when the client asserts that special circumstances require unusual accounting or auditing solutions and should either possess or avail themselves of
sufficient industry knowledge to judge the substance of the situation.
In A S R N o . 174, under a caption entitled " H F K ' s Understanding of Stirling
Homex's Business" is the following statement:
H F K , i n the opinion of the Commission did not fully understand the
funding provisions applicable to Stirling Homex's operations under the
H U D turnkey program and d i d not seek such advice.
As was asserted by the S E C i n these two A S R ' s , failure to understand the client's
business accounted for the failure to obtain competent evidence from w h i c h appropriate inferences could be drawn. More fundamentally, the auditors i n these
cases could not devise the proper observation tests because either (1) they d i d not
k n o w the meaning of the sentences they were trying to test, or (2) they d i d not
know enough even to formulate appropriate propositions to be tested.
In my judgment, prerequisite knowledge of the client's business is so fundamental to inquiry that steps should be taken to assure that such knowledge pervades the entire audit team. M u c h prerequisite knowledge is provided to younger
staff members by recent university education and i n follow-on staff training programs. However, I wonder h o w many staff training programs are directed to
specific industries and specific clients. I assert that inclusion of such programs i n
the training budgets of accounting firms w o u l d be cost-beneficial. Although I
have no evidence i n support of my assertion, I believe the concept can and should
be empirically tested.
Scientific Research Design—A Prototype for Auditing Procedures
Georgen points out i n his paper that auditing procedures—particularly those
procedures directed to the discovery of management fraud—are i n the development state. A s a matter of fact, all human knowledge is tentative and, hence, is
subject to continuing mid-course corrections. Auditors w i l l continue to learn
both from past mistakes and from research. A s we learn more, auditing procedures
w i l l continue to become more effective i n the discovery of fraud and other error.
Experience, of course, is a great teacher. A s some sage so wisely stated, " F o o l
me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me." T h e SAS's are replete w i t h
auditing lessons learned from experience. However, the lessons of experience are
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often bitter pills to swallow. Hopefully, therefore, we w i l l come, more and more,
to rely on research for the development of auditing procedures. Research already
has proved fruitful i n the development of opinion modifications, understanding
the application of statistical inference to auditing, and understanding the impact
of the behavioral sciences on auditing.
Compared to most other disciplines which evolve through research, auditing
is unique i n that a significant portion of the discipline itself comprises a system
of inquiry. Thus, the principles of scientific research design stand as a readymade prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. In my judgment, a
significant positive step i n the development of auditing procedures would be
recognition of this relationship by an authoritative professional body—say,
AudSEC.
Every developing discipline has found that its problems begin to yield solutions when the methods of organized inquiry are applied. W e are just beginning
to tackle accounting and auditing problems i n this fashion. Despite the many
difficulties involved i n getting started, a number of problems are yielding solutions. In my judgment, one of the blessings of the current high demand for
accounting education is the concurrent demand for accounting doctorates—young
people specifically trained to be researchers. T h e important point for auditing as
a discipline is that research education implies the existence of a body of knowledge
specifically about the research process. Because auditors, like trained researchers,
are involved i n a system of inquiry, I assert that, if all auditors were specifically
trained i n the general methods of research design, auditing procedures and their
ability to detect fraud and error w o u l d be significantly improved. Although I
have no evidence to support my assertion, I am convinced that the concept can
and should be empirically tested.
In Summary
In summary I would suggest the following:
1. F r a u d (and perhaps illegal payments) should be viewed by the profession
as simply another possible source of financial statement error w i t h responsibility and consequences no different than for any other source of
error. Auditors w o u l d then be i n a better position to address with force
the questions of due professional care vs. professional infallibility.
2. So-called traditional auditing procedures should be subject to continuing
review for logical "holes." Such review should assure m a x i m u m effectiveness of normal auditing procedures to detect fraud and other errors.
3. Thorough understanding of the client's business is an essential prerequisite to effective auditing and, hence, to the detection of fraud and other
error. I further suggest that staff training be geared to developing the
means of obtaining such an understanding by every member of the
audit team.
4. Because auditing is a system of inquiry, scientific research design should
be adopted as a prototype for the investigative aspects of auditing. I
further suggest that all auditors be trained i n the fundamentals of
research design.

Footnotes
1. In May, 1976,

A u d S E C announced the issuance of an exposure draft entitled The
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Symbolism and Communication in the Auditor's Report
Lee J. Seidier
N e w Y o r k University
T h e 1975 annual report of A r t h u r Andersen & C o . indicated that 6.6% of the
firm's total revenue was received from five clients. 1 Simple arithmetic applied to
the total revenue figure leads to the conclusion that A r t h u r Andersen had five
clients whose annual fees average about $5.1 million each. U s i n g other averages
given, the audit fee portion of the total was about $3.4 million for each client.
Additional analysis of the data provided i n the report suggests that $3.4 million
of auditing fees would represent about 95 man years or 128,000 hours of work.
Obviously, the precision of these manpower estimates is subject to some doubt,
but even with a wide range of possible inaccuracy it is obvious that $3.4 million
worth of auditing represents a prodigious expenditure of skilled accounting labor.
A r t h u r Andersen d i d not indicate the particular clients that were the beneficiaries of this lavish scrutiny. One might assume that the group includes International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, and Texaco, Inc., two of the
largest corporations i n the world that are A A clients. Additional candidates
among A r t h u r Andersen clients, considering size and complexity, might be U A L ,
Inc. (United Airlines), General Telephone & Electronics, and Occidental Petroleum. 2
Let us assume, for purposes only of a simple but significant point, that the
above five corporations are, indeed, the five large clients referred to i n the A r t h u r
Andersen & C o . annual report. T h e n , approximately 17 million dollars, 475 man
years, or about 640,000 man hours were expended i n their audits.
The Audit Reports to Five Largest Clients
A brief, but rigidly conducted empirical study indicates that the audit reports
to the shareholders of these five companies for the year 1974 (the audits most
likely to have been performed i n the Andersen fiscal year ended August 31, 1975),
include a total of 875 words, or an average of 175 words each. 3
N o w consider the significance of this arithmetic. A r t h u r Andersen & C o . was
required, w i t h i n the confines of present, conventional practice, to communicate to
tens of thousands of shareholders and other users, the nature, intent, scope, quantity and results of the equivalent work of 95 professionals laboring for a year,
in about 175 words—and no pictures.
T h i s , then, is the nub of the problem. Tradition, conventional usage, and
ultimately the pronouncements of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants have developed a scheme whereby the auditor confines the report of
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the results of an examination to a few dozen words; a few hundred if unusual
complexities or exceptions manifest themselves.
Audit Reports in Evolution
Audits, as they commenced around the start of the 20th century, involved a
fairly simple and straightforward verification of the existence of the company and
its assets along with some assurance that substantial proportions of the wealth of
a usually small number of shareholders had not been misappropriated by untrust
worthy stewards. Since then, the corporations being audited have grown to
staggering complexity and the auditor is now expected to attest the accuracy of
the measured performance of management's attempts to maximize the wealth of
hundreds of thousands of generally uninformed and disinterested investors.
One might have expected that the vehicle for the auditor's communication of
audit results would have undergone some comparable evolution, but that does not
seem to be the case. Early audit reports issued in the United States (from 1900
until after World War I) tended to be relatively brief:
We have audited the books and accounts of the X Y Z company for the
year ended December 31, 1915, and we certify that, in our opinion, the
above balance sheet correctly sets forth its position as of the termination of
that year, and that the accompanying profit and loss account is correct.
4

It appears that some "long" or descriptive "certificates" were issued in the
1920's. D . R. Carmichael gives two examples: 1924 reports on American Loco
motive Company and General Electric Company. The report of American
Locomotive includes a number of statements which essentially describe the valua
tion practices employed in the financial statements and provide an indication that
proper accruals have been made. The General Electric report includes not only
some valuation practices, but also a listing of many of the audit steps performed.
Nevertheless, as described in an unpublished background paper prepared for
the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities by Terry Aranoff, despite a number
of wording changes, the opinion remained a brief, substantially unchanged
document.
References to conformity to generally accepted accounting principles and to
generally accepted auditing standards were both included by 1941. The "short
form" opinion probably reached a maximum modern length in 1941, when it also
included a reference to a review of the system of internal control. Thereafter,
the report evolved to the present standard opinion, accompanied by such critical
debate as to the number of paragraphs which should be used.
5

The Communication Issue
Having established, or at least described, the massive communication problem
that faces the auditor, I promptly disclaim any attempt in this paper to "solve" or
offer a "solution" to that problem. This reluctance to grapple with the major
problem stems not from limitations of space or time, but of knowledge. I would
have preferred to offer a comprehensive approach to the communication issue.
The staff of the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities has developed several
background papers that relate to the subject, including a long work on the history
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of the auditor's opinion. The Commission has discussed the problem at length
and a tentative paper has gone through several drafts.
Notwithstanding this impressive volume of work and thought, there are few
really new insights into either the problem or the solution. In short, I do not
know the answer, and hence I cannot write a paper that provides one.
However, some of the work of the Commission (that of one researcher in
particular) and a modest amount of informal inquiry by the writer suggest that
one element of the problem may have been missed in the past, or at least, not
explored in enough detail. That element lies essentially in the description—and
therefore nature—of the auditor's communication device. The auditor's message
to the reader of audited financial statements has variously been styled as the
"opinion," the "report," or the "certificate." The last appellation appears to be
in some present disrepute, probably because of the degree of certainty it implies.
The hypothesis of this paper is simple. The present auditor's report is not a
certificate, a report, nor an opinion; it is a symbol. It is a symbol not only to the
socalled unsophisticated user, but to the informed, professional investor as well.
The Report as a Symbol
The mere observation that the auditor's report is a symbol, or at least the
implicit suggestion that the report functions in a symbolic manner is not novel.
However, it appears that intimations that an auditor's report is a symbol are
generally taken as a negative factor in the communication problem. There also
appears to be a prevailing opinion that if the auditor's report is not carefully
read by each user, it cannot convey the complex message that it contains.
I suggest that if the auditor's report is essentially a symbol, then these limiting
interpretations do not follow. To the contrary, if users do perceive the auditor's
report largely as a symbol, then it can indeed convey the highly complex message
that must inevitably result from the previously described enormous labors of
the auditors.
The Nature and Use of Symbols
The classic 11th edition of Encyclopedia Britannica defines a symbol as " . . . a
visible object representing to the mind the semblance of something which is not
shown but which is realized by association with it."
Modern analysis of symbols, signs and dreams, and the vastly increased use of
symbolic logic in the sciences appear to have outdated both the "visible object"
element of the definition, and even the ability of Britannica to provide a brief
discussion of the subject. The current edition prefers to discuss "symbol" under
a number of different subject areas, but not under its own.
Freud and some of his interpreters, however, broadened the concept of symbols
enough to permit themselves, at least, a brief definition. Erich Fromm suggests
that a symbol might simply be, "something that stands for something else."
A symbol may merely be a visual abbreviation of a more complex object. Thus,
the stick figures drawn by children serve to represent the full human figure. More
commonly, and certainly of greater significance, a symbol may be a visible repre
sentation of an object, idea or concept which bears no clear resemblance to the
physical appearance of the symbol. In chemistry, alphabetical symbols represent
6
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the elements. In mathematics, symbols may be used to represent that which
cannot otherwise be conventionally represented; such as Π or ∞.
Symbols, of course, are a major element in religion. The Greeks and Romans
made direct representations of their Gods. The serpent represented evil in the
first verses of Genesis and continues as such a representation to the present day.
St. Peter is represented by keys; St. Paul by the sword. The principal symbol of
Christianity, the cross, demonstrates the extraordinary power of a simple symbol
to convey several different and sometimes extraordinarily complex messages. It
may serve as the identification of a believer, as a protection against evil or the devil,
and ultimately, as instant representation of an entire set of beliefs and teachings.
Symbols play a major role in the modern world. The red star of Communism
carries a vivid message to millions; a message that tends to contradict the symbol of
Uncle Sam. However, while the rigidity of the five pointed red star largely defies
artistic manipulation, the American symbol, Uncle Sam, is more flexible. He looks
sternly demanding on the classic U.S. Army recruiting poster; slightly confused
in Bob Grossman's liberal cartoons in New York Magazine; and threateningly
sinister in his Pravda version.
Thus, the same symbol may carry substantially different messages to different
viewers. Actual alteration is not necessary. The red star means one thing to a
member of the Russian Communist party, another to a member of the U.S.
Republican party. Undoubtedly, a late 15th century Christian perceived a some
what different message in the symbol of the cross than did a non-believer of the
same period, being subjected to the not so tender recruiting techniques of the
Inquisition.
These differences in perception of the identical symbol stem from essentially
different attitudes towards the underlying meaning of the symbol. The symbol
is understood but its message is valued differently.
Differences in the meaning of a symbol may also occur because of misunder
standing or confusion about the symbol. A red traffic light is a symbol indicating
"Stop" to most drivers. The symbol may not exist to the color blind driver who
misses the message. In this case, the difference in perception of the symbol is the
fault of the viewer. One assumes that the issuer of the symbol would prefer that
all viewers make the same, unambiguous interpretation.
In a contrary vein, different symbols may be perceived to be the same symbol.
Certainly a major component of many advertising campaigns is the hope that
just such confusion will occur. For example, it seems clear that some automobile
designers believe that consumers perceive the unique front grill design of the
Mercedes automobile to be a symbol of the quality of the car. Therefore, it appar
ently is no coincidence that both the new Ford and Chrysler "quality" compact
cars sport grills that are almost identical to that of the Mercedes.
Symbol Recognition
Logic suggests that visual complexity plays a role in increasing or decreasing
the possibilities of correct recognition of a symbol. Thus, a circular symbol would
rarely be confused with a square one. However, symbols based on six-sided poly
gons might well be confused with octagonal symbols. The current economic and
legal perils of such confusion of similar, but different symbols were recently
demonstrated and well publicized when the highly paid creative staff of the
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National Broadcasting Company labored and brought forth, at great expense, a
television identification symbol that was almost identical to that generated at
virtually no cost by the Nebraska educational television organization.
The problem of uniform symbol recognition is quite different, however, from
the problem of understanding or interpretation. Thus, virtually all drivers will
recognize a "Drive Safely" sign; they may interpret and implement the message
in quite different fashion.
Developing Symbols
The previous illustration leads to another basic point; symbols are not con
fined to figures, signs or shapes. A language is essentially an aggregation of
symbols. Each word is a symbol for a thing (noun), an action (verb), or a quality
(adjective or adverb). However, the use of symbols as language is a conventional
or neutral usage. There is no linkage between the form of the word-symbol and
the object, action or quality represented. Thus, the letters b-o-o-k are merely the
conventional representation of the object, book. Other than for purposes of re
ducing confusion (of which there is a good deal in the English language), there
is no particular reason to prefer one word symbol over another, as representations
of the same object.
Outside of their general use as language, words may acquire almost a universal
symbolism. The conventional "STOP" sign is essentially a word symbol in many
languages, reinforced by its being pointed on a red, octagonal sign. In New
York, Chase Manhattan Bank has spent a great deal of money to popularize a
simple geometric symbol. First National City Bank, however, abandoned a
rather complex symbolic representation of the globe and is, instead, using its new
official name, Citibank, as a word symbol.
Language or written symbols need not be confined to one word. The conven
tional disclaimer that identifies a preliminary prospectus as a "red herring" is five
lines of small print. The symbolic content of the message is undoubtedly enhanced
by the use of red ink, but it remains essentially a series of words. Once a novice
investor discovers that the words are identical on every red herring, one doubts
that the message is ever read again. The symbol makes the point.
Written symbols need not be confined to relatively short messages. The
Declaration of Independence (about 1,400 words) is the most important of all
American historical documents. It is essentially a partisan document; a justifi
cation for the American revolution. Yet, its unique combination of general prin
ciples and abstract theory of government coupled with a specific enumeration of
the conditions of freedom have made it one of the great Western political docu
ments. Query, does the viewer of a framed reproduction of the original parch
ment on a wall review all these complexities? Of course not; it is but a symbol
of American democracy, and whatever democracy means to that viewer.
As with so many symbols, the accuracy of representation and interpretation
is not always perfectly clear. We celebrate July 4, the date on that document, as
the symbol of Independence Day; the resolution itself was voted on July 2. It was
not signed until several days later; no signatures were applied on the 4th. Far
more important, of course, is the degree of comprehension of the philosophical
content. It is apparent that the Declaration was viewed as almost officially binding
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for some time; the Constitution of the United States and of many individual
states clearly reflect the social contract it specified.
Today, its influence and clarity may be somewhat different. Although repro
ductions on the wall are honored, we are all familiar with occasional stories in
the press of how enterprising "inquiring reporters" are unable to convince unsus
pecting people to sign or endorse verbatim extracts from the Declaration of
Independence.
Interpreting Symbols
Clearly, this long and detailed English language document has become a
symbol whose actual original content is not known to many who pay it homage.
Only at certain critical or celebrated times do people seem to refer back to the
original symbol. Thus Watergate and the bicentennial celebration appear to have
produced a good deal of rereading of two key symbols, the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution.
Sometimes rereading or reexamination may lead to "agonizing reappraisal."
Arthur Schlesinger, for example, in The Imperial Presidency confesses to current
disenchantment with that former symbol of (modern) liberal dogma, the strong
presidency. Thus, the same symbol may have different meanings to the same
person, at different times, as experience tempers interpretation.
A symbol need not have a tangible existence or even be visible in any way.
As Fromm noted, man constantly engages in actions which are essentially sym
bolic, from the simple removing a hat as a symbol of respect for a woman, to
shaking hands as a symbol of friendly feelings, to the biblical rending of garments
as a sign of mourning.
Of course, the Freudians consider dreams as symbols; complex symbols that
require intense probing to determine their real meaning. However, the concept
of a dream as a symbol, albeit interesting, leads to aspects that are not particularly
fruitful in this discussion, for we are interested in the symbol as a vehicle for
communication between people, not for the self revelation of one person.
Herman Wouk points out the extraordinary complexity of the Old Testament
symbol of Sabbath observance. The Sabbath strictures against work appear, at
least superficially, as merely a rigorous means of enforcing a day of healthy rest
for overworked farmers and merchants, seemingly reflecting the biblical rest of
the Lord. However, the Sabbath observance rules prohibiting work are not to be
interpreted literally. Indeed, in many cases the "work" required to obtain the
literal rest of the Sabbath may exceed any concept of leisure and relaxation. How
ever, the biblical concept of work is any interference by man, be it constructive or
destructive, with the physical world. "Rest" is a state of peace between man and
nature. Thus, reading of the scripture, which is "work" in a modern sense, is the
"rest" of the sabbath, since it helps to achieve a state of peace between man and
his God. The symbol "the Sabbath" may be interpreted on one level by orthodox
intellectuals such as Wouk, and on a much lower, virtually automatic level, by
ordinary believers, who simply light the candles, etc. at the right hour.
8
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Is the Auditor's Report a Symbol?
Unfortunately, not a great deal is known about the way or ways in which
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investors, creditors and others use the auditor's report, nor about the message(s)
they derive from it.
One starting place for consideration of the nature of the auditor's report is
the reader of this paper. It is likely that the readers of this work will consist of
persons reasonably familiar with annual financial statements and auditors' reports;
indeed most are habitual readers of annual reports.
Undoubtedly, during the course of reading an annual report (hopefully early
in the reading) you examine the auditor's opinion. Now, consider just how you
examine the auditor's opinion. Do you read every word, savoring each carefully
constructed phrase until the full flavor of the delicious prose of the one or two
paragraphs is clearly communicated? Of course not! You glance quickly, meas
uring length and shape, at the same time noting the absence of several possible
phrases such as, "except for" or "subject to." Probably one positive, searching
element of your scrutiny will be absorbing the name of the auditing firm affixed
to the report.
Assuming that the troubling phrases are not detected and that the firm name
does not connote any extreme reaction, you, as one of the better educated readers
of financial statements, may then be completely finished with the auditor's report.
Hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of dollars have been spent to obtain that
report, and you complete your viewing in seconds.
Was your speed of viewing due to any distaste for the wording, or to a belief
that the report was unimportant? You will undoubtedly spend many multiples
of the time devoted to the audit report on the notes to the financial statements;
are they that much more important?
The answer, of course, is obvious. You know the words in the auditor's report;
indeed, if you are a practitioner or a teacher of accounting you probably know
them by heart. You also know what you believe the words mean, although some
searching would demonstrate that there are wide variations in the perceptions of
that meaning, even among "experts." Only if the auditor's report looks "differ
ent"—that is, if it contains an exception, will you devote any significant time to
studying it. The auditor's report, at least in its most common form of a clean
opinion, is a symbol.
Unfortunately, such little exercises in personal exploration do not make the
stuff of solid research conclusions. And equally unfortunately, there has been
little formal research devoted to careful study of user perceptions of the auditor's
report.
Researching the Audit Report
A n elaborate opinion research study conducted for Arthur Andersen & Co.
inexplicably focused comparatively little attention on the auditor's report. One
question did indicate that approximately half of all shareholders read the auditor's
report most or all of the time. The other half indicated that they sometimes,
rarely, or never read the auditor's report. The Andersen publication also con
tained a series of individual responses received in reply to the query, "What in
particular do you look for in the auditor's report?" The number of responses
reproduced is too small to permit any real analysis, but they do appear to be
divided about equally between those who:
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1. Were not clear what the auditor's report is (for example, versus the
financial statements).
2. Looked only to see if there were exceptions in the report.
Respondents who had indicated that they rarely or never read the auditor's
report were asked for their reasons. Virtually all the responses indicated ignorance
of what the survey meant by the term "auditor's report." While this would be
the expected response, explanations of reasons for negative action or inaction are
rarely meaningful or useful. On the other hand, those who responded that they
were only searching for exceptions would appear to be following the same
symbol reading process that was described above.
12

Marc Epstein's study on shareholder views of the annual report provided
somewhat more interesting data. His study contains several unpleasant con
clusions. Perhaps most upsetting was the indication that the annual report, the
repository of the auditors report, was quite low on the scale of information sources
preferred by investors. Almost half of the respondents considered "Broker's advice"
to be the most preferred source of information. If broker's advice as a source is
combined with those who indicated investment service and financial periodicals,
fully 85% of the recipients preferred the use of a completely secondary source.
Only 15% indicated the annual report as a preferred information source.
A n additional 10% of the respondents indicated that they used "technical
analysis." The use of this term was unfortunate, since it carries two different and
quite contradictory meanings. T o some it may connote conventional techniques
of financial analysis. However, to many others, it undoubtedly means one or
more of the chartist approaches, such as the Dow theory, which are in direct
opposition to financial analysis.
13
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Attempts to draw strong conclusions from Epstein's results must consider the
substantial proportion of his respondents who were unconcerned with the annual
report, and hence, may be presumed to have no valid position (other than apathy)
regarding the auditor's report.
Nevertheless with this caveat, and helped by the reasonably large sample,
some insight may be gained.
On questions related to the reading and usage of the auditor's report, Ep
stein's respondents gave results which he correctly labeled as "paradoxical."
Relative to investment decisions, the auditor's report ranked lowest in "useful
ness" (p. 41), compared to all other parts of the annual report, including the
"president's letter." The auditor's report also ranked lowest in "thorough" reader
ship, as compared to all other parts of the annual report (p. 40). In a compari
son of the responses of sophisticated and unsophisticated users of financial state
ments, the utility of the auditor's report was about the same to both groups (p. 52).
Epstein attempted to derive a relationship between readership of an item
and its apparent utility to the reader. For the auditor's report, the results were
again "paradoxical."
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. . . while the probability is close to one-half that a cursory reading (of the
auditor's report) would be just as useful as a thorough one, the odds are
8 to 1 that a thorough reading would yield more useful information than a
cursory one in the other 50% of the cases. (p. 46)
39

The confusion was compounded by an indication that most respondents did
not want additional information or explanation about the auditor's report.
Epstein's results are indeed somewhat confusing, if the auditor's report is
considered as an element of the annual report which contains what might be
called "variable" information; that is, if the auditor's report contains information
that would often be new and different when read by a user.
However, if the auditor's report is a symbol to the reader, then Epstein's
results are quite logical. Most viewers of symbols do not read them at length;
they glance at them. This explains the low readership. However, if the symbol
is unambiguous and easily comprehended, all readers should be able to gain the
desired information in the same brief glance. Hence the similarity of apparent
utility to sophisticated and unsophisticated investors; both get the same message
quickly and easily. But, what about the supposed low utility of the auditor's
report to both groups? Consider the symbol referred to earlier of a reproduction
of the Declaration of Independence on the wall of an office or school room. Does
that symbol—the reproduction—have any great utility? N o . It is the concept, the
existence of the democratic institutions underlying the Declaration of Independ
ence that gives value and symbolism to the reproduction. The reproduction itself
is of no importance, other than a reminder of the existence of the reality.
The auditor's opinion is also only a reminder of the fact that an audit was
performed. If the opinion is "clean," the audit itself is largely irrelevant to the
reader, at least as far as investment decisions are concerned. Thus, the clean
opinion has little apparent utility in investment decisions, so long as it is there.
Unfortunately, Epstein did not (and probably could not) test the utility of the
audit report against the situation where the audit report was not there; that is,
the utility of audited financial statements versus unaudited statements.
Note too, that the symbolic concept also explains the results quoted above:
that in one-half of the cases, a cursory reading is as valuable as a thorough one,
and that in the other half of the cases, a thorough reading might carry much more
value. Epstein did not distinguish between clean and qualified opinions. One can
easily hypothesize that a clean opinion yields the same information in any type
of reading, while the opinion with exception provides more information to the
thorough reader.
In sum, portions of the paradoxes suggested by Epstein could be explained if
the auditor's report is perceived to be a symbol by most readers.
If the Auditor's Report Is a Symbol
There appears to be reasonable evidence, along with common sense perception,
that many readers of many auditors' opinions do, indeed, regard the report essen
tially in the nature of a symbol. If the opinion is a symbol, what then are the
implications for the communication problem?
One obvious consideration would involve a determination of the message, or
messages now being drawn by users from the symbol. As we noted earlier, the
same symbol may well produce substantially different messages to different
viewers. For the seasoned auditor, the "clean opinion" probably conjures up a
variety of images, possibly varying depending on personal experiences with clients.
A n auditor whose experience has been limited to "clean" audits may well perceive
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the opinion in the light of these pleasant jobs. A n auditor with a more varied
client base may well be reminded of less than satisfactory resolutions of difficult
problems. By imputing personal experiences to auditors' reports in general, the
view might be quite skeptical.
Auditors, of course, constitute only a small fraction of the total audience for
auditors' reports; the reactions of investors and creditors are of far greater interest
and importance. Unfortunately, as suggested by the earlier discussions, little is
known about the messages received by users of audited financial statements. The
comments given by respondents to the Epstein study suggest that at least some
investors—with no apparent distinction between sophisticated and non-sophisti
cated—seem to view the clean opinion as a "Good Housekeeping Seal."
Given the lack of information about the symbolic message(s) users received
from the auditor's report, there appears to be little value in additional guessing
in this area. Clearly, however, research to determine the nature of the message(s)
received by users should have high priority.
For purposes of this paper, let us hypothesize that users of audited financial
statements do receive a message from (clean) opinions that is essentially a seal of
approval. Let us also hypothesize that it is agreed that users ought to receive some
other message, not merely one which connotes "approval." This hypothesis begs
the very real question of whether or not a simple message of "approval" is the
appropriate information that should be derived from the auditor's report. Mautz
and Sharaf suggest an audit report that states:
We have examined with due audit care the data found in (name of state
ment or statements) and find that they present fairly (the purpose of
the statement).
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Thus, they appear to be sanctioning just such a message. Nevertheless, let us
assume that it is desired that the auditor's report carry some other message than
the one(s) presently conveyed to users.
Small Changes in a Symbol Are Useless
A great deal of effort has been expended by members of the accounting pro
fession in devising rather minute changes in the wording of the standard form
opinion. The differences between the usage of "presents fairly" and "true and
correct" (by the British) produced many articles and an almost fundamental
schism between the U.S. and the British professions. Today, the accounting
profession continues to consider small changes in the wording of the report.
A basic point in symbol perception is that small differences in complex symbols
are not readily perceived. Slight modifications in the wording of the opinion,
although possibly perceived to be of great import to the accounting profession,
are likely to go unperceived by users of auditors' reports.
It is possible that a small difference in the wording of the opinion would have
an effect in a court case, but it is doubtful. While accountants and others are fond
of ridiculing the lawyers' preoccupation with fine differences of wording, there
appear to be few, if any, court cases where the decision has hung on a few words
in the opinion. On the other hand, there are many court cases where the total
(symbolic) impression created by the opinion was the central focus.
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Thus, the first conclusion to be drawn, if the auditor's report is a symbol, is
that small wording changes in the opinion are probably futile exercises. The
opinion will be viewed as a whole, as a symbol. Slight changes in the symbol will
not be noticed, examined, or internalized by users.
It follows, then, that any changes in the auditor's opinion to be meaningful
should be significant changes, both in substance and in form. The user of the
report must quickly perceive that a different symbol is present. That perception
will be necessary to force a further investigation of the new symbol.
Is Education the Answer?
A related conclusion concerns efforts at "education" of the users of financial
statements. It has frequently been asserted that since the user of the auditor's
report does not appear to understand what the report connotes, the user must be
educated. A number of persons appearing before the Commission on Auditors'
Responsibilities suggested the development of a booklet or other device that would
inform users about the meaning of the auditor's report.
While such educational efforts would probably not be harmful, their effective
ness, alone, is doubtful. First, there is now no shortage of auditing textbooks that
clearly explain what auditors do. More important, however, is that in the absence
of a significant change in the symbol—the auditor's report—the educational effort
will most likely be wasted. Users already have perceptions of the meaning of the
symbol. It is extremely difficult to explain to them that the symbol means some
thing else. Indeed, it is much easier to change the symbol, for a new symbol will
be perceived as potentially meaning something else.
Note that business organizations have grasped that concept. When corpora
tions attempt to change their "image," they inevitably change the visual symbol,
sometimes even the name of the corporation, in order to produce a quickly under
stood message. It is apparently of little use merely to "explain" that there has been
a change; a symbolic indication appears necessary.
Thus, any intended changes in the meaning of the auditor's report should be
accompanied by a clearly visible change in the size, form or other make-up of
the report.
This conclusion suggests a corollary with regard to opinions with exceptions.
Since it seems clear that readers regard the clean opinion as a symbol, efforts
should be made to assure that the different symbol, namely an opinion with an
exception, can be noted quickly and easily. This again suggests some substantial
difference in form, rather than a small wording change, to indicate an exception.
This difference could be accomplished in several ways. A l l clean opinions could
be written in single paragraph form, with a two or three paragraph form used
for opinions with exceptions. Alternatively, or in addition, the entire exception
could be included in the opinion, rather than as is currently common, by making
a brief reference to a footnote that describes the exception in detail.
Symbols Can Carry Simple or Complex Messages
As noted early in this paper, there appears to be a persistent tendency among
auditors to shorten the conventional standard form opinion. There are obviously
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several reasons for this tendency, one of which is the probably misguided belief
that a shorter opinion reduces potential legal problems.
Another element of the tendency towards brevity, however, appears to be the
feeling that the opinion cannot be made to carry a complex message. Stated
another way, the current readership of the opinion appears to be cursory (as
explained above). Therefore, if a longer explanation of the auditing process were
included in the opinion, it too would not be read.
If the lack of interest of readers of the present short-form report were due to a
general lack of interest in the audit and the audit report, then the previous logic
would indeed follow. However, as has been suggested earlier, it is more logical
to suppose that users do not now read the short form report because they do not
have to; it is a symbol and they think they understand it without reading it again
and again.
It was earlier noted, however, that symbols need not be brief or simple in
meaning. Some symbols convey simple messages; some convey complex messages,
and some convey both simple and complex messages, depending upon the reader.
There is no logical reason for believing that the auditor's report cannot be made
to convey a complex message. In addition, it might be possible to convey, at the
same time, a simpler message.
Consider, for example, the possibility of substantially enlarging the current
short form opinion to include a brief description of the principal assumptions of
auditing—testing, sampling, evidentiary limitations, etc.—along with a brief sum
mary of the principal audit steps. Certainly, some of the present beliefs by many
users (as expressed in many court cases) in the apparent infallibility of auditors
and the audit process (and even the accounting process) might be dispelled.
Would users read such an expanded version of the audit report? Epstein's
study seems to suggest that users read that part of the annual report that they be
lieve contains new or variable information. If the opinion were substantially
expanded, readers would find a new symbol. It seems logical that if the new
symbol appeared sufficiently different from the old, then users would be virtually
forced to attempt to understand the new symbol. That process would involve a
reading of the new, long report and attempts to comprehend its meaning and
import.
Assuming that such comprehension were eventually achieved, through either
repeat reading or other sources, the new, longer report would once again become
another (usually) unread symbol. But, the message of the symbol would have
been changed and presumably understood (or misunderstood) by users.
Note, that this analysis also suggests the possibility of "two tier" disclosure,
which has been advocated frequently by the SEC. The longer audit report could
well convey one important message to certain readers, such as the courts, while at
the same time, it could provide a simpler message of approval to the ordinary
investor.
The key point, however, is that if the opinion is a symbol it does not follow
that it must be simple or brief. To the contrary, a symbolic interpretation suggests
substantially greater possibilities for complexity.
Of course, the concept of the report as a symbol could also be used to support
a shortening of the current, standard form report. As cited above, Mautz and
Sharaf suggested a shorter form. However, if the clean opinion is only a symbol
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of approval, then, in its simplest and most readily comprehended form, it might
merely state:
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Discussant's Response to
Symbolism and Communication in the Auditor's Report
Charles W. Lamden
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
Professor Seidler's analysis of symbolism as a major factor in the auditor's
report is most perceptive. Intuitively, I have felt for some time that the standard
wording of the audit report should be retained. However, the arguments that the
auditor's report should be expanded or contracted, clarified, simplified, or what
ever it was felt was necessary to improve communication also sounded reasonable.
The concept of the audit report as a symbol resolves my dilemma.
Changes in the Wording of the Auditor's Report to Improve the Symbol
It is a fact that the standard wording of the auditor's report has been adopted,
utilized and well recognized. Except for those trained in accounting, who under
stand the overall scope of the examination and the background and meaning of
the terms "auditing standards," "accounting principles," and "opinion," the only
way to understand the general use and acceptance of the audit report is as a
symbol.
Upon reflection, as Professor Seidler points out, even those who have the back
ground and knowledge to understand the technical meaning of the words do not
concern themselves with the standard words, but rather look only for the excep
tions. The standard wording is a symbol also for the technicians.
It becomes quite clear, then, that changing a few words or adding explanatory
comments in the standard audit report are not the answer for improving com
munication in the auditor's report.
The communication problem results from the fact that the same symbol may
carry different messages to different viewers. For example, certain users of the
audit report interpret it as a guarantee rather than an expression of opinion as to
overall fairness of the presentation of the financial statements. Some may argue
that an explicit statement such as "This is not a guarantee as to the value of the
assets included in the financial statements" would improve the communication.
But even this explanatory comment could convey different messages to different
readers. Knowledgeable readers would say "Of course the auditor is not a
guarantor." But others could interpret such a comment as an adverse statement.
Nor would listing the auditing standards or the detailed procedures followed
in the audit necessarily increase the effective communication for most users. As
indicated by the studies to which Professor Seidler referred, ". . . most respondents
did not want additional information or explanation about the auditor's report."
Moreover, the listings would tend to become repetitious, and users looking for a
symbol of credibility would be concerned only with any exceptions. This has
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already been demonstrated historically with the decline in the use of the auditor's
long form report. The concepts embodied in the phrases "generally accepted
auditing standards" and "the procedures necessary in the circumstances" convey
the message adequately.
Psychological Impact of the Auditor's Report
If one accepts the proposition that the audit report is a symbol and changes in
wording will have little or no effect on improving the communication between
issuers and users of the report, this still leaves the question as to what message the
symbol should convey. The issuer, in general, wants to indicate the scope of the
examination, that the examination has been made in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards, that tests of the accounting records and other audit
procedures were those considered necessary in the circumstances, and that the
opinion attests to the fairness (in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles) of the financial statements that were examined. The issuer also wants
the message to indicate that generally accepted accounting principles have been
consistently observed in the current period in relation to the preceding period, that
the informative disclosures are reasonably adequate, and that the degree of
responsibility being taken is clearly shown.
The reference to "generally accepted auditing standards" connotes the entire
professional background of the auditor and the methodology of conducting an
audit which takes years of education and experience to acquire and adequately
comprehend. The issuer of the reports uses the standard wording to convey this
message. Consciously or sub-consciously the issuer must recognize that the words
used are only a symbol for the message intended to be conveyed. The psychological
impact of the issuer's background and training make it possible for the issuer to
be satisfied that the message is being conveyed.
While some critics of the report may be dissatisfied with the adequacy of the
message, the consensus is certainly that a message is being conveyed. This con
sensus may be even more pervasive if the audit report is recognizd as a symbol.
The psychological impact of the symbol to the user of the report would seem
to be even more evident. Seidler makes the point well when he says, ". . . if
users do perceive the auditor's report largely as a symbol, then it can be used to
convey the highly complex message that must inevitably result from the previ
ously described enormous labors of the auditors." In any event the psychological
impact both for the issuer and the user of the audit report is reflected in the fact
that the independent auditor's attestation to the credibility of financial statements
is generally accepted.
Some Limitations to the Symbol Concept
If all opinions were unqualified, the basic hypothesis that the auditor's report
is a symbol would be even more meaningful. However, the fact that there are
qualified opinions, disclaimers, and adverse opinions gives rise to degrees of
credibility. When there is a modification of the standard wording due to a
qualification of the auditor's report, it then becomes important to read the auditor's
report carefully. Further, various types of "special reports" require careful reading,
since the standard wording and, accordingly, the basic symbol are not applicable.
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One cannot dispute Seidler's observation that ". . . if the opinion is 'clean,'
the audit itself is largely irrelevant to the reader, at least as far as investment
decisions are concerned. Thus, the clean opinion has little apparent utility in
investment decisions, so long as it is there." But that is the main point—SO
L O N G AS IT IS T H E R E . Other audit reports such as qualified opinions, dis
claimers of opinions related to unaudited financial statements, and "special re
ports" cannot be classified as covered by the basic symbol. Accordingly, the basic
symbol concept can be utilized only for "clean" opinions.
It is quite evident that minor changes in the wording in the basic symbol (the
clean opinion) will not be effective. No matter how important such wording
changes are to the auditor who prepares the report, they will probably have little
or no effect on the user. Accordingly, if the intention is to utilize a different
symbol (e.g., an opinion with an exception), then an overt effort must be made
to distinguish between the basic symbol and a new symbol. Seidler makes it clear
that the new symbol must be significantly different in both substance and form.
This can be implemented, for example, if a Statement on Auditing Standards
were issued which would require that all unqualified (clean) opinions be written
in a single paragraph, whereas qualified opinions, adverse opinions, disclaimers
of opinion or "special reports" must be in a format of two or more paragraphs.
These "one:two" symbols would be more readily differentiated than today's
"two:three" symbols.
While one can concur, substantially, with the thesis that the standard short
form report is a basic symbol, it is not necessary to agree with the idea that the
symbol can be reduced to just the two words, "Clean Opinion." As indicated
earlier, especially from the viewpoint of the preparer of the audit report, there is
merit in stating the scope of the examination and repeating in each report the
reference to "generally accepted auditing standards," "generally accepted ac
counting principles," "fair presentation," and "consistency."
The Impact of the Symbol on the Issuer of Financial Statements
In his presentation, Professor Seidler refers primarily to the communication
between the auditor and the third party user of the financial statements. In dis
cussing communication as related to the auditor's report, it is also appropriate to
recognize the communication involved between auditor and client (the issuer of
the underlying financial statements). While much of this communication is con
ducted through other media (e.g., the "letter to management"), the psychological
impact of the "clean opinion" symbol on the issuer of the financial statements
should not be overlooked. It is important to the issuer of the financial statements
(the client) to have an auditor's report symbolic of a "seal of approval." Ac
cordingly, the client will adapt recording procedures, presentation, valuation of
assets or liabilities, or disclosures in order to receive an unqualified opinion.
Some Considerations Related to the Future
Accepting the hypothesis that the present standard short form unqualified
auditor's report is a symbol, does not, as Seidler recognizes, solve the massive
communication problem that currently faces the auditor. The search for a solution
of that overall problem is left to the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities.
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Even as the Commission grapples with the problem, the complications in
crease. Auditors are now called upon to report on interim financial statements
and footnotes related to "replacements costs," neither of which is encompassed
by the basic symbol. Moreover, the future portends new types of disclosures and
the reporting and attestation to many new types of information. For example,
reporting on such matters as forecasts, systems quality, and social accounting
information will not only require considerably more knowledge and skill for the
auditor, but will also have a significant impact on communication and the nature
or types of symbols that can or should be used.
Auditors functioning as reviewers of and attestors to new types of information
will undoubtedly face great obstacles in attempting to communicate with users.
The new information will reflect many unfamiliar concepts, judgments and imprecisions. Moreover, much of the new data will be more subjective and less
quantifiable than the data underlying current financial statements.
In summary, the recognition of the auditor's report as a symbol is significant
in giving an important perspective to the communication between the auditor
and the users of the audit report. But the overall solution of the auditor's com
munication problems—both in the present and in the future—leaves a fertile field
for exploration, research and analyses by auditors, researchers and educators.
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Risk and Uncertainty in Financial
Reporting and the Auditor's Role
D. R. Carmichael*
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Grant's Is Going Out of Business
Just as the newspaper, radio and T V ads say, this is an honest-to-goodness
closeout sale. W . T . Grant Company, one of the nation's major retailers, has
filed for bankruptcy.
Predictably—and it's one of the few accurate predictions possible when a
company declares bankruptcy—everyone involved in the issuance of the financial
statements, including the independent auditors, has been named in a class action
suit alleging past financial statements were false and misleading. Such events
raise a critical question: What is the auditor's obligation to warn investors of
impending trouble?
A Look at the 1974 Annual Report
The untutored eye of the ordinary investor only had to be open to see W . T .
Grant was in trouble. In his opening message to stockholders, James G . Kendrick,
Chairman of the Board and President, outlined ". . . the three most serious prob
lems facing the Company:
• A serious merchandise imbalance.
• The severe burden posed by the accelerated store expansion program.
• The excessive build-up of credit receivables, financed at high interest rates
and administered through an exceedingly expensive credit program."
For the year ended January 30, 1975, sales dropped slightly, but $24 million was
charged for store closing expense, net credit expense went from approximately
$6 million to $161 million, and earnings showed a loss of nearly $177 million,
after having declined to $11 million for the year before. Short-term debt had in
creased steadily over the last five years to $600 million. The current ratio dropped
from a range of 1.5 to 1.7 in past years to 1.2. Dividends per share of common
stock were cut from $1.50 in prior years to 30¢.
A l l that information was spelled out in detail for investors. Anyone who con
tinued through the annual report to the notes to financial statements found more
* This paper presents the author's personal views and is not necessarily representative of the
views of any AICPA Committee, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, or other AICPA
or Commission staff members.
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distressing news. Changes in the company's borrowing agreements revealed
creditors and suppliers of merchandise were very concerned with Grant's ability
to pay.
The Auditors Were Uncertain
Grant's independent auditors issued the following "subject to" qualified
opinion dated April 18, 1975.
We have examined the consolidated statements of financial position of
W . T . Grant Company and consolidated subsidiaries as of January 30,
1975, and January 31, 1974, and the related consolidated statements of
operations, capital and changes in financial position for the 52 weeks ended
January 30, 1975 and the year ended January 31, 1974. Our examinations
were made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and,
accordingly, included such tests of the accounting records and such other
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. The
financial statements of Zeller's Limited, used as the basis for recording the
Company's equity in net earnings of that corporation, were examined by
other independent accountants whose reports were furnished to us. Our
opinion expressed herein, insofar as it relates to the amounts of net earnings
included for Zeller's Limited, is based solely on the reports of the other
independent accountants.
As discussed in Note 10 to the financial statements, the Company has
protested certain deficiencies in consolidated Federal income taxes proposed
by the Internal Revenue Service for the years ended January 31, 1964
through 1971, and is presently in litigation regarding such proposed de
ficiencies for the years ended January 31, 1964 and 1965. It is not prac
ticable to estimate the additional income taxes and interest payable, if any,
at this time. As discussed in Note 2 to financial statements, the continuing
value of the Company's total investment in the common stock and con
vertible notes of Granjewel Jewelers & Distributors, Inc., a 51% owned
subsidiary, may be impaired as a result of the potential inability of such
subsidiary to continue as a going concern.
In our opinion, based on our examinations and the reports of other
independent accountants, subject to the effects, if any, on the financial state
ments of the ultimate resolution of the matters discussed in the preceding
paragraph, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the
consolidated financial position of W . T . Grant Company and consolidated
subsidiaries at January 30, 1975 and January 31, 1974, and the consolidated
results of their operations and the changes in their financial position for
the 52 weeks ended January 30, 1975 and the year ended January 31, 1974,
in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a
consistent basis after restatement for the change, with which we concur,
in the method of accounting for finance income as described in Note 1 to
the financial statements.
What Is the Purpose of the "Subject to" Qualification?
Is the auditor pointing to something that is wrong with the financial state
ments? The answer has to be "no" because then the report would indicate a
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departure from generally accepted accounting principles and the qualification
would be introduced by "except for."
Is the auditor only emphasizing a matter that is already apparent from or dis
closed in the financial statements? Note 2 discloses that ". . . because of the net
loss incurred by Granjewel and difficulties in obtaining adequate financing suffi
cient for continued business operations and compliance with terms of loan agree
ments, it is not presently determinable as to whether such subsidiary will be able
to continue as a going concern." The dispute with the IRS is also fully explained
in a note.
Should the "subject to" qualification be viewed as a withholding of an opinion
on a portion of the financial statements that is indeterminable because of the
uncertainty? Does the qualification, therefore, indicate a possible future adjust
ment of that portion of the statements?
Perhaps the function of the "subject to" qualification is only to post a warning
of impending trouble. If that is its purpose, how serious or imminent should the
matter be before qualification is required? Should investors have expected the
auditor's report to point to the information in the annual report that showed
W . T . Grant Company might not continue in existence? Certainly that possibility
should have been apparent to the investor from a quick reading of the annual
report. But why then is any qualification necessary?
The auditor's reporting obligation for significant or unusual uncertainties is
far from settled. The answer ultimately depends on the view taken of the
independent auditor's role. The auditor's role is to add credibility to financial
information. The auditor cannot change the risk of doing business. Neither is it
possible to guarantee the success of the businesses that are audited. One im
portant facet of the free enterprise system is that every business has the oppor
tunity to fail.
Information Risk vs. Business Risk
Two distinct types of risk accompany investment in securities. Information
risk is the risk associated with production and distribution of financial informa
tion. It represents the possibility that the same business conditions will appear
to be different because of errors in the process of accumulating, summarizing, or
presenting information. Reducing information risk is the auditor's job.
Business risk represents the forces in an uncertain economy. Success in busi
ness requires taking chances. Big success requires huge gambles. Investors who
want to share in the possibility of success assume the risk that naturally accom
panies the uncertainties inherent in business activities.
1

How Do Uncertainties Affect the Auditor's Concern with Information Risk?
The auditor's responsibilities for reporting on financial statements are covered
in the AICPA's Statements on Auditing Standards. Statement on Auditing
Standards N o . 2 advises independent auditors that ". . . when there are material
uncertainties the outcome of which is not susceptible of reasonable estimation, the
auditor should consider whether to express an unqualified opinion or to qualify
his opinion. . ." A n opinion qualified because of an uncertainty takes the general
form of the auditor's report on W . T . Grant's financial statements. The form of
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an auditor's qualified opinion is spelled out in detail, but the meaning and
significance of a "subject to" qualification and what should require it are still
debated by accountants.
For example, Henry H i l l recently expressed the view that "the proper method
of reporting on uncertainties seems to be the greatest uncertainty of all." Louis
H . Rappaport has described the major point of contention in these words:
2

Some accountants contend that the "subject to" qualification . . . is re
dundant and unnecessary. In most cases where it is used, there is a clear
reference to information in the statements, indicating that the matter can
not be resolved. A lawsuit, for example, is awaiting judicial determination,
and counsel is unable or unwilling to forecast the result. A n important tax
case is awaiting decision in the Tax Court. A company's claim for reason
able profits on government contracts is before the Renegotiation Board.
A company's basic patents are being challenged by competitors. A com
pany's application for rate increases is being heard by a regulatory com
mission having jurisdiction over rates. Where these or similar circum
stances exist, in all likelihood they are set forth in the financial statements
or in notes to the statements. Since the statements with their notes do set
forth the company's financial position and results of operations, what good
purpose is served by the "subject to" language in the accountants' certifi
cate calling attention to what is in the statements? These accountants con
tend that qualifications and exceptions should be restricted to those matters
with respect to which there is a disagreement between the accountant and
his client. In the circumstances which we have been discussing there is no
dispute; the accountant presumably is completely in agreement with the
representations in the statements.
Other accountants, however, contend that in these circumstances the com
pany's financial position and/or results of operations are indeterminate
and they are therefore not in a position to form an opinion in respect of the
matter in question. For that reason, and for reasons of emphasis, they
believe the "subject to" qualification is appropriate.
3

The debate on "subject to" qualifications has been going on for some time.
Some accountants have the impression that proper use of "subject to" qualifica
tions was settled long ago. Actually, an accounting series release by the SEC as
recently as 1962 set the present ground rules and caused the "subject to" qualifica
tion to assume its current significance. Independent auditors had recognized the
possible need to qualify opinions in the early 1900's and the "subject to" phrase
was one of the earliest used. However, as late as the 1950's the phrases "subject to"
and "except for" were used interchangeably.
In Accounting Series Release N o . 90, the SEC specified the following dis
tinction:
A "subject to" or "except for" opinion paragraph in which these phrases
refer to the scope of the audit, indicating that the accountant has not been
able to satisfy himself on some significant element in the financial state
ments, is not acceptable in certificates filed with the Commission in con
nection with the public offering of securities. The "subject to" qualification
is appropriate when the reference is to a middle paragraph or to footnotes
explaining the status of matters which cannot be resolved at statement date.
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Shortly after A S R No. 90 was issued, one accountant observed:
It has been our opinion for many years, dating back to pre-SEC days, that
the words "subject to" in an opinion paragraph were so ambiguous that
they conveyed no clear-cut meaning to the reader. There is no way of
telling whether they are intended to be a qualification of the opinion, or
whether they are intended merely to direct the attention of the reader to
some significant fact which has been more fully disclosed elsewhere.
4

A newcomer to the financial reporting scene might reasonably wonder what all
of the fuss is about. What difference does it make if auditors' opinions are
qualified and, if they are qualified, why does use of "subject to" rather than
"except for" make any difference?
The Importance of Being Uncertain
For one, the SEC is very concerned with the form and content of the auditor's
report. Under the administrative procedures followed by the SEC staff, the type
of auditor's report has important consequences. Generally, financial statements
will not be acceptable in a filing if the auditor is unable to express an unqualified
opinion because of a departure from generally accepted accounting principles or
a limitation on the scope of the examination. On the other hand, a qualification
caused by an uncertainty is not automatically unacceptable.
In practice, the "subject to" qualification has become an administrative con
venience. Since it is relatively easy to recognize that a qualification is introduced
by "subject to" rather than "except for," the "subject to" phrase has become the
password for an acceptable qualified opinion. Thus, one of the problems caused
by the "subject to" qualification is that since it is acceptable to the SEC, any
matter that can possibly be regarded as an uncertainty may receive a "subject to"
rather than an "except for" qualified opinion.
A "subject to" qualified opinion, however, may not be so acceptable to in
vestors. In its 1972 annual report, Boothe Computer showed a $36.5 million
write-off of additional depreciation on its portfolio of I B M 360 equipment. Com
menting on Boothe's annual report, Forbes magazine described a "subject to"
qualification in this exuberant language:
Now we read that even with the decks thus cleared, Boothe's auditing
firm, Touche Ross & Co., had still qualified its opinion of the company's
1972 statements. A qualified opinion is no laughing matter. It's like
tacking a quarantine notice up on a company's door. Bankers, creditors,
beware! Bondholders, stockholders, on your guard! Touche Ross was say
ing that even with the carrying value of Boothe's rental equipment pared
way, way down by the write-off, it still had serious reservations about
the company's ability to recover the remainder of its computer investment
through future rentals.
5

Thus, a "subject to" qualified opinion has several consequences. In compari
son to other types of qualifications, the company's financial statements are ac
ceptable to the SEC, but investors are warned reported results may at some future
date be adjusted. Also, the general belief has been that by pointing out the
uncertainty the auditor will be absolved of responsibility if the uncertainty is
resolved unfavorably.
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The influence of a "subject to" qualification makes resolution of questions
concerning its meaning or its necessity important. What are the relationships
among the auditor's opinion, the uncertainty, and the financial statements? Is
the opinion or the financial statements "subject to" the uncertain outcome? What
purpose is the "subject to" qualified opinion intended to serve and does it do so
effectively?
Forbes' consideration of Boothe's 1972 annual report, for example, points out
that two other computer leasing clients of the same public accounting firm re
ceived clean opinions that year. Both Leasco Corporation's leasing subsidiary and
Greyhound's subsidiary, Greyhound Computer Corporation, are in the same
business as Boothe. A l l three companies had similar-sized rental portfolios in the
$200 million plus range and all were facing the same competitive problem of
IBM's new 370 computer line. Forbes expressed the following conclusion on the
merits of "subject to" qualifications:
As for us, we could only conclude that Touche Ross would have done us
all a greater service if it had explained in more specific detail exactly what
it was that it was certifying—that all three companies face significant
uncertainties, but that in its opinion Boothe's uncertainties are more
significant. Shareholders would not assume, as they may have by the
absence of write-offs and dirty opinions, that Leasco and Greyhound are
home free in computer leasing.
6

In other words, investors may believe the absence of a "subject to" qualifica
tion means a company's financial statements are not affected by significant
uncertainties, but business risk is unavoidable.
A Horse Is a Horse—Of Course
A simple analogy may put the question concerning the auditor's responsibility
for reporting on uncertainties in perspective. When he was later questioned about
the significance of the hearings held by his committee on Watergate, Senator
Ervin is reported to have said: "You can either draw a picture of a horse or you
can draw the picture and put a caption under it that says 'a horse.' We drew a
picture of a horse." The auditor's "subject to" qualification is analogous to the
caption on the picture. Is it necessary to put a caption on the picture, or is it
adequate simply to draw a clear picture?
If the financial statements adequately portray the uncertainties and their
possible effect, is it really necessary for the auditor to issue a qualified opinion?
Future Shock Hits Accrual Accounting
The basic problem of portraying uncertainties in financial reporting is that
financial statement amounts are traditionally presented as single values, but only a
probability distribution giving a range of values can reflect reality under conditions
of uncertainty. The present accounting model developed when the world was
simpler and the task of accounting less complex.
Accrual accounting developed in the fifteenth century. The usual venture took
about a year, the approximate time of a ship's roundtrip voyage, and at the end of
each voyage the accounts would be settled and the investors would receive their
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share of profit. Accounting for a single venture such as the voyage of the ship
is much simpler than reporting the continuous activity of modern business. Also,
events that affect business are taking place at an increasingly rapid rate. One
accountant has observed that a shoe manufacturer in 1870 would have experi
enced little difference in his products, customers, or techniques either twenty years
earlier or twenty years later. Today, however, a shoe manufacturer is likely to
run the gamut from Indian sandals to kinky boots in two to three years.
Financial statements are imprecise for several reasons, but the major problem
in measuring earnings is uncertainty about the future. The current concept of
earnings is an index of success, and earnings under accrual accounting are
determined by a long-range averaging process. Ideally, under accrual accounting
earnings and cash ultimately will be equal in amount but there will be differences
in timing.
7

8

Earning Power and Earnings Cycles
The essence of a company's earning power is its ability to generate cash in the
future, but ability to generate cash is not the same as cash generated. The Trueblood Report on the objectives of financial statements explains the relationship
between cash generation and earnings:
. . . Cash generating ability and earnings are closely related and the longer
the period, the closer the relationship. For a relatively short period like a
month, a quarter, or even a year, net cash flows . . . will differ from earnings
because of changes in such items as receivables, payables, inventories, and
plant. For such relatively short periods, the accrual basis provides a more
useful measure of enterprise progress than the cash basis. Over longer
periods, cash generation and earnings come closer together. Over the
entire life of an enterprise, they are the same.
9

At various points in a company's life span not all transactions will be com
plete. Some series of related transactions extend over several annual periods. The
Trueblood Report refers to these related activities as earnings cycles:
A simple earnings cycle may be identified quite easily; but for most series
of transactions, it is usually quite difficult to determine when a cycle has
been completed. For example, an enterprise makes a sacrifice by purchasing
a plant to produce goods. In this case, the sacrifice (the cash disbursed)
can be identified. But the benefit (the cash receipt) relates in some way to
each unit being made, sold, and eventually realized as cash. A further
benefit may arise from a cash receipt on disposal of the plant. Until the
plant is sold, some of the benefits relating to the initial sacrifice for the plant
will have been realized through its use in manufacturing, and some will
not. Therefore, this requires estimates of the amount of the sacrifice
applicable to a certain time period, whenever all benefits are not realized
within that time period. Such allocations of sacrifices (or of benefits in
other situations) introduce the need for additional judgments in accounting
for cycles.
10

Debits and Credits in an Uncertain World
Accountants have adopted various concepts and conventions to deal with the
problems caused by incomplete earnings cycles. These concepts, however, attempt
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to eliminate the effect of uncertainty rather than explain it. One of these con
cepts is realization. Revenue is not normally recognized without some objective
evidence such as an exchange transaction and the receipt of cash, or some evidence
that receipt is highly probable. A n attempt is made to match the sacrifices made
in earning revenue against the revenue recognized in a period since the effort to
earn revenue may stretch over several accounting periods. Costs incurred for
future benefit are assets. A cost is not carried forward to future periods unless
the amount is expected to be recovered through future operations.
Another accounting convention adopted to facilitate allocating costs among
future periods is the going concern assumption. A company is assumed to have
an indefinite life unless some major event, such as bankruptcy, proves the assump
tion wrong. This allows the allocation of costs over the useful life of an asset
and avoids the problem of determining the remaining life of a company.
Another traditional accounting convention is conservatism. The operating
rule for conservatism is "anticipate no gains but provide for all losses." Predicting
the future is extremely difficult. Consequently, in the absence of an exchange
transaction, for example, indicating that merchandise has been sold for a loss,
or the occurrence of an event such as a fire that destroys a company's plant,
knowing when the value of an asset has been impaired and when the loss should
be recognized is also difficult.
11

Anticipating Future Costs and Losses
When the Pennsylvania-New York Central Transportation Company was
formed by the merger of two railroads in 1968, the company charged off costs
and losses of $275 million. Penn Central's controller described that charge as
"a bookkeeping loss" and stated that the company was only clearing the decks for
the merger and that the substantial charge would avoid a drag on earnings for
the next ten years.
Leopold A . Bernstein surveyed the reserves for future costs and losses so
popular in the late 60's and early 70's and concluded that charges like the Penn
Central's indicated real problems in accounting. Professor Bernstein questioned
the appropriateness of reaching ten years into the future and expressed the view
that reserves for future costs and losses were all too frequently income smoothing
and shifting devices.
The problem of when to recognize future costs and losses is important, but it
is only a symptom of deeper problems in accounting for uncertainties.
12

The FASB Puts a Hold on the Future
Anticipating future costs and losses is an application of conservatism in
accounting and independent auditors have had difficulty arguing that such
anticipation is not in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles.
At one time, the applicable pronouncement was the AICPA's Accounting
Research Bulletin No. 50 on contingencies, issued in October 1958. Contingencies
were defined as "an existing condition, situation or set of circumstances involving
a considerable degree of uncertainty which may through a related future event
result in the acquisition or loss of an asset or the incurrence or avoidance of a
liability." A R B N o . 50 indicated that when contingencies were not sufficiently
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predictable to permit recording, they should be disclosed if there was a reasonable
possibility of an outcome that might affect financial position or operating results.
However, when the outcome of a matter was reasonably foreseeable, the expected
result should be recorded.
A R B N o . 50 made the recording of a loss dependent entirely on the ability
to estimate the amount, and anticipated losses due to a contingency could be
recognized in a period prior to the actual incurrence of a loss. The legacy of
A R B No. 50 was a paradox for independent auditors.
Under A R B No. 50 accounting principles required that if an item could be
estimated, the effect should be recorded. If an estimate could not be made, the
conformity of the financial statements with generally accepted accounting prin
ciples was indeterminable. The resolution was identifying the "subject to" qualifi
cation as the hallmark for the existence of an uncertainty precluding conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
The Financial Accounting Standards Board took up the question of con
tingencies in 1973 because of abuses in accounting for future losses. The project
was expanded to a consideration of accounting for all contingencies. In March
1975, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards N o . 5,
"Accounting for Contingencies." It was intended to eliminate the practice of
accruing for potential future losses that would not be incurred until a period
after the date of the financial statements. The FASB added a requirement that a
loss must relate to a current or a prior period in addition to being reasonably
estimable. Thus, the requirement of reasonable estimation of A R B N o . 50 is no
longer sufficient to support recording.
FASB Statement No. 5 also redefines a contingency as an ". . . existing con
dition, situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible gain
. . . or loss . . . to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more
future events occur or fail to occur. Resolution of the uncertainty may confirm
the acquisition of an asset or the reduction of a liability or the loss or impairment
of an asset or the incurrence of a liability." Recording of a loss is, therefore,
dependent on the outcome of some definable future event that may or may not
occur. This definition distinguishes estimates required for contingencies from
other estimates that relate to matters requiring approximation of amounts or of
the timing of transactions. Also, there must be a possibility that the event may
not occur. If occurrence is not uncertain, the matter is not a contingency. For
example, amounts owed for services received such as advertising and utilities may
need to be approximated, but there is no doubt that the service has been received.
All Contingencies Are Not Alike
Contingencies can be conveniently classified into two types. Some contin
gencies are a recognized part of incomplete earnings cycles. They result from
normal recurring activities and the need to make estimates is known even though
the amount and timing of future receipts or payments may be uncertain. Examples
are estimation of the collectibility of receivables resulting from credit sales, loans,
or similar transactions and recognition of obligations under warranties for products
or services sold. If, based on available information, future collection or payment
of such items is probable and their amounts can be estimated, the effects should
be recorded and reflected in financial statements.
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Other contingencies result from events that are unusual or infrequent. Since
these events are not inherent in earnings cycles, identifying those that should be
recorded or disclosed can be difficult. Statement N o . 5 applies the same criteria
to these events as is applied to estimates inherent in earnings cycles. If occurrence
of a future event is probable and the amount can be estimated, the effects should
be recorded. If occurrence is only reasonably possible rather than probable, the
event should be disclosed.
Gulf & Western was told by an Appellate Court that its tender offer to Atlantic
and Pacific Tea Company's shareholders was deficient because it failed to disclose
a contingency arising from an antitrust violation. The court held:
The fact that, at the time it announced its tender offer, an antitrust action
had not been commenced against G & W , and that its liability was uncer
tain, does not excuse G & W's failure to disclose all these relevant circum
stances so that A & P shareholders could weigh them in reaching their
decision whether or not to tender their shares. As we said in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833,849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), the
disclosure requirements of the securities laws require "nothing more than
the disclosure of basic facts so that outsiders may draw upon their own
evaluative experience in reaching their own investment decisions with
knowledge equal to that of the insiders." Those "basic facts" bearing upon
G & W's possible liability for antitrust violations were of obvious concern
to those A & P shareholders who retained part of their holdings.
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A possible antitrust action is one example of an unasserted claim. F A S B
Statement No. 5 requires that such claims be disclosed if their assertion is probable
and an unfavorable outcome is reasonably possible. Unasserted claims may be
known to management of a company, but they can be difficult for an auditor to
identify unless the auditor is informed of the possible claims by a company's
management or its legal counsel. The outcome is usually impossible for anyone
to predict.
Antitrust actions frequently result in "subject to" qualifications when auditors
are aware of the action. For example, the Otter Tail Power Company's auditors
qualified their opinion on its 1974 financial statements and included the following
description of the uncertainty in their report:
As discussed in the second paragraph of Note 7 to the Financial State
ments, the Company is a defendant in suits brought by three municipalities
charging antitrust violations and seeking treble and punitive damages
totaling $4,386,593. Since the ultimate outcome of the lawsuits cannot
presently be determined, no provision for any liability that may result has
been made in the financial statements.
In our opinion, subject to the possible effect on the financial statements of
the outcome of the litigation discussed in the preceding paragraph, the
above-mentioned financial statements. . . .
Other government actions resulting in possible losses may be equally difficult
for the auditor and the company to identify. In 1971, for example, Abbot Lab
oratories' operations were interrupted by the government's recall of its U.S.
produced intravenous solutions. Abbott was unable to reenter the market for
intravenous solutions for four months, which had a depressing effect on its results
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of operations. The beverage industry was also seriously affected when products
containing cyclamates were banned. Events of this type are difficult or impossible
to predict and future operations may be seriously affected when they occur.
The impossibility of predicting all events that may materially affect a com
pany's operations has led some accountants to agree that uncertainty qualifications
may result in undue expectations by investors. The absence of a "subject to"
qualification may lead investors to incorrectly conclude that a company has no
significant uncertainties.
Should New Guidance on Contingencies Change Auditors' Responsibilities?
FASB Statement No. 5 supplies welcome clarification of when to record and
when and what to disclose concerning contingencies. Given the possible im
portance of such uncertainties to a company's operations, clear guidelines are
beneficial to investors, auditors and the management of companies. Since State
ment No. 5 has clarified this area of financial reporting, some accountants believe
that "subject to" qualifications are now unnecessary.
The possible outcome of a lawsuit is perhaps the best example of a significant
unusual uncertainty. Armstrong Cork Company's 1974 annual report discloses it
was involved in litigation concerning patent infringement. The auditors' report
and related footnote disclosure appear in Exhibit I. When such contingencies are
disclosed, it is relatively easy to separate the business risk from the information
risk. As long as investors are given enough information, there is no information
risk. Financial statements may disclose but cannot reduce the business risk. The
ultimate effect on the financial statements depends on the outcome of an identi
fiable future event. The type of probabilility evaluation involved here should be
distinguished from the probability of events that are inherent in an earnings cycle.
The estimation of the collectibility of receivables, for example, depends on a
probability evaluation that normally involves a large number of homogeneous
items. This is the classical view of probability—a concept of relative frequency
which is normally applicable only to a large number of items with similar charac
teristics. On the other hand, a lawsuit is a unique event and the classical view of
probability is not applicable. A unique event will have only one outcome—either
favorable or unfavorable.
For unique events, the auditor's "subject to" qualified opinion can only empha
size a matter already spelled out for investors in financial statements. A n auditor's
qualification adds little and may lure investors into a false sense of security.
Since Statement No. 5 provides understandable guidance on when accounting
for the future should stop, some justification exists for removing the auditor's
reporting obligations for uncertainties. However, Statement No. 5 does not cover
all uncertainties and the prohibition against recording certain contingencies raises
other problems.
Thou Shalt Not Record
Statement N o . 5 prohibits recording if the amount cannot be reasonably
estimated or if the event on which the amount is contingent is not probable. The
difficulties that might be caused are highlighted by a current problem of hospitals.
Malpractice suits normally involve astronomical sums and some result in
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significant settlements. As a result, doctors and hospitals are having difficulty in
obtaining malpractice insurance. Insurers are reluctant to offer malpractice cover
age because of the difficulty of estimating future losses. That gives the hospitals
both operating and accounting problems. If a hospital is unable to obtain mal
practice insurance or must co-insure a large amount of the risk, an individual
hospital will have even more difficulty than an insurer estimating the losses for
malpractice claims.
If a hospital makes a provision for malpractice losses when the amount cannot
be reasonably estimated, it will violate FASB Statement N o . 5. A hospital's
auditor might then include the following middle paragraph in the audit report:
As described in Note X , claims for alleged malpractice in excess of insur
ance coverage have been filed against the hospital by various claimants.
In addition, the hospital has no assurance that additional material claims
will not be asserted arising out of services provided to patients in the past.
The ultimate liability of the hospital resulting from these claims is not
presently determinable. Further, as discussed in Note X , the hospital has
charged to income a provision for losses, relating to uninsured malpractice
claims. Because of the uncertainties described above, the amount of such a
provision and the related liability cannot be reasonably estimated.
Someone familiar with the requirements of FASB Statement N o . 5 might
conclude the auditor's opinion paragraph should object to the departure from
generally accepted accounting principles—an "except for" qualification. How
ever, some auditors can be expected to conclude a "subject to" opinion is per
missible. After all, "subject to" qualified opinions are supposed to be used for
uncertainties and this is an uncertainty.
When faced with similar past problems, auditors have sometimes opted for
"subject to" qualifications. In the "big bath" days of the late 60's and early 70's,
the special reserves for future losses complained about by Professor Bernstein also
produced some interesting auditor's reports.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company, in its 1968 annual report, announced
a change in management. The incoming officers adopted new policies on organi
zation, products, production facilities, marketing, and relations with dealers and
customers that resulted in recording special reserves in the last quarter of 1968
totaling $68.7 million. For the year, the final loss was $54 million after recording
future tax benefits of $43 million.
Even after that loss, the auditors were not certain enough to express an
unqualified opinion and issued an opinion "subject to" two uncertainties. This
is the middle paragraph of their report:
As explained in Note 3 to the financial statements, in the last quarter of
1968 the Company recorded substantial amounts associated with (a) re
serves for anticipated costs and losses, and (b) estimated income tax
benefits expected to be realized in the future. Although these reserves and
anticipated tax benefits reflect the best current judgment of the Company's
management, we cannot determine at this time the amounts of costs and
losses which ultimately will be charged against the reserves, and the
amounts of future tax benefits which ultimately will be realized.
The unusual aspect of this special reserve was the effect on the auditor's
opinion of the related income tax effect. Allis-Chalmers obtained a refund of
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only $14 million on past taxes. That left $50 million plus to be claimed in future
years should earnings be adequate. Even though the auditors were uncertain
about future tax benefits that would be realized, those tax benefits were recorded
as an asset and the related gain reduced Allis-Chalmers' loss for the year.
A P B Opinion No. 11 explains the generally accepted accounting principles for
handling the complex differences between the taxes paid in a year and the tax
expense recognized in an income statement. Opinion No. 11 provides that ". . . in
those rare cases in which realization of the tax benefits of loss carryforwards is
assured beyond any reasonable doubt, the potential benefits . . ." may be recorded.
Thus, generally accepted accounting principles require a significant degree of
certainty before recognizing future tax benefits. The prohibition against recording
future tax benefits is similar to the prohibition in FASB Statement No. 5. In both
cases, a significant uncertainty may exist that would prevent recording. When
generally accepted accounting principles prohibit recording, an auditor should
object to the violation with an "except for" qualification. Nevertheless, the desir
able features of a "subject to" qualification may cause auditors to focus on the
uncertainty rather than on the resulting departure from generally accepted
accounting principles.
In addition to the murkiness that may be caused by the uncertainties that
Statement N o . 5 prohibits recording are the uncertainties on which Statement
No. 5 offers no guidance.
Contingencies, Commitments and Conundrums
Statement N o . 5 excludes several matters that come under the heading of
uncertainties in accounting.
Among the matters excluded are contingencies inseparable from other measure
ments inherent in earnings cycles. For example, depreciation is excluded because
"the eventual expiration of the utility of the asset is not uncertain."
Another major category of accounting measurements excluded from Statement
No. 5 is impairment of asset values arising from current conditions rather than
depending on the outcome of future events. Some of these measurements are
covered by other pronouncements: marketable securities (FASB Statement No.
12), inventory pricing (ARB N o . 43), investments in common stock accounted
for by the equity method (APB Opinion No. 18) and losses arising from disposal
of a segment of a business (APB Opinion No. 30).
Losses on operating assets, such as plant and equipment, arising from changed
current economic conditions are also excluded.
The appropriate accounting period to be charged for a loss from a con
tingency is also not covered by Statement N o . 5. The criteria for prior period
adjustments established by A P B Opinion N o . 9 remain unchanged.
The Silver Lining of "Subject to"
The correct period to be charged for a loss causes difficulty in accounting.
There will always be differences between the estimations made and the actual
results. Consequently, accountants have developed criteria for deciding whether
the difference should be charged to the period when the estimate was made or to
the period when the difference between the estimate and the result is determined.
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If the difference is viewed as a correction of income reported in earlier periods,
substantial losses or gains may escape the income statement and the attention
of investors. On the other hand, reporting the differences in the current income
statement may distort the measurement of a company's normal, recurring earning
power.
Opinion No. 9 limits prior period adjustments to material adjustments that:
(a) can be specifically identified with and directly related to the business
activities of particular prior periods, and (b) are not attributable to eco
nomic events occurring subsequent to the date of financial statements for
the prior period, and (c) depend primarily upon persons other than
management, and (d) were not susceptible of reasonable estimation prior
to such determination.
Opinion No. 9 also observes that in most cases the opinion of the independent
auditor on the financial statements of the prior period would have contained a
qualification because of the uncertainty. A "subject to" qualification is not one
of the criteria for determining a prior period adjustment, but there is a strong
implication that the presence of a qualified opinion will make prior period treat
ment more justifiable. Research by Samuel Laibstain and Thomas Huff suggests
that the type of auditor's opinion does have a direct relationship to the accounting
period charged for subsequent adjustments. They observe that the relationship
between the auditor's opinion and prior period adjustment treatment may make
management more inclined to accept "subject to" qualifications:
If the auditor's opinion does govern subsequent accounting treatment of
the error, another result may be that management often will readily accept
a qualified opinion if it suspects that actual results may be significantly
worse than its estimate, reasoning that subsequent adjustment will be to
retained earnings.
14

Indeed, in its 1974 annual report the management and independent auditors
of Del E . Webb Corporation complain bitterly about the denial of prior period
adjustment treatment. The middle paragraph of the auditor's report explains
the matter as follows:
Our previously issued accountants' report dated February 28, 1974 on the
1973 consolidated financial statements was qualified subject to the effect of
the resolution of the claim against the Government of Honduras. Included
in the accompanying consolidated statement of earnings for the year ended
December 31, 1974 is a charge of $2,749,444, representing the write-offs of
amounts recorded in connection with this claim (as more fully explained
in note 2 to the consolidated financial statements), which the management
of Del E . Webb Corporation believes should have been recorded as a
prior period adjustment. It is our opinion that it would have been prefer
able to accord this charge prior period adjustment treatment, which would
have increased 1974 net earnings by $1,474,549 ($.17 per share).
Note 2 to the financial statements explains that the SEC insisted that the $2.7
million charge appear in the 1974 results of operations.
This SEC action does not seem to be an isolated example. In fact, the SEC
staff seems to have embarked on a campaign to eliminate prior period adjustments
and the FASB is also reported to be working on the subject. If prior period
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adjustments become a thing of the past, "subject to" qualifications will make even
less sense.
The auditor's qualification could be viewed as pointing out to investors that
the financial statements being reported on might be adjusted at some future date
when the uncertainty is resolved. Some accountants have suggested "subject to"
qualifications should be used only when the financial statements might be adjusted.
If any gain or loss would be shown in the financial statements of a future period,
the financial statements reported on would never be changed. Henry H i l l states
the case:
Auditors should take care that they let the financial statements speak for
themselves. When uncertainties arise, a careful analysis should be made
to see whether unfavorable resolution will have an effect on the current
financial statements. "Subject to" opinions should be limited to events that
will have such an effect. Other contingencies should be clearly recited in
the financial statements in the interest of full disclosure, but this does not
mean they are a proper component of the auditor's report. In other words,
as far as uncertainties are concerned, the factors that lead to retroactive
restatement should be precisely the same as the factors leading to a
"subject to" opinion.
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The fact that either favorable or unfavorable resolution of uncertainties with
respect to an earlier year's financial statements may cause no adjustment of those
statements violates intuitive logic, but as Mr. H i l l observes.
Logic may not always prevail. . . where debits and credits are involved, for
such a solution invites debits to the rear, credits to the fore. The policing
instinct of auditors makes them shrink from encouraging practices which
permit omission of recording of losses from the current year's financial
statements. . . . One way to resolve the problem would be to do away
completely with "subject to" opinions where estimates are involved. This
would not further the interests of the financial statement reader, however,
and it would deny the auditor some protection.
15

Prediction, Protection and Professionalism
Two critical questions are whether the interests of financial statement readers
are furthered by "subject to" qualifications and whether the independent auditor
receives any protection from them.
A "subject to" qualification does post a warning to investors that financial
statements reported on by the auditor may need to be changed. However, many
uncertainties when resolved will not result in retroactive restatement of financial
statements and the number of uncertainties that will receive prior period adjust
ment treatment grows smaller every day. Another reason for posting a warning
might be implementation of a new idea being pushed by the SEC staff that
disclosure is required whenever historical operating results may not be indicative
of future results because of some matter within management's knowledge.
16

At this date, however, generally accepted accounting principles and the rules
of the SEC do not require such disclosures in financial statements. The only
place that the SEC requires such disclosure is in management's discussion and
analysis of the summary of operations which is not part of the financial state63

ments. Even if the necessity of disclosing such matters in the financial statements
were acknowledged, there is no compelling reason to believe that adequate dis
closure would not sufficiently warn investors.
The essential question then becomes whether investors need or want a pre
diction of future events or whether they would be better served by information
that would allow them to make their own assessments of whether the risk inherent
in the company's activities is one they will accept. Contingencies by definition
depend on the outcome of future events. Contingencies involving infrequent or
unusual future events are not susceptible to normal estimation methods. The
Trueblood Report recognizes distinctions are necessary among different kinds of
measures that vary in the certainty of their ultimate impact on cash. The view
taken of earnings measurement in the Trueblood Report assumes ". . . users
generally will want to make their own judgments about uncertainty."
Contingencies involving infrequent or unusual future events should be fully
disclosed. Investors should be given enough information to make their own
assessment of risk. This conclusion does not fully resolve the auditor's respon
sibility because other uncertainties may also cause a "subject to" qualification.
17

Are Asset Evaluations Uncertainties?
The carrying amount of an operating asset may exceed the amount expected
to be recovered through future use of the asset because of current conditions that
make recovery of the carrying amount doubtful. For example, the Callahan
Mining Corporation at the end of 1974 did not know whether one of its mines
could be operated because of geological risks involved in deep shaft exploration.
The auditor's qualified opinion and the related note to management's financial
statements appear in Exhibit II.
Operating assets are used over many accounting periods and a company may
not intend to dispose of the assets in the near future. Even though the estimation
of the appropriate carrying amount of the asset depends on current conditions,
the accuracy of that estimate cannot be determined with certainty unless the asset
is sold or abandoned. Also, if the asset is disposed of at a loss at a future date, the
loss may have arisen in subsequent periods. Thus, the amount realized may not
indicate the appropriate carrying amount at an earlier date.
Another problem in determining the appropriate carrying amount of an asset
is that most assets are used jointly to generate future receipts of cash. The contri
bution of an individual asset to the earnings process cannot be determined
uniquely when it makes a joint contribution.
The contribution that the auditor can make has some limitations because of
the number of factors involved in determining the appropriate carrying amount
of an asset. The auditor can determine that the asset exists and that it is owned
by the company, but the uncertainty surrounding the future cash receipts that will
result from using the asset makes evaluation of the appropriate carrying amount
difficult.
Auditors' opinions are qualified "subject to" the company's ability to recover
the carrying amount of assets. Whether disclosure of those uncertainties would
be sufficient without qualification is a critical question. Statement N o . 5 offers
no guidance.
18
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The SEC Fills the Disclosure Gap
In late 1974 the SEC issued Accounting Series Release N o . 166 on the dis
closure of unusual risks and uncertainties in financial reporting. ASR N o . 166
recognizes that additional disclosures may be necessary when:
• Special circumstances affect a company's ability to measure current
results.
• Current economic conditions have changed the risk characteristics of
assets.
• Assumptions underlying the use of certain accounting principles have
become subject to substantial uncertainty.
A l l of the examples in ASR No. 166 relate to the carrying amount of assets
such as loan loss reserves for financial institutions, marketable securities, and the
operating assets of some companies with a small number of projects that have a
dominant effect on operating results. Examples of projects with a dominant effect
include major aircraft by aircraft manufacturers and construction contracts by
contractors.
The following recommendation in ASR N o . 166 seems to be the prototype:
The disclosure should include a description of the unusual circumstances
involved, a description of the types of assumptions made by management
when preparing financial reports, and an indication of the sensitivity of
current and prospective earnings to changes in such assumptions caused
either by changing circumstances or the final determination of the uncer
tainties involved.
The thrust of the ASR seems to be to put disclosure of uncertainties concerning
the carrying amount of assets on the same basis as contingencies. The disclosure
recommendations highlight uncertainties and describe the sensitivity of operating
results to estimates. The notes, in effect, suggest the probability distribution
behind the single amount in the financial statements.
When Is Disclosure Not Enough?
The recent decisions, one by the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York and the other by the SEC in an administrative proceeding
illustrate that a "subject to" opinion will be of little value to an investor, or to an
auditor defending an action, if the extent of the disclosure about the uncertainty
causing the qualification is inadequate. The administrative proceeding involved
an audit of Talley Industries, Inc. (Talley) by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
(PMM).
Talley was engaged in the manufacture and distribution of various products,
including bomb racks and pyrotechnics designed for the U.S. Armed Forces. In
connection with a proxy statement being distributed to solicit approval of the
merger of Talley with another company, P M M issued a qualified opinion on
Talley's financial statements for the year ended March 31, 1969. The opinion was
qualified "subject to" Talley's ability to obtain sufficient future contracts as referred
to in Note 3 to the financial statements. Note 3 stated:
The Company bases its calculation of inventories and of cost of sales ap65

plicable to fixed price United States Government contracts on the costs
(including administrative overhead) incurred and estimated to be incurred
on the relative production programs. For the purpose of computing sales,
these costs are prorated over the estimated total revenues for such programs.
The estimates are based on actual contracts on hand and future contracts
expected by management to be obtained. The resultant value of inventories
on this basis at March 31, 1969, is approximately $8,900,000 in excess of the
prorated cost of actual contracts on hand and such excess is believed to be
larger at December 31, 1969, but management expects sufficient future
contracts to be received to recover such excess.
The SEC found the opinion and related footnote to be materially deficient in
the following respects:
• The note did not disclose the dollar amount of future contracts ($100
million) which Talley's management estimated would be obtained.
• Since recovery of excess costs was dependent in part on Talley's achieving
projections of material savings in production costs, the report should also
have been qualified with respect to Talley's ability to perform contracts
in a profitable manner.
The P M M proceeding does not have the authority of case law, and P M M for
purposes of the settlement order neither admitted nor denied any of the state
ments or conclusions of the SEC, but the position taken by the SEC on qualified
opinions is instructive. The lesson is that the SEC will look beyond the words
of qualification to determine whether adequate disclosure has been made in the
auditor's report, the financial statements, or in the related footnotes, of the
uncertainty causing the qualification.
The SEC's analysis of the Talley case emphasized the difficulty and subjectivity
of the prediction. In projecting future sales, Talley had to predict the total dollar
amount of future contracts for a particular product to be awarded by defense
agencies and the portion of the total market for that product they would be
successful in capturing. Underlying the SEC's criticism seems to be the belief
that the projection of $100 million in sales when Talley had a backlog of orders
of only $24 million required something more than a "subject to" qualification.
The SEC stated:
. . . we believe that the auditors relied too heavily upon the representations,
projections and estimates made by Talley's management and did not re
quire sufficient documentation and evidential matter to enable them to
review adequately the sales projections and cost estimates for reasonableness.
In such circumstances, disclosure may not be enough.
Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About an Uncertainty and More
The other case implies that disclosure may sometimes be enough, but that a
"subject to" qualification is a poor substitute. In Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, the critical transaction involved the purchase by
The Firestone Group, Ltd. ( F G L ) of certain nursing homes on November 22,
1969 for $13 million and their subsequent sale four days later for $15 million to a
company run by a Mr. Ruderian. Both the purchase contract and the sales contract
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provided for a payment of $5,000 on execution of the contract, $25,000 approxi
mately one month later, a payment of $4 million (on FGL's purchase) or $5
million (on FGL's sale) on January 30, 1970, with remaining amounts to be
paid over a period of 25 years in monthly installments. The auditor's opinion on
FGL's financial statements was qualified "subject to the collectibility of the
balance receivable on the contract of sale (see Note 4 to the Notes to Financial
Statements)." Note 4 set forth the basic terms of the contracts of purchase and
sale and stated that of the total profit of approximately $2 million only $235,000
was included in income, with the remainder deferred until payment was made
on January 30, 1970.
The sale of the properties by F G L was never accomplished as F G L went
bankrupt, and certain investors in F G L brought suit against the auditors, alleging
that the financial statements did not disclose material facts known by the auditors
concerning the purchase and sale contracts. The auditors argued that their quali
fication and the disclosures in the note to the financial statements adequately
alerted potential investors to doubts the auditors had about the collectibility of
this significant account receivable.
The court rejected the auditor's argument, stating that:
We agree that the qualification throws some doubt on whether the trans
action would be culminated, but we think more was required of Laventhol
as an independent auditor. Each investor was entitled to decide for himself,
on the basis of the stark facts, whether the transaction had a realistic
prospect of being completed. The information needed to make that judg
ment and known to Laventhol was not disclosed in the Laventhol report.
(Emphasis in original)
The court stated that the auditors should have disclosed such facts as that the
party buying the properties had a net worth of only $100,000, and that the presi
dent and controlling stockholder of the buyer, M r . Ruderian, was not personally
liable on the sales contract.
The full litany of the disclosures suggested by the court follows:
Thus, we believe that the full disclosure mandated by the Act required
Laventhol to include in its report at least the following facts: (1) Conti
nental's net worth; (2) the ambiguity of the language in the contracts
which might have suggested to some that they were options; (3) Ruderian,
on whose reputation and representations Laventhol was depending, was
not personally liable on the contracts; (4) Ruderian's practice of reselling
property before he paid for it; (5) neither of the transactions was recorded
in FGL's books of original entry or corporate minute books; (6) this
transaction was the largest in which F G L had ever participated; (7) F G L
would show a loss if the income from the Monterey transactions were not
realized; (8) F G L had not acquired title to the nursing home properties
from Monterey; (9) no deed, title search or title insurance on the prop
erties had ever been obtained by F G L ; and (10) the legal opinion sought
by Laventhol, on which it relied in treating the transaction as an enforce
able purchase and sale, had been obtained over the telephone from an
attorney who not only never saw the contract but never even had it read
to him on the telephone.
The court seems to have emphasized the need for adequate disclosure by
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throwing in everything that might possibly be disclosed. The decision is presently
being appealed and the disclosure burden imposed has been criticized. However,
the court's message is clear. The important thing is the adequacy of disclosure and
providing the investor with enough information to make a personal assessment
of the possible outcome of the uncertainty. The auditor's "subject to" qualifica
tion alone does not do that. The inescapable question is: If the financial state
ments contain enough disclosure to allow the investor to make appropriate
assessment, is there any need for the "subject to" qualification?
Many accountants are coming to the conclusion that the "subject to" qualifica
tion serves little purpose for most uncertainties. The financial statements can
and should give a clear picture of the company's status and prospects along with
a description of the uncertainties that make an accurate picture impossible. How
ever, these accountants would like to hang on to the "subject to" qualification for
the ultimate uncertainty of all—doubt about the company's ability to continue
in operation.
The Going-Going-Gone Concern
This point brings us back to where the analysis started with W . T . Grant. A
company's ability to continue to operate as a going concern is one of the most
fundamental uncertainties faced in the preparation of financial statements. When
such doubts exist, auditors have expressed "subject to" qualifications or in severe
cases disclaimed an opinion.
The qualification of an opinion because of doubts about a company's going
concern status has a number of drawbacks. First, there are no accepted criteria
for determining when a company has changed from a going concern to a gone
concern. Even the fact that a company has filed for bankruptcy is not conclusive
evidence that it will be forced to liquidate. Second, if the decision is made that
financial statements should be prepared using liquidating values rather than
amounts that would be appropriate for a continuing company, there are no gen
erally accepted accounting principles to explain how those financial statements
should be presented.
Research indicates that analysis of financial statements is probably a better
method of evaluating a company's future prospects than relying on a qualified
opinion. Edward Altman and Thomas McGough prepared a quantitative model
based on ratios of financial statement amounts. Generally, their bankruptcy
model proved to be the better predictor of company failure. Altman and McGough
explained the relationship between their model and the auditor's report as follows:
The bankruptcy model and the auditors' report have different but analogous
functions. The model was developed to predict bankruptcy. The auditor
does not attempt any such prediction. A n unqualified opinion is not a
guarantee that a company will continue as a going concern, but an excep
tion because of going-concern problems is not a prediction of liquidation.
A n opinion expressing doubts concerning a company's ability to continue
as a going concern is based on the uncertainty of the fairness of presentation
of the financial statements. It would be possible for financial statements
based upon historical cost to be fairly presented when the company is facing
bankruptcy if the carrying value of the assets of that company represents
the realizable value of those assets.
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Thus, the effect of the going concern question on the auditor's report is not
significantly different from the concern with the impairment of asset values based
on an evaluation of current economic conditions. It is doubtful that the going
concern assumption adds anything to the concept of realization. The auditor's
concern with asset realization and the amount and classification of liabilities
would be the same without any going-concern assumption because of the realiza
tion concept.
Another drawback is that the auditor's qualification is a "self-fulfilling proph
ecy." A company's financial and operating difficulties should be apparent from
its financial statements. A "subject to" qualification only adds to a company's
problems and may hasten its demise. Accounting Series Release No. 115 adds a
new dimension because it puts the auditor in the position of deciding whether a
company is able to obtain more funds to continue operations. The SEC will not
accept a "subject to" qualification based on a company's going concern status in
a registration statement. Thus, a company unable to continue operations unless
it obtains more funds cannot obtain those funds by a public offering of securities.
The auditor's present responsibilities for reporting on uncertainties may force
him to predict future events and analyze the company's future prospects. These
may be useful functions, but the question is whether they are compatible with the
auditor's role and whether an auditor is competent to effectively perform them.
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What Is the Auditor's Role?
The auditor's role is to add to the credibility of financial information. In
formation risk and business risk should not be confused. Financial information
should portray the risks under which a company operates. Predicting the out
come of future events and hence attempting to eliminate those risks from financial
statements is incompatible with the auditor's basic role.
If disclosure in the financial statements is adequate and the auditor's "subject
to" qualification adds nothing, the availability of that qualification may cause the
auditor to stop short of insisting on all the disclosures necessary to inform
investors and place them in a position to evaluate the outcome of uncertainties.
Further, the fact that auditors do issue "subject to" qualifications may lead
investors to think that the absence of a "subject to" qualification means that the
company has no significant uncertainties. In other words, investors may be led
to rely on the auditor to evaluate business risk when the essence of investing is
evaluating business risk and taking a chance on the outcome. Auditors should
not accept a responsibility that would tend to shift some portion of business risk
to them. Their function is to minimize the information risk. The auditor's
attention should be freed for an evaluation of the adequacy of disclosure con
cerning uncertainties.
Under present requirements, some matters closer to departures from generally
accepted accounting principles that cannot be evaluated by investors receive "sub
ject to" qualifications because they contain an element of uncertainty. A distinc
tion is called for between contingencies involving unusual or infrequent events
that depend on an unpredictable future outcome and questions concerning the
impairment of asset values based on current economic conditions. Disclosure is
probably adequate to inform investors about such contingencies. For other
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matters presently called uncertainties, auditors must evaluate the adequacy of
disclosure and consider whether the failure to recognize a loss or recognizing an
uncertain profit is in reality a departure from generally accepted accounting
principles. A departure will exist whenever generally accepted accounting prin
ciples require a reasonable estimate that does not depend for its resolution on the
outcome of a future event. If the auditor does not believe disclosures of the type
recommended by ASR N o . 166 adequately portray the business risk, a "subject
to" qualification is inadequate.
Thus, I recommend that the requirement to issue a "subject to" qualification
be eliminated. It is not an appropriate responsibility for auditors. However, the
term "uncertainties" has been used too broadly, and careful distinctions must be
drawn between contingencies for which no qualification is required and other
matters that under my recommendation may be either departures from generally
accepted accounting principles or matters of insufficient evidential matter re
quiring the auditor to issue a qualified opinion or disclaim an opinion because of
a restricted examination.
Future Accounting for the Future
As generally accepted accounting principles are developed, much more will
have to be done to make investors aware of the uncertainties involved in the
preparation of financial statements.
The Trueblood Report contains recommendations that would improve the
ability of investors to identify and evaluate uncertainties.
For example, it
recommends that ". . . basic underlying assumptions with respect to matters
subject to interpretation, evaluation, prediction or estimation should be dis
closed." It also contains a number of other ideas that would improve disclosure
and presentation of uncertainties. For example:
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• Classify assets and liabilities by uncertainty of amount and timing of
cash flows rather than on the basis of liquidity.
• Separate operations into complete and incomplete earnings cycles and
disclose the results of those cycles separately.
• Disclose ranges of precision, reliability, and uncertainty rather than single
valued estimates.
Implementation of the recommendations of the Trueblood Report may be a
long way off and until the new ideas about providing information concerning
the effect of uncertainty on the financial statements can be implemented, some
intermediate measures would be worthwhile.
First, the type of disclosure recommended by the SEC in ASR N o . 166
could be implemented on a more wide-scale basis. The sensitivity of operating
results to the matters affected by significant uncertainties should be routinely
disclosed.
Another possibility would be to expand the note on disclosure of significant
accounting policies to better explain the assumptions and estimates involved in
certain accounting methods. The percentage of completion method for recogniz
ing revenues would be an outstanding candidate for elaboration.
Significant uncertainties are important enough to deserve their own financial
statement note, similar to the note on significant accounting policies. Thus, in70

vestors would have one place to look for a description of significant uncertainties
instead of being required to read long notes on litigation to pick out an antitrust
suit that could put the company out of business. Investors would not need to
probe credit agreements to find that one recent agreement has locked up the
company's ability to pay dividends, dispose of assets, or enter into any new
debt arrangements.
The auditor's role in evaluating these disclosures would be difficult. In many
ways it may be more difficult than the present responsibilities for reporting on
uncertainties. However, the auditor's task is to evaluate whether or not the
company's financial picture adequately portrays the business risk and not to
reduce or assume that risk. A n auditor should decide whether the picture is
clear enough, rather than worry about whether a caption is necessary to let
people know what a poor picture represents.
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23. The discussion related to improving the communication of uncertainties in financial
reporting is found in Chapter 5, particularly pp. 34-40.

Exhibit I
Example of Auditor's Report and Related Note
on Outcome of Lawsuit Against the Company
ARMSTRONG CORK COMPANY
Auditor's Opinion
The Board of Directors and Stockholders,
Armstrong Cork Company:
We have examined the consolidated balance sheets of Armstrong Cork Company and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1974 and 1973 and the related consolidated statements of earnings
and changes in financial position for the years then ended. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of
the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in
the circumstances.
The company is involved in continuing litigation relating to patent infringement. The
amount of damages, if any, resulting from this litigation cannot be determined at this time.
See Litigation on this page for further details.
In our opinion, subject to the effect on the accompanying financial statements, if any, of
the resolution of the matter referred to in the preceding paragraph, the aforementioned consolidated financial statements present fairly the financial position of Armstrong Cork Company
and subsidiaries at December 31, 1974 and 1973 and the results of their operations and the
changes in their financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles which, except for the changes in 1974, with which we concur,
in the method of valuing inventories and the method of accounting for fluctuations in foreign
exchange rates explained on pages 19 and 20 of the financial review, have been applied on
a consistent basis.
Notes to Financial Statements
In February, 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the earlier decision
of the United States District Court holding that the company infringed chemical embossing
patents held by Congoleum Industries, Inc. The decision applies only to the company's United
States manufacture of a certain type of rotovinyl flooring during the period 1967 through 1972.
A request for the review of this decision by the Supreme Court of the United States is now
being actively pursued.
In 1973 the disputed chemical embossing process used by the company was modified to avoid
further claims of infringement. The trial to determine if the modified chemical process infringes
the Congoleum patents has been held, and a decision should be forthcoming in 1975.
By January 1, 1975, the company had replaced the chemical embossing technique with a
mechanical embossing process involving no question of patent infringement. Accordingly, any
injunction issued will not prevent the continued production of rotovinyl flooring by the company.
Suits also are pending in the United Kingdom and Canada involving comparable chemical
embossing patents. Neither of these suits has reached the trial stage.
The amount of potential damages, if any, will not be known until all legal procedures have
been exhausted. However, with the sales of the disputed rotovinyl material constituting a
relatively small share of consolidated sales, it is management's opinion that the potential
liability could have no material adverse effect on the business or financial position of the
company.

Exhibit II
Example of Auditor's Report and Related Note
on Recoverability of Asset Book Value
C A L L A H A N MINING CORPORATION
Auditors' Opinion
To the Board of Directors and Shareholders of
Callahan Mining Corporation
We have examined the consolidated balance sheet of Callahan Mining Corporation and
Subsidiaries as of December 31, 1974 and the related statements of income and retained earnings
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and of changes in financial position for the year then ended. Our examination was made in
accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and accordingly included such tests of
the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances. We previously examined and reported upon the financial statements for the
year 1973.
The Company's investment in the Caladay Project is carried at cost, the recovery of which
is subject to the success of the project which cannot be forecast at this time, as described in
Note 2 to the consolidated financial statements.
In our opinion, subject to the effects on the financial statements of the ultimate realization
of the carrying value of the investment in the Caladay Project, the aforementioned consolidated
statements present fairly the financial position of Callahan Mining Corporation and Subsidiaries
at December 31, 1974 and 1973 and the results of their operations and the changes in their
financial position for the years then ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles applied on a consistent basis.
Notes to Financial Statements
2. At December 31, 1974, the Company's investment in the Caladay Project aggregated
$3,265,000, including $247,000 representing the cost of property contributed by Callahan and
$980,000 representing the net book value of buildings and equipment. The recovery of this
investment is subject to the success of the project which cannot be forecast at this time. See
page 4.
(Page 4)
Caladay Project
The Caladay Project, which adjoins the Galena mine on the east, remained on a care and
maintenance basis during 1974. Escalating costs have made reactivation of the proposed deep
shaft exploration program unattractive at present in light of the geologic risks involved. Discussions continue on a less costly alternative approach under which initial exploration of this
property may be carried out from one or more of the lower levels of the Galena mine.
In the interest of increased public awareness of mining activities in the District and elsewhere, the Caladay tunnel and underground workings were made available during Expo 74 for
underground tours by some 15,000 visitors to the area.
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Discussant's Response to
Risk and Uncertainty in Financial
Reporting and the Auditor's Role
J. Herman Brasseaux
University of New Orleans
Let me begin by saying that Doug Carmichael's paper is a most comprehen
sive, if not overwhelming, treatment of an extremely timely issue in our profession.
The issue has been raised before but not treated in this fashion. The paper is
provocative; it calls for a basic change in reporting on uncertainty, and as such,
will undoubtedly generate some lively debate.
My views are basically parallel to Doug's (and others') on the central theme
of the paper. So, rather than contest his thesis, I will attempt to deal with some
of the practical reasons why it may be some time before the profession is ready
and willing to take the step recommended in Doug's paper.
The Problem of Uncertainty
A discussion of the auditor's role in this area must include a consideration of
the nature of uncertainty as it affects the business enterprise and a consideration
of the methodology of reflecting and reporting on uncertainty in financial state
ments. The business enterprise has experienced increasing complexity over the
past two centuries, but especially in the most recent 30 years, and the uncertainty
within the business environment has greatly accelerated. Measuring income for a
short period such as a quarter or a year and measuring financial position at a
given date, when one considers the risk environment of business entities in today's
world, is a heroic undertaking indeed! Coupled with this is the fact that our
methodology and capability to measure, portray and communicate business uncer
tainty to the average reader have been and remain inadequate.
Given these problems, it is encouraging that we are making progress in getting
a better understanding of the impact of uncertainty and in reporting thereon.
FASB Statement No. 5, SEC disclosure requirements in this area, the Trueblood
Report, and the soon to be released FASB proposal on the conceptual framework
project are but a few examples of our efforts to get a better handle on the
uncertainty issue.
A quick look at annual reports being published at this time of the year attests
to the literal explosion which is taking place in financial statement disclosure.
The notes to the statements frequently run several pages longer than the basic
statements and much of the increased disclosure relates to the complexity and
uncertainty of the firm's environment. To cite one case in point, the 1975
Annual Report of Occidental Petroleum presents the basic financial statements in
five pages, but the notes require nine pages. The note on contingent liabilities
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and commitments, alone, runs over two full pages. The increased disclosure in
footnote form may be an indication of the inadequacy of the basic financial state
ments to convey the full message in technical language form, and hence our
tendency is to revert to narrative explanations which are long and inefficient and
probably not well understood. One observation is that comparability of financial
statements, if this ever was a realistic goal, has suffered a serious setback. Another
observation may be that with so much disclosure, the auditor needs a means of
calling attention to the most or more important items.
Our greater awareness to the uncertain environment of business and our
efforts to better reflect this condition in financial statements are quite germane
to our concern with the auditor's reporting responsibility. A difficult question,
or perhaps the central question, facing us is whether we have made sufficient
progress in the standards for financial statement presentation (especially now
that FASB N o . 5 is part of our literature) to justify a change in the auditor's
reporting on uncertainty.
Time for a Change?
Doug says the time has arrived for us to make a change, i.e., eliminate the
use of the "subject to" qualification. In other words, we should limit audit
qualifications to those situations where the financial statements fail to conform
to generally accepted accounting principles and for conventional scope limitations.
The central recommendations of the paper revolves around two basic issues.
They are (1) the benefits of the "subject to" notation to users when the financial
statements otherwise disclose material uncertainties and (2) the protection afforded
to auditors by the addition of the "subject to" clause in the opinion.
When we look at the developing nature of accounting standards and auditing
reporting standards over the last 40 years, there have been sound and under
standable reasons for the type of audit reporting which has prevailed. Not only
have accounting standards (and the auditor's reporting thereon) been gradually
evolving, but the extensiveness of use of financial statements and the expectations
of users have increased. The auditor has felt obligated to make up for some of
the deficiencies in accounting standards by using the "subject to" and sometimes
the "disclaimer" as signals to the reader. Thus for some years the auditor has
used these signals whenever it was felt that the financial statements failed to
adequately convey the risk situation or that there was a need (and/or expectation)
of additional emphasis.
The conditions which gave rise to the use of "subject to" and sometimes the
"disclaimer" opinion have been fully explained by Doug. Further, the reasons
why we should now move on to a new period in reporting on uncertainty are well
documented. Why, then, should we not make this move?
Reader Expectations
Basic to the question of the continued use of the "subject to" opinion is the
role (or the perceived role) of the auditor when associated with a firm facing
unusual uncertainties and/or serious financial difficulty. Many feel (within and
without the profession) that regardless of nice sounding phrases such as "audit
ing standards," "present fairly," and "conformity with generally accepting ac75

counting principles," if serious or potentially serious financial consequences are
looming for the firm under audit, the auditor had better be on record, up front,
with some appropriate warning. If practitioners perceive that stockholders and
creditors (and likely courts and juries, too) expect some explicit warning from
the auditor, this constitutes a bias on the part of the auditor which is difficult,
in the extreme, to dislodge. The matter becomes not what users and society
should expect, but rather what many in the profession perceive their expectations
to be.
We should not overlook the fact that the communication pattern (i.e., the
auditor's reporting on unusual uncertainties) has been established and utilized at
least since the early 1960's. A l l the parties to the communication "message" have
been conditioned. A change in the form of the message will require re-education.
It is certainly difficult in the mass communication arena to change well-ingrained
behavior patterns. Are the arguments supporting a change strong enough to
justify the efforts?
Other Considerations
On a related point, when the Auditing Standards Executive Committee was
considering an SAS on the wording of the standard auditor's report, a decision
was made not to change the words "present fairly . . ." but rather to "explain"
the existing words. There was concern that changing the words would cause
excessive complications.
In evaluating Doug's thesis on "subject to" qualifications, we must assess,
from a judgmental point of view at least, whether, given the state of the art, we
have indeed made sufficient progress in accounting standards and the accounting
framework to warrant a change in audit reporting for uncertainties. Doug's paper
cites the improvements of FASB No. 5 and other sources such as SEC require
ments. His paper also points out that FASB N o . 5 does not treat all areas of
uncertainties. Maybe the FASB upcoming pronouncement on the conceptual
framework will help fill the remaining gaps in our literature. Until we are able
to treat uncertainties in a comprehensive manner in the financial statements within
accounting standards, should the profession deny the auditor this reporting tool?
On the other hand, if we can conclude that FASB N o . 5 has internalized
uncertainty (or, at least loss contingencies) within accounting standards, then we
can argue that the auditor's role should be to determine that the financial state
ments conform to accounting standards. This reasoning supports the notion that
there is little added benefit provided to the reader by the auditor's use of the
"subject to" opinion if the uncertainty has been adequately disclosed in the
financial statements.
Auditor Protection or Small Comfort?
If, however, the use of the "subject to" opinion cannot be strongly supported
on the basis of (added) utility to statement users, does its value as protection to
the auditor support its continued use? Doug has pointed out to us that in at least
two instances, viz., Talley Industries and Herzfeld vs. L K H & H , the presence
of the "subject to," absent what was deemed therein to be adequate disclosure,
did not provide much protection to the auditor. However, to most practitioners
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there may still be some comfort in being able to point to "something" in the
opinion if unfavorable consequences overtake the client.
The great reluctance on the part of practitioners to give up any reporting
tools was clearly demonstrated, I believe, in the controversy which preceded the
issuance of SAS N o . 2 on "Reports on Audited Financial Statements." Much
argument and support had developed in the profession and in the Auditing
Standards Committee to support the position that there was little benefit to
readers or protection to auditors in the use of a "disclaimer" in cases of material
(even very material) uncertainties, beyond that which a "subject to" with ade
quate disclosure could provide. As you may know, the compromise (which was
necessary to get a two-thirds vote) was to "permit," although not recommend,
the use of "disclaimer" where an auditor felt a need to flash a warning that might
have greater impact than that provided by "subject to."
Prognosis
The profession has experienced a period of unprecedented litigation where the
tendency has been for auditors to look to all existing professional rules and guide
lines as protection and to resist strenuously giving in on any point. Courts and
regulatory bodies have stepped in and are defining and redefining professional
responsibilities. This environment is not at all conducive to our taking bold,
progressive steps in the audit reporting area.
Of great practical significance is the fact that the "subject to" opinion is the
one departure from the auditor's unqualified report (other than the consistency
exception) which is acceptable to the SEC. It is undoubtedly true, as Doug
points out, that this departure is sometimes used when an "except for" may be
more appropriate. Nevertheless, the "subject to" opinion has become institu
tionalized and is used by the auditor whenever it is felt that a signal should be
given to the reader, or more likely, whenever it is felt that there is a need for
some protection in case of adverse consequences.
In summary, I believe Doug has made a strong case for his proposal. I ques
tion whether the time is right from the point of view of practitioners and perhaps
even from the point of view of users and regulatory bodies.
I believe progress, such as suggested by Doug, should and will come about.
It will simply take longer than some of us may feel it properly should.
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5
Status Report on Auditing in the European Community*
Richard L. Kramer
Arthur Andersen & Co., Brussels
My comments will be principally directed towards practice within the Euro
pean Economic Community ( E E C ) . There are, of course, European countries
who are not members of the E E C , but the nine member states of the E E C
include Europe's largest economic entities, and the major developments in the
accounting scene are taking place within the E E C . That scene is, however, one
of deep contrasts, so that endeavoring to comment on any aspect of accounting
or auditing within the E E C presents a considerable challenge.
The E E C encompasses the countries of Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany.
The nine member states have a population of approximately 255 million and a
gross national product of approximately $1,000 billion (the United States equiva
lents being approximately 211 million and $1,400 billion).
Historical Developments
A little history is helpful to put our topic in perspective. Considerable differ
ences in accounting philosophies and practices have always existed among the
original six member states. The admission in 1973 of Great Britain and Ireland
(who share a substantially common approach) and of Denmark brought yet
further and deeper diversities. The expanded E E C then had to resolve not only
the differences already present in Continental practices but also to accommodate
the very different philosophies and practices held by Great Britain and Ireland.
The result was an encounter which, sparing a blow-by-blow description, has
fortunately moved the accounting harmonization process quite clearly in the
direction of U.S. practices. This resulted not only from strong recognition of
British-Irish practices but also because several member states have taken advan
tage of the time delay to make needed changes in their own professions and
accounting practices. This encouraging progress should not, however, lead us to
underestimate the magnitude of the harmonization task itself nor the time con
suming nature inherent in the process of getting nine sovereign countries to first
* Author's note: For purposes of presentation at this symposium, comparison of the E E C
generally was made to U.S. accounting and auditing practices. Such a comparison suffers on
two accounts. First, European practices are so diverse that country-by-country analyses and
comparisons are really needed to do justice to the subject. Michael Lafferty's recent book
Accounting in Europe (Woodhead Faulkner Ltd., 1975), is highly recommended for the
interested reader. Second, a more correct, but time-consuming and overly ambitious, approach
would have been to compare European and U.S. practices to an international standard. Hopefully, the worldwide professions, including the U.S., will move in this direction.
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agree and then to implement anything which is such a basic part of their
political and economic structures.
Accounting harmonization within the E E C has received wide coverage in
academic circles within the U.S. in recent years. The discussions have, however,
tended to concentrate on accounting principles and reporting philosophies rather
than upon auditing. Any meaningful discussion of auditing must first deal with
the diverse accounting and reporting environment, after which we can explore
the present and prospective auditing scene in more depth.
Major Accounting Differences
Accounting within the E E C is characterized by five important differences
compared with the United States:
1. Public interest (largely a function of share ownership) in business varies
tremendously between countries. In most member states, share owner
ship is either not extensive or is channeled through banks and other
institutions (particularly in Germany) with the result that there is little
demand for improved reporting standards. Hitherto, only in the British
Isles and The Netherlands has there existed a sufficiently wide public
interest in business for it to have an impact on financial reporting.
2. Company law in a number of countries, rather than "fairness," domi
nates financial reporting. In such countries, notably Germany and
France, prime importance is attached to conformity of financial state
ments with the detailed provisions of the law rather than whether such
financial statements provide a fair presentation. It is probably only in
the British Isles and The Netherlands where "fairness" is at present
considered to be the overriding objective in financial reporting.
3. Tax laws in certain countries, notably Belgium, France and Germany,
have constituted a major obstacle to the development of meaningful
financial reporting by requiring that income and expenses be treated the
same for both book and tax purposes. Since the objectives of tax legis
lation and financial reporting frequently diverge, these countries have
thus created a seemingly impenetrable barrier to the development of
improved accounting standards.
4. Creditor protection is emphasized, rather than communicating with
shareholders. In Belgium, for example, we observe that unions are
working vigorously for adequate disclosure, while management, share
holders, and the financial community are disinterested. This attitude
combined with the requirements and economics of the tax laws tends to
result in more conservative financial statements and less complete dis
closure than might otherwise prevail.
5. The accounting professions within the E E C have generally had only a
weak to moderate influence in the establishment and development of
accounting standards and, until recently, such endeavors were highly
diffused.
In such an environment, it is not a surprise that auditing standards and
procedures tend to vary from very poor to barely adequate by comparison with
generally accepted auditing standards in use in the United States.
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Fortunately, the seeds for reform are present in the form of the harmonization
of accounting and reporting practices.
Accounting Harmonization
The Treaty of Rome establishing the original E E C provided for the eventual
overall harmonization of corporate law within the Community, and to this end
the Commission of the European Communities has issued a series of proposed
directives. The proposed Fourth Directive, originally issued in 1971, is concerned
with the presentation and content of annual financial statements, methods of
valuation, and the publication of such financial statements. While it is hard to
imagine nine countries with greater differences in their present practices, there is
one unique common feature in that each member is charged under the Treaty
with responsibility for minimizing these differences. There is thus a driving
force behind their efforts which is not generally present in other forms of
accounting cooperation. The Fourth Directive has been gestating for over a
decade and it is now possible to see the likely content and to envisage its inclusion
in the statute books of the member states by approximately 1980.
The underlying philosophy of the revised proposed Fourth Directive may be
summarized as follows:
Concept of fairness. The overall concept of "fairness" rather than conformity
with the law is to be the cornerstone of financial reporting. This, however, is
to be achieved not by establishing detailed accounting rules but by the acceptance
of existing practices backed by elaborate disclosures.
Present practice accepted. The proposals are principally based on existing
laws, generally accepted accounting principles, and business practices within the
Community. This does not mean that new norms have not been established—
they have. But it does recognize that some practices (such as the insistence of
certain member states that book and tax reporting be in conformity) cannot be
overcome through the present legislation.
Prescribed basic principles. In spite of permitting a variety of accounting
practices in certain areas, the proposed Directive establishes a number of highly
desirable basic reporting standards. For example, depreciation of fixed assets will
be required, and the use of hidden reserves to normalize income will be pre
cluded. Although it can be argued that the basic principles represent little more
than the lowest common denominator within the E E C , it must be continually
emphasized that the E E C , because its accounting and reporting had languished,
has had far to travel in recent years and must, therefore, frequently settle for
pragmatic, partial advances.
National standards may be established. The proposed Directive permits the
application of a variety of accounting principles. In addition, matters not covered
may be prescribed by the legislature or, more likely, the professional bodies of the
member states. Thus, the more progressive members of the E E C who have
already established more ambitious standards or programs than those envisaged
by the proposed Directive will generally be free to pursue these programs.
Application is selective. The proposed Directive will apply to all forms of
companies that limit the liability of owners for the companies' debts; these types
of companies in each of the member states are specified in Article 1 of the
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proposed Directive. However, it contains a provision that would authorize mem
ber states to permit certain small private companies to publish abridged balance
sheet and profit and loss information.
Auditing
With the foregoing background, I can now turn specifically to auditing
standards and procedures within the E E C . My comments will be directed mainly
to the more significant differences between the E E C and the United States. For
this purpose, my comments will refer to the primary headings of generally ac
cepted auditing standards as used in the United States; namely, general standards,
standards of field work and standards of reporting. Auditing procedures as
distinct from auditing standards are also discussed.
I will then offer some comments on the possible course of future develop
ments.
Because of the many contrasts between member states, an overall comparison
between the E E C and the United States becomes complicated. To cut through
the diversity, one must concentrate on the factors that are common to a number
of the E E C countries that differ from practice in the United States. Therefore,
I must generalize and generalizations by their nature will be charitable to some
and uncharitable to others.
Accounting and Auditing Contrasted
Probably the most striking difference between the E E C and the United States
is the degree to which the development of auditing standards and procedures has
lagged behind the development of accounting and reporting standards.
In most member states, auditing standards and procedures are far from
maturity and in some member states are hardly embryonic. While differences in
accounting and reporting have received much attention in recent years and the
proposals for harmonization are at a relatively advanced stage, the establishment
of generally accepted auditing standards is really still an embryo. Even in the
British Isles, which is generally viewed as the most advanced of the member
states, the accounting profession acknowledges it has yet to develop auditing
standards and procedures in many areas and has therefore recently announced
its intention to devote much greater effort in this area.
This is generally in deep contrast to the situation in the United States, where
it has long been recognized that the development of accounting practices and
auditing standards must move in unison if the end product is to be improved.
Such unison of development has not generally been present in the E E C .
Concept of an Audit
While the accounting professions of most member states aspire to using the
basic concepts of auditing accepted in the United States, the laws of certain
countries, for example, Belgium and Italy, provide for the appointment of auditors
in circumstances which do not even remotely resemble an examination using
generally accepted auditing standards. In these countries, it is recognized that
the statutory audits required by the law involve little more than a cursory review
of the financial statements and that the whole exercise is very perfunctory.
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Government Involvement
While the governments of the member states have established the legal
framework for auditing by requiring audits of various types of entities, the
approach has varied significantly between countries.
One of the most interesting differences is the type of entity that must be
audited. Most continental member states began by requiring that only listed
companies be audited and then expanded the requirement over the years to other
companies meeting certain criteria, generally size. In contrast, the law in the
British Isles requires that all companies with limited liability be audited irrespec
tive of size. This means that in the British Isles, over half a million companies
are audited annually, theoretically to the same auditing standards since neither
the law nor the professional literature recognizes any differences in this regard.
However, the profession tacitly recognizes the differences in the auditing pro
cedures it applies and it would appear that legal and professional recognition of
the impossibility of auditing all companies to the same standard is a necessary
prelude to improvement of auditing standards in the British Isles.
In addition to stipulating the entities to be audited, the governments of most
member states have established provisions relating to the qualifications, appoint
ment, responsibilities, etc., of auditors. Although there are many differences, they
are not significant to the overall view.
Professional Institutes
While the laws of most member states have provided a legal environment for
auditing, the auditing standards to be applied have invariably been left to the
respective national professional institutes. The standards established by the pro
fessional institutes have hitherto been principally concerned with what are termed
"general standards" in the United States. They have thus been primarily con
cerned with training and proficiency, independence, and related professional
matters.
Even in countries where the respective institutes have issued pronouncements
on more detailed auditing procedures, the approach has been ad hoc. In no
country within the E E C does there exist a comprehensive body of published
auditing standards building from the general to the particular equivalent to that
issued by the American Institute.
Qualifications
Most member states share the philosophy that auditing is a highly respon
sible activity that should be conducted only by parties who have obtained recog
nized professional qualifications. With a few exceptions, the obtaining of a
professional qualification is essential to a right to practice and the laws of most
member states restrict auditing to members of certain recognized professional
institutes. Admission to such institutes is invariably by examination, accompanied
by varying periods of internship aimed at providing a thorough grounding in
accounting and auditing practices before admission. The educational standards
necessary to commence training are generally high although a university degree
is not universally required. Overall, the professional accountant within the E E C
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is generally well prepared to play a more vigorous role as the auditing pro
fession develops.
Independence
While it has generally been recognized that independence is a significant
factor, the concept does not have the sanctity it has in the United States. Thus,
while it is generally accepted that an auditor may not be an employee of the
company and that no member of the auditing firm should participate in the man
agement of the company, there are few rules with regard to share ownership in
client companies. Thus, in the British Isles, share ownership by an auditor in a
client company, which had been a requirement for appointment, has in the past
year been finally officially viewed as an impairment to the independence. The
current regulations do, however, provide for a period of transition in which
auditors may continue to hold shares in client companies. In Germany, the com
mercial banks are among the major shareholders of most companies and a
number of the major German auditing firms are owned wholly or partly by
such commercial banks, thus creating a situation in which the auditor is also
a shareholder.
Some examples can be cited in which E E C countries are ahead of the United
States. Guidelines in the United Kingdom state that an auditor should derive no
more than 15% of total fees from any one client; a guideline basic to inde
pendence which the United States could consider importing. Perhaps the U.S.
was following a European lead in 1975 when the A I C P A announced SAS 7,
dealing with communications between predecessor and successor auditors, since
the Dutch Institute had established a similar rule of conduct (specifically Rule
29) several years ago. The Dutch rules carefully cover the request of information
from the preceding auditors and require receipt of such information (except for
unreasonable delays) before acceptance of an appointment. Perhaps this is one
of the major reasons why the Dutch profession has such stature, and members of
the profession have such strong, yet independent, relationships with their clients.
Standards of Reporting
Standards of reporting in terms of expressing an opinion with regard to
adherence to generally accepted accounting principles, the adequacy of informa
tive disclosures and the overall "fairness" of the financial statements, present
many contrasts with practice in the United States.
As we have seen, there are at present few generally accepted accounting principles recognized in all countries within the E E C , and two member states, notably
Belgium and Italy, are virtually without any established accounting principles.
Although this situation is in the process of change through the legislative efforts
of the European Commission, the final directive will provide for no more than
certain basic ingredients for financial statements. Accounting principles will still
vary substantially between countries for the foreseeable future; in fact, the
differences appear to be growing. Most Continental countries continue to be
wedded to cost while the British Isles is moving rapidly towards value-based
financial statements. (Of course, my friends in The Netherlands quickly point
out that the introduction of replacement value accounting dates back to 1924;
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however, there is by no means widespread application and no observable trend to
extensive usage such as exists today in the British Isles.)
Thus, an intelligent reading of financial statements from within the E E C
demands a thorough knowledge of the accounting principles pertaining in a
particular member state. However, even with such knowledge one is not neces
sarily fully equipped, in that no member state has developed a body of generally
accepted accounting principles which approach those in existence in the United
States. The absence of generally accepted principles in many areas combined
with an acknowledged reticence toward disclosure in many member states, fre
quently leaves many unanswered questions concerning financial statements.
Turning to the adequacy of disclosures, we have seen that conformity with
the law continues to be the benchmark for financial statements in certain states.
Even where "fairness" is an acknowledged objective, the law has continued to
play a significant role in financial statements. For example, while "fairness" may
be considered the overriding criterion for financial statements in the British
Isles, companies and the accounting profession have been slow to expand dis
closures beyond those required by the law. Thus, information relating to such
matters as pension costs, leasing obligations, and related party transactions are
rarely covered in financial statements in the British Isles. Overall, in the E E C
the adequacy of informative disclosures falls far short of present standards in the
United States.
With regard to auditors' reports, we have seen that the range is from the
concept of conformity with the law (as in Germany) to one of "fairness" (as i n
the British Isles and The Netherlands). A number of states specify additional
matters that must be included in auditors' reports, but these are not significant
to an understanding of overall standards.
Auditing Procedures
Detailed auditing procedures within the E E C are almost unbelievably varied
and hence generalizations are particularly difficult.
Generally, there is much less emphasis on what is termed in the United States
"competent evidential matter." While some independent corroborative procedures
are followed, they tend to be limited. Circularization of receivables has been
endorsed by the professions in the British Isles, Germany, France, and The
Netherlands as has the observation of physical inventories. Accounts payable are
not generally circularized and the obtaining of legal representations is rare.
Even greater differences are created by the fact that professional endorsement
of a procedure does not necessarily mean it is universally followed since pro
fessional pronouncements in auditing are generally no more than recommenda
tions and compliance is not mandatory. Thus, while the confirmation of
receivables and the observation of physical inventories are recommended by the
professions in the British Isles, France, and Germany, such procedures are by no
means universally followed in those countries.
It should be noted that in many respects auditing is a relatively new science in
certain member states. For instance, in France prior to 1966 only listed companies
had to be audited and the most that other companies received was a cursory
review. Thus, the present Commissaires aux Comptes are very much in the early
84

stages of developing and implementing procedures that approach generally
accepted standards in the more advanced member states. Actual practice in
France is still far behind the professional pronouncements. A n even more
embryonic situation prevails in Belgium and Italy. In these countries, significant
improvements will require a generation to change significantly, which requires a
time consuming educational process.
What of the Future?
My comments so far have painted a picture of somewhat backward auditing
practices in the E E C . On a positive note, recent years have seen the establish
ment of the foundations that should provide a base on which to elevate auditing
standards, and it is clear that there is a growing awakening to this problem.
Generally, the accounting professions within the member states are increasingly
well-equipped to elevate their standards. Further significant developments in the
area of auditing will undoubtedly take place in the coming years and I will
mention the more significant likely developments.
In this connection, I have emphasized the magnitude of the task facing our
European contemporaries. When we consider the energy, devotion, and traumas,
that have accompanied some of the major auditing developments in the United
States, the prospect of conducting the same exercise with the representatives from
nine different member states with deeply rooted traditions, practices, etc., presents
a task that is, to say the least, formidable. Great credit is due to our European
contemporaries for undertaking this endeavor and for the efforts that have and
will be made. My feeling is one of guarded optimism about the probable outcome.
What has to be done? In summary, the effort hitherto brought to accounting
by member states and combined institutions now needs to be mirrored by similar
efforts in auditing. Without such redirection, financial statements may look fine
but whether they are right will remain questionable.
Fourth Directive
The Fourth Directive has now received a second reading by the Council of
Ministers working party and will probably be enacted by the Council within the
next year. The enactment of the Fourth Directive by the Council will require
each member state to incorporate its provisions into its national laws within a
period of 30 months. The enactment of the Fourth Directive will, I suspect, act as
a sort of watershed for progress within the E E C . The professions will realize how
much has been achieved and begin to see the potential for further progress.
Fifth Directive
The Fifth Directive on the Structure of Sociétés Anonymes (1972) contained
a number of important measures with regard to auditors. The proposed directive
would apply to each company that is organized under the law of a member state
as a sociétéanonyme, which term is used to describe a corporation whose capital
is represented by freely transferable shares and whose shareholders have no per
sonal liability to creditors beyond the amount of unpaid subscriptions for shares.
Among the more important provisions concerning auditors are the provisions con
cerning the independence of auditors and the appointment of auditors.
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A person would not be eligible to become the auditor of a company if then or
during the last three years the person was a member of the company's super
visory board, management board, or staff. Similar restrictions would apply to
an enterprise or firm if any member or partner in the firm or member of its
supervisory or management board or person having power to represent the firm
is or during the past three years was a member of the company's supervisory
board, management board, or staff. Auditors would be appointed for a specified
period, which would have to be at least 3 and not more than 6 years although
auditors would be eligible to be reappointed to successive terms.
While the provisions of the Fifth Directive relating to auditors will undoubt
edly find their way to the statute book eventually, the overall Directive contains
many contentious matters with regard to worker participation in management and
it may be necessary to present the provisions relating to auditors in a new
document.
National Progress
The gradual integration of many E E C institutions and the advent of a single
capital market is likely to provide a tremendous impetus to certain national
laggards. In other words, the example being set in certain member states will
undoubtedly be emulated by others. The changes that have occurred in France
in the last decade illustrate the sort of development that is likely to evolve in
other member states.
However, leaving developments to individual member states may result in
slow and fortuitous progress and it seems likely that substantive progress will
only be made through the combined efforts of the member states.
International Development
As in the United States, governments appear content to leave the logistical
aspects of auditing to the accounting professions—provided, of course, satisfactory
progress is made. Accordingly, responsibility for raising auditing standards pres
ently rests squarely with the professions.
A number of organizations presently exist which could act as a catalyst to
improve auditing standards. The Union Européenne des Experts Comptables
Economiques et Financiers (the " U E C " ) and the E E C Accountants Study Group
(the "Study Group") would be the natural forums. The U E C , which is an
international organization embracing virtually all the European countries, has
already issued some statements on auditing but they have been relatively low key
and are no more than recommendations. Accordingly, a much more likely
forum is the Study Group.
The Study Group comprises representatives of the professional bodies of the
member states. For a number of years, the Study Group has assisted the Euro
pean Commission in the study and development of accounting, and it has become
recognized as the principal body with which the Commission and its various
agencies consult on accounting matters. The Study Group has played an active
role in the development of the Fourth Directive but hitherto its efforts have been
largely confined to accounting principles and reporting practices. As I have
illustrated, there is an urgent need within the E E C for the harmonization of
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accounting and reporting practices, to be followed by the harmonization and
elevation of auditing standards. This will require the combined efforts of the
professional institutes of the various member states and I believe that it is inevi
table that the Study Group or similar body will be charged with the harmoniza
tion of auditing standards. Exactly how this will be achieved is unknown.
However, countries are presently cooperating in accounting and reporting matters
in a manner which was almost inconceivable only a few years ago, and it is clear
that such study and eventual harmonization must, of necessity, reach auditing
standards and procedures.
Value Reporting
No current commentary on the accounting scene within the E E C would be
complete without mention of the move towards value orientated reporting in the
British Isles. Following the issue of the Sandilands Committee recommendations
last year, the accounting profession is now rapidly developing the disciplines
necessary to implement a system known as Current Cost Accounting ( C C A ) .
This system will report fixed assets and inventories at current value and also
report the impact of inflation on reported results. The end product is a system
very similar to that set forth in the Arthur Andersen & Co. publication Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises Throughout the World.
The significance of value reporting to auditing lies in the fact that it
demands a significant change in mentality on the part of the auditor. The auditor
is charged with reporting on amounts which are highly relevant but not necessarily
subject to the precise determination that has been possible under the historical
cost system. This will, of course, inject greater subjectivity into the role of the
auditor and as a result, demand much greater judgment and caution.
Auditors' Liability
And now to end on a lighter note. One significant memorandum issued by
the Study Group in 1974 concerned the liability of auditors. It clearly reflects
recognition that with progress will come responsibilities that must be defined
and limited. The principal recommendations and conclusions contained in the
memorandum were that:
1. Any damage arising from reliance placed on a company's annual finan
cial statements that do not present a true and fair view should be
primarily the responsibility of the company's management board.
2. Legal liability proceedings should be brought against auditors only after
all recourse against members of the management board relating to the
statements has been exhausted.
3. Because all auditors in member states do not have professional liability
insurance, the present unlimited liability of auditors in certain member
states offers false security in that compensation frequently cannot be
made beyond the means of the auditor and thus the right to unlimited
damages is purely theoretical. Accordingly, it is proposed that in any
case of civil liability, where the wrongful act was not committed
intentionally:
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a) any loss that is estimated at an amount of approximately $100,000 or
less, must be made good in full, and
b) any loss of a higher amount shall be made good up to an amount
equal to ten times the annual audit fee relating to the accounts in
question or an amount of approximately $1,000,000, whichever is less.
4. Professional insurance up to the recommended maximum liability
amounts should be made obligatory.
In the light of experience in the United States, our contemporaries within the
E E C may have many shortcomings, but they most certainly have communicated
the message loud and clear with regard to reasonably limiting their obligation.
This is but one example of an area where the U.S. may have much to
learn—that of working out an effective, constructive working relationship be
tween government and the profession. This may, in fact, be one of the main
reasons for the U.S. to take increased interest in future E E C developments. If the
past few years are any guide, the E E C countries will increasingly encounter
terrain familiar to the United States, and their highly pragmatic solutions may
increasingly provide comparisons and contrasts to be studied, and additional
lessons to be learned.
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Discussant's Response to
Status Report on Auditing in the European Community
Jan Klaassen
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam
(Visiting faculty, Oklahoma State University, Spring 1976)
The task of preparing a report on the status of auditing in a single country is
a difficult one because of the many auditing aspects involved; preparing a status
report on auditing in nine countries is even more difficult because of the
differences among the countries. Taking this into account, Richard Kramer's
report gives a clear analysis of the current accounting and auditing situation.
I will not focus my discussion on the description of the current situation as
such, but try to add some aspects that are relevant for an evaluation of that
situation and for formulating expectations.
I will cover mainly three topics:
(a) The evaluation criteria used to analyze the status of auditing.
(b) The current status and future expectations about accounting.
(c) The current status and expectations concerning the future of auditing.
Evaluation Criteria
The problem of using appropriate criteria is probably the most difficult prob
lem that one faces in evaluating the current status, since the outcome of the
evaluation is very much dependent upon these criteria.
The author compares the situation of the E E C as a whole with that of the
U.S., taking in most instances the American situation as a standard. It is
undoubtedly interesting for U.S. accountants and auditors to compare their
situation with the European situation. Unfortunately, however, this method of
comparison obscures the fact that the E E C is so different from the U.S. that the
two cannot realistically be compared.
First, the E E C consists of nine different states, each one having its own
economic, political, and social system. To consider the E E C as a whole is at the
present time only justified in the areas of agricultural and trade policy. The
corporations in each of the member states are mainly operated under company
laws, which are different in each state. There is not yet a European company
operating under E E C rules.
A unified European capital market, in the sense that banking systems, stock
exchanges, etc., are integrated, does not exist. Although there are, of course, in
the E E C a number of multi-national corporations, the capital sources, ownership,
and employees for most companies are concentrated in the countries where the
companies have their main operations. So the financial statements and the
attached auditing reports are mainly only of importance within each country.
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Auditing work is done in each country according to national standards. The
educational system in each country has the purpose of providing the required
knowledge for an auditor to operate at a national level. Generally state laws
require certain corporations to be audited, and at the same time set requirements
for the auditor's qualifications. Foreign accountants are generally allowed to audit
those corporations only if they have the same qualifications as national accountants.
The foregoing means that in each country auditing is mainly of national
importance, and it has some specified meaning which is recognized within each
country. Therefore, the status of auditing and accounting would be better
judged by taking into account the national circumstances. In other words, the
evaluation criterion could be: Do auditing and accounting, under the national
political, economic, and social circumstances of a certain country, perform their
functions well?
This statement of the problem does not take into account that there is a
tendency toward economic, political, and social integration. But for the moment,
this integration is not at all realized. Therefore, it is in my opinion that it is
better to discuss this as a prospective issue, although this perspective clearly
requires very important changes.
Accounting: The Current Situation and the Future
The author mentions five points, describing differences between accounting
in the E E C and in the U.S. Some of these points are probably connected. Thus,
if shareholdership is less important, it is to be expected that creditor protection
receives more emphasis. Then too, it should be added that the interests of
employees tend to become an increasingly important factor that should be taken
into account.
Government involvement in setting rules for financial reporting is probably
connected with the degree of freedom for national accounting professions to set
accounting standards. With the author, I believe that too much government
involvement can be a hindrance to prepare meaningful and fair financial state
ments, but on the other hand, if certain laws exist which prescribe certain strict
rules, their appropriate evaluation criterion is whether or not those rules are good,
taking into account the purposes and uses of financial statements in those coun
tries. Especially since the investing public is less important in the E E C than in
the U.S. and other groups are more important as users of the services of auditors
and accountants, U.S. criteria are not valid in judging the adequacy of disclosure
and valuation in the E E C .
From this viewpoint, undoubtedly, the situation in certain countries is not
optimal (especially not in Italy). Additionally, tax laws requiring certain treat
ments of income determination in the financial statements can be obstacles to
improvement of accounting standards, as Kramer has indicated.
The prospects for harmonization are, however, clearly laid down in the
Fourth Directive of the European Community. Its second draft is influenced by
the accounting profession, via the E E C Accountants' Study Group. This proposal
is a basis for future development by means of its design. It is mainly directed
toward disclosure, but it allows flexibility. However, it is still unclear to what
extent there will be room for accounting standards, although it can be expected
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that these will to some extent be proposed on an E E C level. The resulting system
is not likely to be as extensive as the U.S. system of generally accepted accounting
principles, and it will also be considerably more flexible.
As long as the economic and political integration is still in statue nascendi,
it is in my opinion not a disadvantage that there remains some room for national
financial reporting differences. The trend towards value accounting in the
British Isles is very much comparable to the trend in the Netherlands, where we
clearly see a tendency to show both historical cost and replacement cost-based
profit caclulations. This tendency is also present in Germany where the
Accountants Institute recommended that financial statements should show the
effect on profit of price changes of assets consumed in sales, as far as they were
financed by stockholders' equity.
Auditing: Present and Future
The paper presents the following picture of the current situation:
(a) Auditing standards are different in the member states and are in
some countries even absent.
(b) Standards of reporting are less developed.
(c) Auditing procedures are less stringently prescribed than they are in
the U.S..
The auditing standards in each country are a reflection of the concept of
auditing prevalent in that member state. The differences among the states can
probably be expressed in the following generalizations. As far as the examination
of the accounting system is concerned, there is a distinction between professions
emphasizing the formal correctness of the books and those emphasizing auditing
techniques that are more directed to problems of insuring that all the economic
activities of a firm are properly reported. In the area of financial reporting, a
distinction might be made between emphasis on legal requirements and emphasis
on the adequacy of financial statements in providing information.
To appraise the situation properly, pronouncements on auditing standards
need not necessarily be considered to be a good source, since at least in some
countries they are only a reflection of generally accepted standards that are
already operational. However, many firms apply their own, more detailed
standards, and in some countries courts take jurisdiction on behalf of the pro
fession to make certain that auditing practice is appropriate in the circumstances.
So at least a partial explanation for the absence of stringent auditing standards
is an individualistic attitude among auditors which emphasizes the choice of the
appropriate techniques for each company. It might be expected that the above
mentioned differences in approach towards auditing will make it very difficult
to develop uniform auditing in the E E C .
A n additional point is that auditing education is very different in many
respects. In some countries universities are the main educational institutions,
while i n other countries, apprenticeship systems prevail. Harmonization of
auditing education is an especially important requirement to develop a harmonized
auditing practice in the future. In the current situation in each country there is
a tendency to teach students the auditing approach that is prevalent in that
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country. In the future, it will be very important to take a broader point of
view, and that will require that standards are developed at an E E C level that
define the concept of auditing.
Even when those standards are developed, the implementation in practice
will take some time, since resistance to change will hinder auditors in many
countries from changing their approach. In this area, there is certainly a big
task for the E E C .
Finally, we should perhaps mention that many public accounting firms in
the E E C have recently established relationships with firms in other E E C
countries. This enables a mutual influence and can be a very important factor
in harmonizing auditing standards.
In conclusion, it might be said that my opinion is different from Richard
Kramer's at the following points:
(a) In his evaluation, he takes largely the U.S. situation as a starting point
and compares it with the E E C as a whole. I would prefer an approach
that analyzes the situation in each country, taking into account the
legal, economic, and social framework of the country.
(b) I have a more positive attitude towards the accounting harmonization
proposals of the E E C .
(c) I think that auditing standards for the E E C as a whole in the future
will be necessary, but in the current situation where (and if) the
financial statements have only national significance, the lack of uni
form standards is not as bad as Kramer suggests.
(d) The lack of explicit standards in some countries is partly due to an
individualistic approach towards auditing, and does not mean that no
standards exist, but rather that they (especially standards of fieldwork) are set for each individual case relative to the needs and
relationships that have been discerned.
(e) It will be difficult to harmonize auditing in the future because of
differences in auditing approaches. In this regard, as differences in
auditing education among countries are overcome, change will be
facilitated, but international cooperation on many levels will always
be important.
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6
An Examination of the Status of
Probability Sampling in the Courts
Boyd Randall
Brigham Young University

Paul Frishkoff
University of Oregon
Auditing researchers, staggering under an ever-increasing blizzard of pro
nouncements, articles, and memoranda, might well be disposed to believe that
complexity feeds on itself. For example, two themes which were of much con
cern—perhaps even dominant—at the first two University of Kansas Auditing
Symposia were the increase in litigation against auditors and the growing
sophistication of statistical sampling techniques in auditing. This paper attempts
to examine the interaction between the two.
Indeed, his paper arose directly as a result of the 1974 Symposium. At that
conference, one of the present authors raised the question of whether statistical
sampling (i.e., probability sampling) would be a better defense in the courts
than judgment sampling. There appeared to be some division among prac
titioners present at the conference.
1

Practitioner Opinions
Some felt that the use of probability sampling would ameliorate the position
of the defense in a lawsuit, since probability sampling is viewed as more "scien
tific," as encompassing more up-to-date technology, and as more susceptible to
mathematical "proof" of its validity.
Others were more skeptical or at least agnostic. They felt that expert wit
nesses might debate the merits of a particular probability sampling plan to the
ultimate utter confusion of jurors and jurists. Their contention was that the
"expert judgment" of a highly trained professional, on the other hand, was less
suspect and less susceptible to point-by-point rebuttal.
Our purpose in this paper is twofold. First, we will examine past court
decisions to discover whether the courts have shown any preference for prob
ability sampling. Then we will examine cases in which probability sampling was
used, either by one of the parties or by the courts themselves, to see what implicit
standards for such sampling may be emerging from the judicial process.
For readers who are curious about the outcome of these questions, yet less
than enthusiastic about wading through the details of this paper, we will admit
at the outset that our conclusions are more equivocal and more tentative than
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either they or we might have wished. Auditing remains an inappropriate field
for uncertainty-avoiders!
Some Definitions
Probability sampling plans, to quote one source implicitly used by the courts,
". . . make use of the theory of probability to combine a suitable procedure for
selecting sample items with an appropriate procedure for summarizing the test
results so the inferences may be drawn and risks calculated from the test results
by the theory of probability. For any given set of conditions there will usually be
several possible plans, all valid, but differing in speed, simplicity, and cost."
Simple random sampling is but one of many possible applications of probability
sampling.
Judgment (non-random) sampling plans, on the other hand, ". . . have one
common characteristic: the probability that an individual (item) is included in
the sample is unknown. . . . When the determination of the individuals (items)
to be included in a sample involves personal judgment, one cannot have an
objective measure of the reliability of the sample results, because the various
individuals (items) may have differing and unknown chances of being drawn."
A census involves the examination of all items in a population, rather than a
sample thereof. The economics and timing of such procedures preclude their use
for more facets of an audit.
2

3

Extent of Use of Probability Sampling
The official policy of the A I C P A has been to condone both probability and
judgment sampling. A n examination that we made of a (non-random) sample
of six recent auditing textbooks indicated that judgment sampling was not
explicitly condemned, but the preponderance of material under the heading
"sampling" dealt with probability sampling.
Most accredited Schools of Business have required one or more courses in
statistical theory and techniques for at least the past decade or two. A l l national
C P A firms and the A I C P A have offered training programs or modules on
probability sampling as well. One might expect, then, that probability sampling
is used overwhelming. This is apparently not the case, however.
4

A questionnaire survey by Jacobs of C P A firms in the Los Angeles area re
vealed a wide disparity in the use of statistical sampling within a given office,
among firms of a given size, and among firms of differing sizes. As might have
been expected, the use of statistical sampling by national firms was far greater
than by locals, but the use was far from universal in any size grouping.
A more extensive questionnaire survey, undertaken by Strawser and Hubbard
confirmed these findings; their research also indicated that utilization of statistical
sampling techniques has been increasing fairly rapidly in recent years. These
results were consistent with an unscientific face-to-face inquiry of various Port
land, Oregon practitioners undertaken by one of the present authors during the
past year.
Judgment sampling, then, is still very much alive, and its acceptability in the
courts is thus not a trivial problem.
5

6
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Survey of Cases
We surveyed a wide variety of cases where statistical sampling was an
explicit issue or in which it was mentioned by the courts. We wish that we
could report that we found The Definitive Audit Case or a truly helpful case of
any kind. Instead, we found that references to sampling usually arose where the
technique was being used to gather evidence for the court, rather than where it
had been used prior to the litigation, such as in an auditor's test of transactions.
Therefore, we concentrated on court pronouncements that suggested standards
that should be used in sampling. Such standards, we argued, should be applicable
in almost any context, and in particular where an auditor's use of a sampling
method might be questioned relative to the standards recognized by the courts.
Implicit Court Standards for Sampling in General
There is no codified law regarding standards for sampling. Yet standards of
other bodies, while not of themselves court standards, become so indirectly when
they are recognized and cited as such by the courts on sufficient occasions.
"Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases" is
a Report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Protracted
Litigation. This report was adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United
States in March, 1960. It reached the following conclusions on the question of
sampling:
Scientifically designed samples and polls have received increasing ac
ceptance in recent years in government and in industry. The important
question to be considered in a given case is whether the contemplated or
proffered sample or poll is admissible under existing rules of evidence.
Samples [confined to observable facts]. When a sample is offered
through the testimony of the sampler, the report on the sample examined
(i.e., on the count of units or the test borings, in the samples noted above)
usually does not involve hearsay. In order to project this report, however,
the burden of proof rests upon the offeror to show, by the testimony of
a statistical expert, that the sample was selected in accordance with ac
cepted principles of sampling so that it properly represents the universe.
Note. Once this is established, there remain only questions of relevancy,
materiality and weight.
7

The note in the above quote refers to two sources of accepted principles of
sampling. They are:
1. Munitions Board Standards, Agency of the Department of Defense, and
2. The American Society for Testing and Materials.
We were unable to locate the Munitions Board Standards, but we did examine
the relevant standards of The American Society for Testing and Materials
( A S T M ) in some detail.
A perusal of ASTM's standards for statistical sampling reveal—by the sophisti
cated nature of the language, mathematical notation, and footnote references—
that these standards were enacted by statisticians for use by those with considerable
grounding in the field of probability and statistics.
ASTM's pronouncements also reveal, time and again, a pronounced preference
8
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for probability sampling and an aversion to wholesale nonrandom sampling.
For instance:
In order to make any estimate for a lot or for a process, on the basis
of a sample, it is necessary to select the units in the sample at random.
. . . The only universally acceptable definition of a random selection is
is one made by the use of random numbers, which in effect is the
guarantee of thorough stirring of the sampling units in a lot.
Selection by use of random numbers need not be more onerous or costly
than hit-or-miss methods of sample selection, provided the sampling plan
is thoughtfully formulated. . . . Randomness is obtained by positive action;
a random selection is not merely a haphazard selection, nor one declared
to be without bias. . . . However, mechanical selection is still usually
preferable to a judgment-selection.
The foregoing paragraphs do not mean that nonrandom and judgment
samples, for example, may provide useful information for the efficient
design of a probability sampling plan. . . . It also should be noted that
judgment plays an important role in the design of a probability sampling
plan. For example, it may be used to assess costs, to estimate spreads and
likely values of variances; also definitions of strata. In the actual prob
ability sample, however, judgment is not used in the selection of the
individual items of the sample, nor in making the inferences, nor in cal
culating the risks of decisions based wholly on the sample or succession
of samples.
9

10
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Thus, nonrandom sampling is relegated by A S T M to a role of amassing initial
evidence when little is known about the underlying population. Such might be
the case in a preliminary stage of an audit of a previously unaudited client, for
instance, but would not likely be the case in the actual selection of receivables to
be confirmed for the engagement, and especially would not be supportable for an
engagement that has been of long standing.
The courts have cited the Handbook, and thus implicitly the A S T M standards,
on at least three occasions. None involved auditing, however, and none involved
a head-on-head confrontation between probability and judgment sampling.
In Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, the courts rejected plaintiff's
sampling plan in an action under the Sherman Act for treble damages and
injunctive relief. The court held that the restraint involved in a "no check" plan
whereby school employees were required to take some affirmative action to
transfer funds from defendant bank to a bank of the employee's choice was not
shown to be unreasonable.
12

. . . (T)he tendency is to admit the results of properly conducted
surveys for whatever they are worth in spite of the hearsay difficulty. . . .
In this case, however, we do not even reach the hearsay question as it
relates to the admissibility of surveys, for we think the trial court was well
within its bounds of discretion in refusing to admit a poll conducted as
was this one.
A survey is inadmissible when the sample is clearly not representative
of the universe it is intended to reflect. See Hawley Products C. v. United
States Trunk Co., 1 Cir., 259 F . 2d 69, 77; Handbook of Recommended
Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351,429; . . . Here
the universe was either all school board and hospital employees under the
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plan, or at a minimum all school board employees under the plan. The
sample was chosen from neither of these groups but instead from those
employees who at one time banked with appellants and later switched
exclusively to Commercial Security.
13

In another case, Berman v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., the court
rejected a poll as evidence, citing the Handbook, and finding the poll to be
entirely inadequate. One reason was because the sample size was less than 1% of
a universe of 3,500 to 5,000. It is of interest that the A S T M standards include a
section replete with mathematical notation entitled "Equations for Calculating
Sample Size," with the strong implicit assumption that probability sampling is
used and that characteristics of the underlying probability distribution are known
or can be estimated.
In a third case in which the Handbook was cited by the court, Grotrian,
Helfferich, Schuz, etc. v. Steinway and Sons, the court held that the survey
offered in evidence met the criteria for admissibility of samples found in the
Handbook.
14

15

16

Court's Examination of Underlying Probability Distribution
The underlying probability distribution on which a sampling plan was based
arose in two cases involving depreciation, both, however, concerned tax litiga
tion, not financial auditing.
In Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., the question was whether a
television network affiliation for a two-year term, which is automatically renew
able in the absence of termination by the affirmative act of either of the parties,
for an unlimited number of successive two-year terms, is a depreciable asset.
The Seventh Circuit Court held that it was not a depreciable asset.
17

The theory of the statistical tables compiled was that an annual rate of
contract termination for each pertinent period could be obtained by divid
ing the total number of years commenced by all the affiliation contracts
during a given period into the total number of contract terminations
occurring during the same period. Using that termination rate, taxpayer's
expert witnesses testified that the average life expectancy of any given
contract could be determined by applying the Poisson-Exponential Theory
of Failure. The crux of that theory is that the percentage of failure of items
to which it is applied is a constant. . . .
Adopting that theory, and applying it with some modification to the
statistical history, the Tax Court found that an estimated useful life of the
W I S H and W A N E C B A affiliation contracts could be determined with
reasonable accuracy, and that use of a straight-line method over 20 years
was a reasonable basis for depreciation of the contracts.
We think the Tax Court erred. . . .
It is likewise clear that the stipulated exhibit graphically refutes the
existence of a basic premise upon which the Poisson Theory relies, namely,
that the life expectancy of all contracts is the same regardless of the length
of duration of the contract.
1 8
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Super Foods Services, Inc. v. United States is similar to Indiana Broadcasting. Super Foods owned franchise contracts with grocers; they attempted to
depreciate the contracts, but the IRS claimed that the contracts had indefinite
20
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lives. The plantiff introduced a study of 486 contracts; the study tended to
show that any contract which had been in force more than 12 months had an
average life of 86 months. Expert testimony was that the contracts "display a
definite and consistent pattern of termination." The government relied on
Indiana Broadcasting for the proposition that statistics of past performance do
not reliably predict termination dates. In ruling for the taxpayer, the court
distinguished Indiana Broadcasting because in the present case the IRS had
introduced no evidence of their own to controvert plaintiff's statistical evidence.
Court's Examinaion of Sampling Plan Used by Litigant
Johnson v. White was an action by Connecticut welfare recipients against
the state commissioner of welfare. The commissioner had converted the F A D C
program to a "flat grant" system to simplify A F D C payments by averaging
budgeted needs of each size of assistance unit and making identical payments to
each family of a given size. The court held that such averaging was permissible,
and explained:
21

The defendant adopted a pre-sample confidence interval of 95%,
plus or minus 10%; and a post-sample check determined that the selected
level of confidence had in fact been met. The defendant's sampling tech
nique was approved by H E W . The plaintiff's claim that in certain
components of need for certain assistance unit sizes, the sample size was
too small to guarantee the selected level of confidence. The defendant's
confidence level, however, was for the average of budgeted needs as a
whole, rather than for each component in the standard of need. Giving
due weight to the expert opinion of H E W , the court finds that the
defendant's sampling technique was adequate.
22

Use of Sampling Techniques by Court Itself
In Rosado v. Wyman, also a welfare case, New York welfare recipients
claimed that the state impermissibly lowered the standard of need by eliminating
items arbitrarily in 1970. Social Security Act Sec. 402 (a) (23) provides that a
state may not lower its standard of need by arbitrarily eliminating items which
were included before enactment of the amended statue in 1969.
The court used statistical sampling techniques to determine if amounts paid
under the 1970 plan accounted for certain special need grants paid in 1968. The
amount of aid received by a sample of 1968 recipients was compared to the
proposed 1970 schedule. The court found that 1968 recipients received more than
was allowed by the 1970 schedule, refuting New York's allegation of paying
100% of the standard of need in both years.
23

Some Other Illustrative Cases
Many anti-trust cases employ statistics. In bank merger cases, such as United
States v. Philadelphia National Bank and United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., the government used rather simple arithmetical statistics to
show the effect of mergers. For a detailed analysis of these two cases, and—in
particular—for suggestions for the use of statistics in similar cases, see Lozowick
et a l .
24
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A n older case involving statistics, a landmark anti-trust action, was United
States v. United Shoe Machinery? The court discussed minor problems with
the government's choice of universe and of sample selection, but accepted the
sample pragmatically, because ". . . if anti-trust trials are to be kept manageable,
samples must be used, and a sample which is in general reasonable should not
be rejected in the absence of an offer of a better sample."
27
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In Hawley Products Co. v. United States Trunk Co. (a case, incidentally,
cited by the court in Bank of Utah v. Commercial Security Bank, which we
discussed earlier) and in a related case, American Luggage Works, v. United
States Trunk Co., plaintiff attempted to prove that its design for suitcases had
acquired a secondary meaning. The survey was "inadmissible to show that in
the market of ultimate consumers the plaintiff's design had acquired a secondary
meaning when the universe surveyed consisted of retailers."
In International Milling Co. v. Robin Hood Popcorn Co.
the evidence
included a consumer action survey designed to determine whether purchasers
associated the product packaged by International Milling with the product pack
aged by Robin Hood. The Commission went into detail in describing the survey,
the questions asked, the selection of a sample and the standard deviation expected.
Readers may be familiar with the use of sampling in cases where a defendant
or plaintiff has asserted that a jury is racially imbalanced and thus in violation of
Fourteenth Amendment rights. In cases such as Carter v. Jury Commission,
courts have been willing to accept a statistical analysis of the population and use
that probability to determine that a certain proportion of jurors should be of a
particular race. (Such cases, of course, involve arguments from the population,
rather than from a sample.) A recent article on jury selection goes into detail
on the statistical problems involved.
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Sampling Standards Employed by Internal Revenue Service
The IRS issued some rather lengthy standards of sampling in conjunction with
the timing of trading stamp redemptions. These standards explicitly condone
only probability sampling. Thus, "the taxpayer may use any sampling procedures
that are in accord with generally accepted probability sampling techniques. . . .
While no specific requirements are established for the sampling expert responsible
for the design of the study, it is recognized probability sampling is a highly
specialized field and that otherwise competent statisticians may not be qualified
in the field of probability sampling. . . . The sampling plan which is used must
conform to the standards of the 'Report of Committee on Standards of Probability
Sampling for Legal Evidence—Admissibility of Data from Probability Sam
ples.' "
3 5

This report, published by the Society of Business Advisory Professions, Inc.,
in cooperation with New York University, is remarkably similar in tone and
substance to the previously cited A S T M documents. The report does not allow
for the possibility of judgment sampling, and indeed makes the solemn assertion
(in two different places) that: "The interpretation of a statistical calculation such
as the standard error is not a matter of opinion, nor of judgment, but is a
mathematical consequence."
36
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Approval of Probability Sampling by U.S. Congress
In a bill approved in 1964, the House of Representatives specifically permitted
the use of statistical sampling procedures in the examination of vouchers. A
detailed report accompanying the bill discusses the appropriate use of statistical
sampling in the examination of vouchers and the reasons supporting increased
governmental adoption of statistical analysis.
37

A Most Tentative Conclusion
No absolutely definitive case has yet arisen to demonstrate that judgment
sampling will not be allowed by the courts in auditing. Nonetheless, some trends
seem apparent to us. The courts—and such quasi-judicial agencies as IRS—are
relying more heavily on sophisticated statistical documents whose standards barely
condone, and certainly do not encourage, nonrandom sampling when probability
sampling is feasible.
We can not conclude with the lame epithet that "further research needs to be
done." There is no more "data" left to examine, and additional "research" will be
effected by the courts themselves. Our murky crystal ball suggests that a land
mark case involving sampling in an auditing context will arise within the next
few years. We caution those auditors who continue to use judgment sampling in
the presence of feasible probability sampling procedures to be prepared to defend
their logic in so doing. For that matter, given some of the decisions cited, we
urge auditors who use probability sampling to be prepared to defend their
particular sampling plans in terms of demonstrating that their sample results can
indeed be argued to be representative of the underlying universe.
Addendum: Sampling Lost, Sampling Vindicated?
The following case has been verbally cited to us by several colleagues. So far
as we know, it has not been officially reported. Moreover, it is somewhat dated
and was tried on a municipal court level only. Nonetheless, for the sake of com
pleteness, we include it for the interested reader.
In Sears Roebuck and Co. vs. the City of Inglewood, Sears sued for a sales
tax refund of $27,000. Sears had found an error in their own local records as to
the extent of out-of-city sales, such sales not being subject to the municipal tax.
In support of their contention, Sears conducted a random sample of sales slips,
which indicated that the refund ought to be $28,250, plus or minus $4,200, at a
95% confidence interval.
The judge ruled against any sampling technique! This ruling was not predi
cated on any statistical oversight in Sears's procedures, but on the judge's conten
tion that the amount of the refund must be determined exactly, without any
possible error in estimation, however small. That is, he insisted, as required by
the applicable statute, that Sears demonstrate a lack of sales tax liability for
each invoice!
Since the Court permitted Sears to perform a "complete audit," the plaintiff
did not appeal the case. The complete audit, of which the sample had constituted
only 4%, revealed a liability of $26,750.22, well within the confidence interval.
As we said, we doubt that this case constitutes an important precedent, since
38
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special conditions were present which the judge interpreted to preclude any
form of sampling. If sampling is applicable, judges can be expected to follow
the precedents that have been cited, and even if a judge does not understand all
of the ramifications of sampling, sampling is at least likely to be tolerated.
It is of interest, however, that the author who cites this case goes on to
comment, hypothetically, ". . . if (the judge) had refused to admit the amount
of the claim as $27,000 because it was based on a judgment sample as opposed
to the random sampling insisted on here, that also would have been a valid
objection."
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Discussant's Response to
An Examination of the Status of
Probability Sampling in the Courts
Kenneth P. Johnson
Coopers & Lybrand
It may be clear to some that the courts are increasingly dealing with issues of
probability, or statistical, sampling and how it should be used. It may also be
clear to some that auditors who continue to use judgment sampling in the per
formance of their audits should be prepared to defend their logic for doing so.
However, the discussion by Professors Randall and Frishkoff will not support
these conclusions. Further, as the authors indicate, it is certainly not clear how
the courts will appraise the results of statistical sampling as part of the evidence
used to reach audit conclusions.
On reviewing this paper, it occurs to me that there may be distinctions and
observations that the authors have not made, which may assist in anticipating
what attitude the courts may adopt in ruling on sampling questions that arise
from audits of financial statements.
Considerations by the Courts
Only some of the cases cited turn on a court decision concerning the appro
priateness of a sampling plan or particular statistical technique used. For
example, in Johnson vs. White, the court reviewed the sampling plan and
determined that it was appropriately devised and applied based on a review of
the techniques employed. Two of the cited cases do not seem to deal directly
with probability sampling. In Commissioner vs. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., the
issue seemed to turn on whether a Poisson distribution was either applicable or
appropriately applied. This entailed consideration of whether proper judgments
had been made in the planning stage, including whether the defined population
had the appropriate attributes for the application of this statistical concept.
Another cited case, Super Foods, appears to have been decided on a legal issue
rather than on the issue of statistical techniques employed.
Putting aside these cases, I believe there is another characteristic implicit in
the remaining cases that should be discussed. The paper notes that "references to
sampling usually arose where the technique was being used to gather evidence
rather than where it was used prior to the litigation, such as in an auditor's test
of transactions." I believe it is significant that the cases cited typically seem to
deal with specific attributes of a more or less well-defined population. However,
the court's acceptance of probability sampling plans in these circumstances, in my
opinion, does not indicate what its attitude would be in the much more com
plicated auditing environment. The expertise required of an auditor in devising
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a sampling plan to help support general audit conclusions is sharply distinct from
that required of an advocate developing evidence to sustain a particular position
after the fact.
This leads to my next point. I am not surprised that there are no so-called
"auditing cases" that deal with the issue of the appropriateness of statistical
sampling applications or the lack of appropriateness of judgmental sampling.
By its nature, the auditing process involves a series of judgments. The range of
those judgments is so broad that there is little possibility that a case will turn
on the very narrow issue of the specific sampling technique employed. One
practical reason is that other broader areas, such as materiality of transactions and
balances and the concept of reliance on internal control, are more promising
areas for challenge in litigation involving audited financial statements. But those
factors are outside the scope of this paper and it is sufficient to note that this is
part of the backdrop for the current discussion.
Defensive Considerations
I believe that the genesis of this discussion paper was the suggestion that one
of the advantages of using statistical, or probability, sampling is that "since the
interpretation of the results is based on demonstrable statistical principles, the test
is not only objective, but defensible, even before a court of law . . . or, even
more important, before one's own conscience. Since the sample is objective and
unbiased, it is not subject to the questions that might be raised relative to a
judgment sample." As we have seen, Randall and Frishkoff have not been able
to support this suggestion through their examination of actual legal cases.
There is no evidence that statistical sampling would provide a better defense
than judgment sampling when an audit undergoes the scrutiny of litigation. Let's
look at the problem a little differently—why hasn't the auditing profession rushed
to adopt probability sampling?
Reactions Within the Profession
At this symposium in 1972, Kenneth Stringer remarked on the increased
use of statistical sampling, as follows:
The reasons why progress [in the use of statistical sampling] has been
more evolutionary than revolutionary are understandable, and have in
volved both statistical and auditing problems. The statistical problems
have included the general unfamiliarity of auditors with statistical methods,
and technical questions concerning the applicability of certain statistical
methods to auditing situations. The auditing problems have related pri
marily to defining and expressing audit objectives in terms susceptible to
statistical measurement, and to the difficulty of combining statistical and
subjective evaluations of audit evidence in forming overall audit con
clusions.
In my view, growth in the use of statistical sampling in independent audits
continues at only a measured pace. This, in my opinion, is due less to the
general unfamiliarity of auditors with statistical methods and more to the
problem of relating statistical measurements to audit objectives and conclusions.
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In his book on sampling in auditing and accounting, Herbert Arkin elaborates
on the role of statistical sampling in audits, as follows:
However, in considering the use of statistical sampling approaches by the
auditor, it must be remembered that he is in a somewhat different position
from that of the sampler in most other fields. He normally does not place
total reliance on the results of a simple sample . . . in arriving at his
decision, but he usually performs other examinations and a variety of
other tests and analyses in evaluating the condition of the records and
their impact on the accuracy of the financial statement.
1

We may summarize the kinds of audit tests and their purposes, as follows:
• Transaction reviews: T o confirm an auditor's understanding of the
flow of data.
• Functional tests: T o gather evidence that controls are functioning, thus
permitting reliance on the underlying accounts.
• Validation procedures: T o substantiate an account balance by con
firmation, physical inspection, reperformance, or vouching.
• Analytical reviews: To corroborate a logical relationship among items
or accounts.
At this point I should note that this framework is designed for purposes of
discussion and conceptualization. In practice, these distinctions between audit
procedures and their purposes are never mutually exclusive. For example, every
transaction review contributes something to functional testing and often to vali
dation and analysis as well. Moreover, the underlying logic is that, if transaction
reviews and functional tests reveal no reason to doubt the reliability of the
underlying evidence, an auditor is justified in minimizing validation procedures
and analytical reviews. Conversely, if transaction reviews or functional tests
reveal the possibility of doubt about the reliability of the underlying evidence,
that doubt can often be removed or reduced sufficiently by validation testing
and analytical reviews. Accordingly, the auditing process and the resulting
auditor's opinion are based on a composite of not quite discrete testing com
ponents. Moreover, to the extent that we can identify such components, their
contribution to audit conclusions and the auditor's opinion based on such con
clusions are highly variable and characterized by the subjective and judgmental
nature of the total audit process.
An Example
For example, in functional tests, examination of one item ordinarily demon
strates the existence of a control or controls, and, in most cases, examination of a
few items demonstrates that the control or controls are functioning. Of course,
the purpose of these tests is to determine whether there are disciplinary controls
which reasonably assure the continued functioning of basic controls. In my
opinion, the variety and nature of influences that affect the amount of evidence
needed require the auditor to make a number of judgments in designing and
applying sampling techniques, statistical or otherwise. Moreover, there is little
agreement about what constitutes a sufficient test because several factors affect
the degree of confidence an auditor may have in a specific system of controls,
and he must take them all into account. Some of these factors are:
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•
•
•
•
•

The importance to the auditor of the data being controlled
The type of control
The effectiveness of disciplinary controls
The type of conditions that lead to difficulty in maintaining control
The auditor's overall assessment of the reliability of the accounting
system.

Some Difficulties in Application
I am not satisfied that our "auditor's" understanding of the concept of
sufficient control can be uniform enough to permit designation of measurements,
such as those of confidence and precision, necessary for effective use of statistical
techniques. Let me illustrate. My firm places stress on evaluating the com
ponents of controls. In our view, certain aspects of discipline, e.g., supervision,
are more important to the auditor than other characteristics of control. Since
there is no consensus yet in the profession on the usefulness of identifying the
components of controls, I am certain we would fail to agree, for example, on
what effect the lack of "adequate" supervision would have on the sampling plan.
Even when the problems of sampling plans and sample size have been resolved,
there is the issue of the judgment problems involved in evaluating sample results.
The authors' reference to their murky crystal ball includes a suggestion of a
landmark case involving sampling in the auditing context. I haven't found a
basis for the statement. But accepting it for the purpose of discussion, such a
case will be decided on the court's appraisal of the auditor's judgments made in
the assessment of the circumstances that support his conclusions as to the appro
priate sampling plan to be employed. Whether probability sampling or judgment
sampling is applied, the auditor and the courts must deal with the same critical
decision. I believe that present probability sampling techniques do not offer
special "protection or comfort" in this area for the auditor. In fact, I'm con
cerned that auditors may be misled by an "aura of acceptability" and be bitterly
disappointed in the legal arena. Bear in mind that either method of sampling
entails the same essential risk. For these reasons, I believe that the authors'
cautionary statements are useful reminders and that a practitioner should weigh
the likelihood that probability sampling will lead in practice to the same prob
lems as judgment sampling in justifying his procedures.

Footnotes
1. Herbert Arkin, Handbook of Sampling for Auditing and Accounting, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., 1963, p. 5.
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7
Use of Decision Theory in Auditing—
A Practitioner's View
James K. Loebbecke
Touche Ross & Co.
In 1974, Bill Felix delivered a paper at this symposium entitled " A Decision
Theory View of Auditing," for which I was the discussant. At that time Howard
Stettler asked if we would consider reversing roles in 1976. This paper is the
result of our agreement to do so, with the caveat that I could speak only from
the point of view of a practitioner since I am neither an academic nor a
mathematician.
In planning this paper, I made a limited review of current academic literature
on the use of decision theory in auditing and, in addition to Bill Felix' 1974
paper, found several notable works. These will be referred to below. I also
formally surveyed a group of my peers to determine 1) their familiarity with
decision theory and 2) their advice on how it might be used in auditing. Their
response indicates that a very small proportion of practitioners have considered
the subject formally. Without going into great detail, 70% stated they have no
truthful idea of what decision theory is, 15% acknowledged having a general
idea, and 15% stated they could specifically define decision theory as presented
in the literature.
These findings should not be interpreted as evidence that auditors are ignorant
or that they are making poor audit decisions, but rather that decision theory is a
relatively new concept which has not yet been widely exposed to them. My
feeling, as was expressed in 1974, is that if decision theory were presented to
practicing auditors on a broader basis (e.g., in The Journal of Accountancy), the
introduction would be successful only if the more technical aspects could be
presented in the auditor's own terms. Since this introduction, to the best of my
knowledge, has not yet been made, I consider the purpose of this paper to be input
to that future undertaking. Accordingly, I have tried to identify a decision frame
that I believe many auditors are using in a way that relates to formal decision
theory, and to examine some of its implications.
Review of Decision Theory in Auditing
A broad definition of decision theory is an essential starting point. Decision
theory is a systematized approach to problem solving such that the choices made
will produce the optimum outcome. Formal decision theory utilizes statistical
techniques extensively. Thus, relative to auditing, the use of statistical sampling,
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particularly in the form of hypothesis testing, would be classified as part of
decision theory.
As Felix and others point out, however, the definition of the optimal deci
sion should consider not only relative probabilities, but also the costs and benefits
involved. These considerations are combined with the probabilities so as to lead
the decision maker to take whichever available action will most likely provide the
greatest payoff (or least cost). Kinney presents the following general model:
1

E(W|a*) = min

ΣW(s,a)P(s)

Where E ( W ) is the cost expected to arise from action a*, the optimum action
(i.e., the one producing the lowest cost) from all possible actions a with cost W
associated with states s given the probability P(s) that each state s exists.
As illustrated by Felix, this can be related in auditing to two states and
respective actions (Figure 1):
FIGURE 1

Basic Audit Decision
s —Material
Error Exists

Actions

1

a —Render Unqualified Opinion
a —Require Adjustment or Qualify Opinion
1

2

20
-3

States
S —No Material
Error Exists
2

-7
1

In this illustration, the matrix contains the net cost W (positive) or benefit
— W (negative) associated with each possible a/s combination. If P(s ) = .1
and P(s ) = .9, we have the following:
1

2

E (W|a ) = .1(20) + . 9 ( - 7 ) = -4.3
E (W|a ) = . 1 ( - 3 ) + .9(1) = +.6
1

2

Thus, a is optimum in this case as it produces a negative cost (benefit), and
the auditor would choose to render an unqualified opinion.
Felix and Kinney have both examined a logical extension of the model at
this point—the problem of deciding whether to examine additional audit evi
dence before the decision is considered final. Kinney further processed hypo
thetical assumptions through the model to determine its sensitivity to the
various factors involved.
Dacey has studied a problem that I raised in my 1974 discussion—that of
the model leading to a premature decision. Dacey recommends that auditors
consider a model based on conclusion theory, which provides for acceptance of all
hypotheses which meet certain criteria, not just one "optimal" hypothesis. The
possibilities are held open until adequate conclusive evidence about a single
hypothesis is obtained.
Scott has also examined these problems and has attempted, as have Demski
and Sweringa, to relate this internal model to outside models. In the case of
Scott, to the capital market, and in the case of Demski and Sweringa, to a joint
problem of the auditor and management.
For my purposes, however, I shall consider two key aspects in the basic
1

2

3

4
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model in Figure I: the cost of making the wrong decision and the probability
that a material error exists. I shall then consider the implications of these
aspects on the decisions commonly made by practicing auditors.
Cost of Making the Wrong Decision
Figure 1 indicates two possible wrong decisions: the issuance of an unqualified
opinion when a material error exists (a , s ), which I will henceforth call a Type I
error ; and requiring an adjustment or qualifying when no material error exists
(a , s ), which I will call a Type II error.
When a Type I error is made, the results can be disastrous. The auditor can
be held liable for damages suffered by the client on the basis of a tort action for
negligence, or the auditor can be held liable to third parties on the basis of gross
negligence, or be held liable for violation of the securities law in certain in
stances. Of particuar concern, is the further possibility of criminal charges under
both federal and state laws. This occurred in circumstances in which most
auditors would hardly believe that a crime had been committed, in both the
Continental Vending and National Student Marketing cases.
To illustrate the possible magnitude of direct loss, suppose the auditor were
required to pay damages to a third party for gross negligence and incurred legal
fees for a grand total of $5,000,000. (Amounts of this general magnitude have
been incurred in several instances.) Also suppose the audit fee for the engage
ment was $500,000 per year. Based on my experiences with the operations of an
international C P A firm, I estimate it would take over forty years of net income
from audit fees to recover this loss.
1

1

5

2

2

The indirect costs of a Type I error are not as easy to measure, but they are
of great concern. A tremendous amount of energy is sapped from the firm by
a serious lawsuit. Attention of a number of high level partners is required, and
the attention of others is diverted. Not only is there a loss of these persons' time,
there is a loss of the leverage they command as well. There is also the possibility
that a special peer review would be required which would cost several hundred
thousand dollars and require considerable time. A negative environment can
be created. Additionally, the firm's reputation can be damaged to the point
where potential opportunities and even existing clients can be lost. One serious
Type I error can overshadow good work done on ten thousand other clients.
It can ruin careers and even lives.
Type II errors are individually less costly, but at a relatively uncritical level,
more likely to be incurred. There is a great deal of pressure in auditing to
control hours worked. This results from client fee concerns and engagement
scheduling problems caused by turnover and work peaks. Often, where apparent
errors are uncovered, the auditor will approach the client to request an adjust
ment. The client may react by refusing, and additional work will be done to
resolve the situation. Where the matter is resolved in favor of the client, a
Type II error has been made and corrected. The client may or may not agree
to pay the auditor for this additional work. If this strategy is followed extensively,
the auditor may irritate the client to the point where the auditor is replaced.
If the client accepts the auditor's request for an adjustment or if a qualified
opinion is issued when a material error does not exist, the Type II error reaches
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the critical stage of impacting the published financial statements. Although low
chance of discovery is a factor, it is possible the client could suffer damages, and
a lawsuit against the auditor could result.
Another aspect of the Type II error problem is the possibility that an auditor
may seek additional protection by extending the amount of work performed.
If the engagement is for a fixed fee, there is a cost to the auditor for any
unnecessary work that is performed. If per diem rates are charged, the client
bears the cost, but if the auditor's fees become excessive, the loss of clients becomes
a possibility, with the attendant cost to the auditor.
In contrasting the relative magnitudes of the two types of errors, as a prac
titioner I would certainly want to control both of them, but in the final analysis,
Type I far overshadows Type II. The lawsuits resulting from Type I errors
have dominated our environment for several years now; they are a study in and
of themselves. Although we carry large amounts of insurance to cover losses
that can occur, such insurance is only a long-term financing mechanism. Any
large loss will be rebilled to us in future years with interest.
For these reasons, I believe that when auditors make the decision to issue a
report, the losses associated with Type I errors are foremost in their minds.
They first decide: "Is there any real chance the opinion should be qualified?"
If the answer is affirmative, they will go to great lengths to be satisfied. If the
answer is negative, it is unlikely that much additional work will be performed
beyond the minimum level associated primarily with tradition or internal policy.
This approach is at least partially consistent with the formal decision theory
model. The differences are:
1. The decision to extend work is biased toward a one-sided expected cost
consideration—i.e, the cost of a Type I error.
2. A third decision point can be reached where the auditor cannot sub
stantiate the basis for a qualification, yet is afraid to give an unqualified
opinion because of the circumstances. Here the alternatives may be to
disclaim an opinion or withdraw from the engagement.
This second aspect is explored in more detail in the next section.
Probabilities Associated with Type I Error
Given that the decision framework just described is legitimate in the current
auditing environment, a logical audit strategy would be to:
1. Allocate audit resources as efficiently as possible to minimize the risk
of giving an erroneous unqualified opinion.
2. Establish a standard for an acceptable level of such risk beyond which
an unqualified opinion would not be rendered regardless of the in
ferences that may exist (i.e., unless a qualification is clear, disclaim an
opinion or do more work).
Generally accepted auditing standards aim at these objectives, but they are
far from specific. With regard to the first, there are definitions about general
types of audit tests and procedures (i.e., compliance, substantive, analytical, con
firmations, etc.), but little indication as to mix or preference.
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With regard to the second objective, the minimums set by generally accepted
auditing standards should provide at least a qualitative floor for acceptable risk.
Certainly the discussions about competent evidential matter, independence, due
care, and statistical sampling, for example, give some idea of what is expected.
However, these become largely abstractions when a single examination is
involved; and the abstraction is made more severe by the absence of clear-cut
guidelines for determining materiality.
Thus, the auditor is in a position where the audit risk cannot really be
measured, and the notion of the risk being taken must be compared to a presently
undefinable standard. Is this bad? No, it is simply the way it is, and as time
goes on clearer standards should evolve. In the meantime, how can the auditor
minimize risk?
As indicated in SAS 1, the risk of making a Type I error can be viewed as
comprising two separate risks: Ia—the risk that a material error is committed
and exists in the financial statements, and Ib—the risk that the auditor fails to
discover that fact. A complexity to this formulation is that when the Ia risk is
great, it may also be that Ib is great due to the circumstances that relate to Ia.
For example, if the Ia risk is great because of an inadequate record keeping
system, Ib may be great because the system does not provide audit evidence to
inspect. It is important to recognize this interaction because it implies that in
certain circumstances where Ia is great and the interaction exists, it is not possible
to perform an audit in accordance with professional standards. In such situa
tions, the auditor should recognize this at the outset and withdraw from the
engagement, rather than attempt an audit for which the fee may not be collected,
incur extreme client/user dissatisfaction, and/or be faced with a high risk of
Type I or Type II errors.
The specific magnitude of Ia risk cannot, of course, be measured objectively.
However, conditions which will indicate its general magnitude can be appraised.
Thus, where Ia is low or moderate, certain strategy alternatives relative to
controlling Ib can be available; whereas, if Ia is high, disengagement or a special
set of procedures should be considered.
Figure 2 presents the factors which affect the propensity for a material error
to exist, the possibility of interaction with Ib risk, and the steps available to the
auditor to make an appraisal of the risk and/or to achieve some control over it.
Thus, we see that there are very strong interactions between the integrity of
management and the design of internal control, and the auditor's ability to
gather sufficient competent evidence. If management is dishonest, it may conceal
evidence or make false representations to the auditor, which cannot be overcome
with evidence-gathering procedures. The common thread in many of the
notorious lawsuits against CPAs is the presence of dishonest managements.
Finally, if the design of the system of internal control is such that economic
events can occur and yet escape capture by the system, adequate evidence may
not be available for the auditor to examine.
A possible interaction exists where the industry is unique and an industry
expert is not available; perhaps the audit should not be undertaken. In cases
where the company is having problems with excessive growth or possible in
solvency, or if client personnel lack competence, errors may be more likely, but
the auditor's ability to find them may not be affected. On the other hand, where
6
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FIGURE 2

Factors Related to Existence and Detection of Material Error
Factors Which
Increase Propensity
for Material Error

Steps Available to Auditor
(or Audit Firm) to Appraise or
Control Risk of Material Error

Interaction
with Risk of
Nondiscovery

• Nature of industry

Possible

• Nature (condition)
of business
• Integrity of manage
ment

Possible

•
•
•
•
•

Strong

•
• System of internal
control—i.e., design

Strong

•

• Competence of client
personnel

Possible

•
•
•

Use of industry experts
Control of industry mix
Financial analysis
Client profiling techniques
Client investigation procedures
(new and repeat)
Score card (retrospect) of client
representations
Table of transactions and sources
of evidence
Preliminary evaluation
Observation
Tests of data

the condition of the business causes management to compromise its integrity, or
where incompetent personnel make auditing such a painful and time-consuming
process that the auditor takes unwarranted expediences, interaction occurs.
Some of the steps listed opposite each factor are familiar ones. Others may
be new. Following are comments on the relatively unusual steps:
Financial Analysis. This is not new in itself, but more advanced models are
beginning to be used by auditors. Specifically, bankruptcy prediction techniques
are being used for the purpose cited here. Two techniques used by Touche Ross
are a discriminant analysis by Altman and a gambler's ruin model developed
by Wilcox.
Client Profiling Techniques. Some audit firms recognize that certain client
characteristics are related to greater risks, and a profile is maintained citing these
characteristics for audit clients. This is kept current and reviewed at least
annually to consider whether the audit program adequately considers the risks
involved.
Score Card of Representations. Throughout an audit, certain representations
are requested and made by responsible client personnel. For example, the col
lectibility of specific accounts receivable and the ultimate outcome of construction
projects in process. A record of these by person is maintained in the permanent
file, and in subsequent periods the actual results are entered to judge the
accuracy of the representations.
Table of Transactions and Sources of Evidence. This technique requires the
auditor to identify all possible economic events which are likely to occur with
regard to the entity. These are generally described as types of transactions and
are constructed into one axis of a two-dimensional matrix. The other axis lists
all sources of evidence available to the auditor about those events. These are
generally divided into specific internal control subsystems of the entity and other
sources, such as outside confirmation, board of directors' minutes and direct
7

8

112

physical observation. The body of the matrix indicates the relationships be
tween the axes and allows the auditor to make preliminary appraisals and plans.
Specifically, it is possible to see whether there are any transactions which lack
substantive evidence sources, to determine which systems must be evaluated and
the extent of potential reliance on internal control, and to plan the proper se
quence of audit steps.
Figure 3 presents in a fashion similar to Figure 2 the factors which affect
the auditor's risk of failing to discover material errors should they exist.
FIGURE 3

Factors in Failure to Discover Material Errors
Factors which Affect the Auditor's
Risk of Non-Discovery of Errors

• Scope and terms of engagement
• Reliability of audit evidence

Steps Available to the Auditor
(or Audit Firm) to Control Risk

• Engagement letter
• Audit plan
• Selection of evidence—
direct vs. indirect

a. Nature (effectiveness)
b. Timing
c. Extent
• Performance by auditor
a. Capabilities
b. Conditions

•
•
•
•
•

Training
Instructions
Staffing
Tools
Review

The factors shown relate to the auditor's achieving the position where there
is clear agreement about the examination to be performed and the feasibility of
such performance, and where there is certainty that the audit conclusions are
sound. This latter aspect relates to the evidence itself and the proper interpretation
of the evidence. Interpretation is used in the broad sense of not only evaluating
what is observed, but observing what is available. Interpretation is behavioral.
Proper interpretation requires knowledge, experience, alertness, and similar per
sonal strengths in the individual auditors involved. However, the conditions
under which interpretation is accomplished are also a factor. The physical form
of the documentation of the evidence gathered influences interpretation; also, any
time constraint under which the interpretation must be made has an effect.
It is interesting to speculate how the need to meet tight deadlines for a registration
statement or an early annual report issuance during the "busy season" affects the
auditor's judgment in this area.
Selection and Evaluation of Evidence
With regard to the steps available to deal with the factors, the most pertinent
set deal with the selection of evidence. The theory of evidence can be presented
in various ways; I have chosen here to distinguish between direct and indirect
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forms of evidence. (I do not intend, however, to present a comprehensive theory
of evidence.)
Direct evidence is defined as evidence of the monetary amounts recorded in
the financial statements, as of the financial statement date. Indirect evidence
is defined as all other evidence. One might argue that an ideal audit would
contain all direct evidence, i.e., risk would be minimized. On closer inspection,
however, this may not be true, because the relative quality of the available indirect
evidence may be better than that of the available direct evidence, and obtaining
indirect evidence might enhance improved performance by the auditor.
First, let's consider the quality of the evidence. The quality of a single type
of evidence relates to the source of the evidence and effectiveness of the audit
procedure used to obtain it. For example, with an account receivable confirmation,
the source of the evidence is an outside party—a high quality source. The
effectiveness of the audit procedure, however, will vary depending on the reliability
of address information, the design of the request, the nature of the industry, and
the characteristics of the customer. On the other hand, a management repre
sentation may not constitute adequate evidence because of its source, even though
the auditor's interviewing techniques are effective.
Where the quality of a single type of evidence is lacking, the auditor must
generally obtain evidence of other types. If all indicate the same conclusions, their
aggregate quality will be significantly enhanced. This is a point that should be
noted because traditionally some auditors have confused evidence quality with
evidence quantity. As a result of this confusion, they have attempted to com
pensate for a relatively ineffective audit procedure by taking large samples. It
should be quite clear that the bias introduced by improper measurement of sample
values has a severe effect on the sampling distribution regardless of the sample
size. Thus, the auditor may be better off taking relatively small samples of more
types of evidence whenever the quality of a single type is not clearly superior.
9

Many of the types of indirect evidence relate to testing the internal controls
of the client organizations and balances at interim dates. Both of these ap
proaches allow a large amount of audit work to be spread throughout the fiscal
year preceding the financial statement date. This enhances planning and control
and effective staffing—conditions which can reduce audit risk. Internal control
testing also has the advantage of providing evidence of a second type relative to
other direct evidence.
The danger of these approaches is concerned with the difficulty of relating
the conclusions to the financial statement balances. Where reliance is placed on
internal controls, an appraisal must be made relating the effectiveness of the
various subsystems to potential monetary errors in the accounts. This is a
complex task and it is questionable whether it can really be done subjectively
except in vague terms. The problem with interim-date tests relates to the risk
that conditions may change between the interim date and year end. The ap
praisal of this risk is closely related to the evaluation of internal control.
10

Non-Sampling Error
Non-sampling error—the result of incorrect performance by the auditor—
causes bias in the same manner as an ineffective audit procedure. Non-sampling
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error can result from assigning the wrong person to a specific audit task, or from
subjecting the auditor to conditions where fatigue, boredom, or other personal
weaknesses might occur. These can be controlled by a variety of approaches as
shown in Figure 3.
It would appear that the aspect which most closely relates to the formal deci
sion theory model is the determination of the extent of procedures—i.e., sample
size. Both the costs of sampling and probabilities can be specified for a decision
model in much the same way as with classical sampling. The difficulty would
occur in attempting to specify the cost of a Type I error (as I have defined it)
because this relates to the aggregation of all evidence, not just the results of a
single test. The jump from individual tests to the overall aggregation appears
to be the greatest challenge to formal model usage.
Summary
The concepts of formal decision theory are extremely useful to auditors as a
means of recognizing which elements of audit effort should receive available
audit resources. Traditionally, there have been observations that too much time
is spent on trivial areas or areas which are "the easiest to audit." I have at
tempted to present the audit framework in such a way that various elements
can be discussed relative to their effect on the risk of issuing an unqualified
opinion when material error exists in the financial statements, as I believe this
risk is of pervasive concern among practicing auditors.
In controlling this risk, it was indicated that the auditor should appraise the
client's propensity to commit a material error. Most significantly, two factors—
integrity of management and design of internal control—have strong interactions
with the auditor's ability to discover errors. If these factors are negative, dis
engagement or disclaimer is advised. It is also possible that other factors—nature
of the industry, condition of the business, and competence of client personnel—
could have similar interactions in some circumstances.
Based on the importance of this aspect of risk, one would expect auditing
firms to establish standards and procedures for the initial and continued ac
ceptance of clientele, the use of financial analysis on all audits, and the develop
ment and use of industry experts. One interesting social consequence of all
auditing firms adopting such policies would be to set minimum standards for
managements to qualify for audits.
In examining the various aspects relating to the auditor's discovery of errors,
it was indicated that the effectiveness of procedures and control of non-sampling
error were essential prerequisites to further assumptions relating to sample size.
Although these factors are most often discussed in the context of statistical
sampling, they apply to judgmental samples as well.
The key point to be made regarding the risk of non-discovery, however, is
that the proper combination of all elements is not clear, and would not be
universal for all audits. The phrase "appropriate in the circumstances" has real
meaning here. The auditor's skill provides as meaningful and effective a basic
recipe as can be contrived, and further assistance should be available through
firm and professional standards, guidelines, and tools. In this regard, auditing
firms can be expected to deal with such issues as:
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• What training costs will be incurred.
• What minimum duties and responsibilities should be defined for partners,
managers, and staff.
• When specialists must be consulted.
• When certain tools, such as questionnaires or statistical sampling, must
be used.
• What audit procedures must always be done at year-end.
• What constitutes minimum reliance on internal controls.
• What types of workpaper review are necessary.
• How technical issues are resolved.
Some of these issues have passed to the professional level. A review of
pronouncements indicates a predominant concern with control of Type I errors.
SAS 4, Quality Control Considerations for a Firm of Independent CPAs, for
example, cites areas where firms should have policies established and gives
examples. And the current Auditing Standards Executive Committee agenda
includes additional such items, such as management's illegal acts and the
auditor's responsibility for detection of fraud. Little that has happened in the
profession of late has resulted in less auditing.
A l l of this leads up to the point of the next logical question—"what is the
relationship of the costs and benefits of auditing?" Are the benefits sufficient to
justify those costs? Can the cost factors be changed, e.g., through legislation of
legal liability statutes? Until such issues are made more clear, it will be
difficult to gain agreement on what constitutes reasonable assurance in auditing.
And until reasonable assurance and materiality are more clearly defined, auditors
will continue to take their present defensive position of acting to minimize
the Type I risk.
One of the issues of the Commission on Auditor's Responsibilities is the
cost-benefit issue. Successful efforts by the commission will facilitate more
formal use of decision theory in auditing.
11
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Footnotes
1. Throughout this section I have drawn on three excellent sources for material on decision
theory in auditing:
—Dyckman. T . R., "Some Contributions of Decision Theory to Accounting," Journal of
Contemporary Business, Autumn 1975.
—Felix, W., "A Decision Theory View of Auditing," Contemporary Auditing Problems,
ed., H . Stettler, University of Kansas School of Business, 1974.
—Kinney, W. R., Jr., "A Decision-Theory Approach to the Sampling Problem in
Auditing," Journal of Accounting Research, Spring 1975.
2. Dacey, R., "A Conclusion-Theoretic Resolution of the Auditor's Detection Problem,"
Working Paper No. 75:13, University of Oklahoma Center for Economic & Management
Research.
3. Scott, W., "A Bayesian Approach to Asset Valuation and Audit Size," Journal of Accounting Research, Autumn 1973.
4. Demski, J. and Sweringa, R., "A Cooperative Formulation of the Audit Choice Problem,"
The Accounting Review, July 1974.
5. I realize that under conventional hypothesis testing, this may be labelled as a "Type II
error." To the auditor, however, it is the error of greatest concern, and the definition "Type
I" would seem more consistent with his view. This has been my experience in teaching
statistical sampling to auditors. Where the hypothesis test has been framed so that the "alpha
risk" represents the risk of accepting a materially misstated account balance, it has enhanced
understanding.
6. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Sec. 320A.14.
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7. See Altman, E. I. and McGough, T . P., "Evaluation of a Company as a Going Concern,"
Journal of Accountancy, December 1974; and Altman, E . I., "Corporate Bankruptcy Prediction
and Its Implication for Commercial Loan Evaluation." The Journal of Commercial Bank.
Lending, December 1970.
8. See Wilcox, J. W., "A Gambler's Ruin Prediction of Business Failure Using Accounting
Data," Sloan Management Review, Spring 1971.
9. See Loebbecke, J. K. and Neter, J., "Considerations in Choosing Statistical Sampling
Procedures in Auditing," Proceedings of Conference on Statistical Methodology in Auditing,
University of Chicago, May 1975 (to be published in Journal of Accounting Research Supplement).
10. See Burns, D. C. and Loebbecke, J. K., "Internal Control Evaluation: How the Computer Can Help," Journal of Accountancy, August 1975.
11. As but one example, this is particularly pertinent to the current issue of auditor involvement with interim financial statements in deciding whether 1) all reviews should be voluntary
(initial AICPA position), 2) reviews should be mandatory (SEC position re publicly held companies), and 3) public reporting should be allowed on the basis of a review vs. a regular
examination.
12. Statement of Issues: Scope and Organization of the Study of Auditors' Responsibilities,
AICPA, Para. G-1, D.
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Discussant's Response to
Use of Decision Theory in Auditing—
A Practitioner's View
William L. Felix, Jr.
University of Washington
Jim Loebbecke is to be complimented on his willingness to provide a prac
titioner's view of a topic area that is, I am sure, very difficult to deal with.
Researchers interested in using decision theory as a descriptive model of
auditing practice need feedback and criticism from practitioners. Otherwise, it is
very likely that inaccurate models and inferences from these models will result.
I would particularly like to observe the importance of contributions such as the
auditor's logic process that Jim provided in his 1974 comment on my paper.
These views of the basic audit process, including (1) steps for the collection of
particular kinds of evidence and (2) steps that represent major decision points
in the audit process, are the kind of basic information and feedback that is
necessary to construct useful models.
Significance of Research on Decision Theory
The significance of the research efforts in decision theory may not be entirely
clear. The line of argument that is most appealing to me is that a decision theory
model requires rather precise specification of relationships and decisions that may
have previously been left rather vague and imprecise. The result of greater
precision ought to be better understanding of the consistencies and differences
in the various opinion formulation processes being used in the profession. In
addition, the resulting well structured and understood models would improve
the ability of researchers to investigate problems and by implication, for the
profession to adapt to changes.
Possible Misconceptions
On the first page of his paper, Jim indicates that approximately 30% of the
practitioners he surveyed have some idea as to what decision theory implies with
regard to auditing. Being realistic, I suspect that this is a fairly optimistic figure.
There are probably only a handful of practitioners in this country that can
approach Jim's knowledge of this particular application of statistical inference.
Yet I think that his paper indicates that he has some misconceptions about the
nature of decision theory, either as a normative model of the auditor's decision
processes or as a descriptive model of how auditors behave. Let me illustrate my
point with a couple of observations from Jim's paper. In the last paragraph on
page 110 of his paper under "point 1" he states that the decision to extend work is
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biased towards a one-sided expected cost. That is, that the auditor is so over
whelmed by the potential impact of Jim's Type I error that other potential deci
sion factors don't matter. I would agree that this outcome is possible, but it seems
to me that regardless of whether or not this situation will exist, a decision theory
model will handle it properly. The auditor's degree of belief or probability for
this type of error is used to weight the cost of the error so that the result or
expected value is used in making choices. Regardless of how overwhelming the
consequences of such an error, if it is of very low probability or very unlikely to
occur, it may not be significant in the final outcome. Some of Jim's discussion
indicates that he understands this point yet he is describing it here as a difference
in the model.
Risk Assessment
On page 111, Jim's discussion indicates some concern about the objectiveness
of the assessment of the risks the auditor uses in decision making. It is my
belief that the critical assessments of risk made by the auditor are now, and
always will be subjective. Decision theory, or its use in auditing, does not imply
an objective measurement of risk. A l l that is required is that in some way the
auditor elicit subjective assessments of risk and combine them with whatever
objective sampling evidence is available to reach a composite risk assessment
that is then used for decision making. This point is raised again on page 115,
where Jim states that it would appear that ". . . the aspect (of auditing) which
most closely relates to the formal decision theory model is the determination of
the extent of procedures—that is, sample size." It may be that most near-term
applications of a decision theory model would be in audit decisions that relate
to samples and sample sizes, but the use of the model itself is primarily oriented
toward the combination of the results of judgment and sampling in order to
reach audit decisions both in terms of individual tests and as the auditor aggre
gates evidence from a variety of sources to reach overall decisions on balances
and the financial statements taken as a whole.
Audit Process Model
To illustrate, let me refer to the flow chart in Appendix I. As complex as
this chart appears, it is only a partial model of the audit process. It presents
the elicitation, assessment, and evidence composition problem for accounting
systems, the conversion or transition from accounting system error rates to
account balance error rates, the assessment of balance error amounts and their
composition for total error amounts, and the individual account error amount
aggregation problem, all in one chart. Clearly missing are the beginnings of
the process where the auditor engages in a general learning process before
trying to disaggregate this general evidence to priors on the error rate for
specific procedures, the contribution of this general learning to assessments for
decision problems throughout the audit process, and most critically, the
specification of the terminal loss function which will be used for decisions
throughout the process. The major point that I would like to make from the
chart is that it indicates that a decision theory model is certainly not oriented pri
marily toward determination of the extent of audit procedures. It is far broader.
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On page 110, Jim observes that the two-state decision model in my prior
paper does not represent all the alternatives. I would certainly agree that the
model was designed primarily to illustrate the potential rather than to be a
definitive description. In another paper, a student and I have addressed the
problem of expressing the auditor's payoff function more realistically. Appendix
II illustrates a possible specification of the auditor's action space. Note that
the action space includes a clean opinion, various kinds of non-standard opinions,
and withdrawal from the engagement.
Appendix III illustrates the nature of the loss functions that we are exploring.
These models allow inclusion of both fixed and variable losses. Each functional
form is made up of, at most, three plateaus, corresponding to immaterial near
zero error amounts, small error amounts, and extremely large error amounts.
The change from one plateau to the next starts out slowly, builds up rapidly,
and then slowly approaches the target plateau. Also, rather than argue for a
single payoff function, we suggest a decomposition of the assessment problem
into three components: professional reputation, legal costs, and settlement costs.
In conclusion, I would like to return to the title of Jim's paper. We are not
ready for the use of decision theory in auditing, and many of Jim's comments
are indicative of the reasons why such use is not now being proposed. Continued
research and teaching of decision theory in auditing are both desirable, how
ever, because of the potential of this methodology to make us better heuristic
decision makers, and the promise of the research to achieve those benefits in
understanding and communication mentioned at the beginning of my comments.
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Logical Structure of the Evidential Integration Framework
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Specification of Auditor's Action Space
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Disclaimer
Adverse opinion

APPENDIX I I I

Three Plateau Loss Functions

L(x)

=

The present v a l u e of a f t e r t a x l o s s e s corresponding to e r r o r
amount x.

X

=

The aggregate e r r o r amount.
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8
Capital Investment and U.S.
Accounting and Tax Policies
Richard D. Fitzgerald
Price Waterhouse & Co.
Capital formation is the lifeblood of our industrial and economic complex. Yet
we hear increasing warnings of the problems ahead from undercapitalization of
American business and the resulting constraints on production and employment.
Historical Background
For years, American business has been largely self-financing. Fifteen years
ago, close to 90 per cent of corporate capital expenditure was supplied from
internal cash flow—retained earnings and depreciation. This proportion has
dropped significantly, although recently improved corporate earnings should
help for the short term. We are all aware of the collapse in equity market
financings in recent years. From a high point in 1972 of nearly $15 billion in
equity offerings, there has been a dramatic decline in the last two years. The
difficulty of raising equity capital on a reasonable basis has been accompanied
by record levels of corporate indebtedness—an amount outstanding nearly as
large as one year's G N P . Debt to equity ratios have risen sharply in the last
decade. Of particular concern has been the marked increase in short-term
indebtedness which requires continual refinancing.
One U.S. businessman has summarized his view of the basic capital problem:
The shortage of equity capital has been especially worrisome. This
has forced us to rely on short-term and long-term debt to finance innova
tion, modernization and expansion. Consequently, interest cost has be
come a significant added expense, depressing profits. Lower profits make
it more difficult to generate retained earnings. Lower earnings and a
high debt to equity ratio further depress the value of the company's shares,
making equity financing even more difficult.
While a number of studies have been made of the potential capital shortage,
there are, as you might expect, as many different answers as there are studies.
The New York Stock Exchange, in its often-quoted study of capital needs, has
estimated a frightening shortage of savings compared to capital needs—$650
billion over the next ten years. Their study was based on projections of desired
levels of investment and available savings under basic assumptions of 3.5 percent
real growth and 5 percent inflation annually. Several other studies, such as
Chase and Business Roundtable, also reflect shortages. The Brookings study,
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based on lower levels of inflation and unemployment and larger government
surpluses, shows about a breakeven over the period to 1980. It may be that these
studies and the many comments provided in hearings have not yet fully con
vinced Congress, but the outpouring has certainly made a sizable impact on its
members judging by the variety of proposals being seriously considered by
Congressional task forces.
Quantifying the Problem
Whether or not it is possible to conclude on some quantification of capital
needs for the next decade, there seems to be growing recognition that the social
objectives pursued by government have created bias in the direction of consump
tion rather than savings and that it is time to assess and moderate the discentives
affecting capital investment. We know that one and one-half million new
workers will be moving into the job market over the next ten years at a minimum
investment cost of $35,000 each. This will account for at least $50 billion a year
of new investment. There also will be the replacement, modernization and
environmental demands of the future—all to be considered in light of continuing
inflation. If there is no staggering shortage of the magnitude shown by the
N Y S E study, it does seem reasonable to conclude there will be no surplus either.
Senators Javits and Humphrey, not particularly noted for their conservative
banners, in jointly sponsoring certain legislation for employee stock ownership
plans, have commented within the last month on their concerns with capital
formation:
(I)t is no secret that the United States is experiencing a substantial
problem with respect to a shortage of capital investment. The U.S.
Treasury estimates that from 1960 to 1973, investment as a percentage of
real national output was 13.6 percent in the U.S. as compared to 29
percent in Japan, 20 percent for West Germany and 18.2 percent for
France. What is needed to alleviate the capital shortage of the 1970's and
1980's are new approaches to equity investment. (Javits)
In recent years new stock issues have only contributed 2 to 5 percent
to corporate financing needs. Last year, for example, just 568 companies
used new stock issues to help raise capital. I believe that is an unhealthy
situation for the U.S. economy and one that must begin to have some
remedies applied if we are to meet the large capital needs of the coming
decade. (Humphrey)
Cause and Effect
The effects from inability to raise the desired capital are not difficult to
foresee. In a capital intensive country, the initial consequence will be evidenced
by continuing unacceptable levels of unemployment. The reduction of invest
ment must necessarily mean curtailment of plant expansion, modernization and
research and development. There is no way that technological improvement can
be sustained and new job opportunities created without the required investment
input. There is no way productivity can be enhanced if industry cannot buy the
equipment necessary to do the job. Moreover, the scramble by industry in capital
scarce times produces the high interest rates that help close the cycle for stifling
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earnings and impeding economic growth—as we have been so painfully aware
in the last two years.
World Interdependence
In assessing U.S. needs and objectives, clearly economic interdependence
around the world is a reality. While the severity of cyclical swings may vary
from country to country, there is direct linking of investment resources and
demand. Inflation, currency exchange rates, and interest rates all involve world
wide consideration. Not too long ago in the U.S., we were pre-eminent with our
abundant raw materials, cheap energy, super technology, high volume, and
profitability. It doesn't take much reflection to recognize that those days may be
gone forever. We are now faced with either scarcity in some resources or control
over their supply held by other nations. The technology achievements and
productive capability of some countries provide the keenest, if not superior,
competition to our own industry. In fact, the emerging economic and political
order in the world demands a larger sharing in production and revenues by
less industrialized nations.
In preserving and building its capital base, business must continue to sharpen
its own management technique to optimize return from new expenditure, to
conserve its liquid resources and to take full advantage of tax and other oppor
tunities to retain capital. For many companies, the LIFO inventory method has
helped alleviate capital erosion. Despite the pain of reducing reported earnings,
hundreds of companies made this move in the last few years to preserve capital
that would otherwise have been paid out in income taxes. Although it seems
business managers are carrying the struggle as well as possible, the resolution of
capital shortage problems ultimately has to rest with motivation and government
policy.
Taxation Policies
Of prime importance in stimulating capital investment is the taxation system.
Our federal tax system is built substantially on the income tax—a tax inherently
unfavorable to investment. In fiscal 1975 about 60 percent of federal revenue
came from personal and corporate income taxes. As government has grown and
tax rates increased, what the reformers choose to call "loopholes" are whittled
here and there into the structure to permit some money to flow into investment.
This kind of tax system means permanent conflict between government's revenue
appetite and the nation's capital needs.
In effect, the U.S. has maintained a tilt in tax policies toward consumption
and away from savings and capital formation. Our tax experts point out a
number of shortcomings when the U.S. tax system is compared with other
industrialized countries.
Capital cost recovery on fixed investment. The adoption of the A D R class
life system in 1971, together with the restored investment credit, did improve
capital cost recovery in the U.S. It is estimated that with regard to fixed invest
ment since then, using double-declining balance, about 60 percent of the original
cost can be allowed for tax depreciation in the first three years. Nevertheless,
compared to other countries, the U.S. is still nearly at the foot of the class. For
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example, the U . K . allows 100 percent recovery in one year; Canada in two years;
Sweden in three years.
Inflation adjustments. The U.S. has no provision in tax law for inflation
recognition unless you count L I F O as basically a tax measure. Some countries
allow special valuations, reserves and adjustments for inventories and other
assets. The Task Force on Business Taxation estimated underdepreciation of
$10 billion in industry overall for 1970 alone in considering inflationary effects
up to that time. This condition has undoubtedly worsened with the high
inflation level in subsequent years. Replacement cost depreciation for fixed
assets is certainly a lively subject these days for financial reporting, but there is
little reaction from the government for its acceptability for taxation purposes.
The New York Stock Exchange study indicates that, after adjusting for in
ventory profits and underdepreciation based on historical costs, effective corporate
tax rates on pre-tax profits for 1973 and 1974 were about 66 percent as contrasted
with the statutory rate of 48 percent. In fact, the Exchange estimates on this
inflation adjusted basis that in 1974 business actually paid a portion of its
dividends out of capital.
Capital gains. No other major industrial country imposes a maximum longterm capital gain tax as high as the U.S. Only Canada and the U . K . have
capital gains tax levels comparable to ours. Yet the reformers press for taxing
capital gains as ordinary income despite the fact that the system is still another
form of double tax on earnings, that the gain is often due to inflation and that
unequal treatment would apply to losses. It is probable Congress will extend the
required holding period to one year from the present six months' term. On the
other hand, the Administration has proposed a sliding scale of exclusion after
the one-year holding period—50 percent of the gain up to five years, increasing
to 70 percent after twenty-five years.
Foreign subsidiary earnings. U.S. tax law has been constantly whittling
away at the economic neutrality concept. Other countries for the most part
exempt foreign based income or allow tax credits. N o other country penalizes
foreign earnings, as has been proposed in recent months, through the taxing
of unremitted foreign earnings. Sound taxation concepts should preclude double
taxation, allow foreign tax credits at the higher of U.S. or foreign tax rates, and
provide for deferral of tax payments until such time as income is received
through distribution. To impose taxes earlier would impose a penalty and a
bias against foreign investment.
Incentives for investment and savings. The U.S. has no real incentives for
direct investment, while other countries exempt certain types of income and
grant special write-offs and allowances. A few years ago, the Administration
called for new tax proposals to stimulate research and development of new
industries and technologies. Such development can be best encouraged by
additional tax credits for at least part of the cost. The rapid amortization pro
gram enacted for anti-pollution equipment has been made unnecessarily complex
and limiting and in part contradicts the flexibility of the A D R capital cost
recovery procedure. If our national policy is to ensure the highest quality and
safety for our environment, why not make the expenditures required of business
simply tax deductible as incurred?
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Double Taxation of Corporate Income
As you know, we have a double taxation approach to corporate earnings
while all other major countries have some form of relief from such impact. In
the jargon of our tax experts, the U.S. system is known as the classical or
separate method; i.e., tax is imposed at the corporate level without regard to
dividend distributions. These distributions are then separately taxed to the
recipient. The classical system, however, conflicts with stimulating equity
investment and tends to give foreign competitors an advantage especially where
consumption-type taxes ( V A T ) are a major source of tax revenue. Moreover,
our system tends to discourage dividend distributions. For this reason, penalty
taxes have had to be devised to deal with "unreasonable accumulation" of corpo
rate earnings.
None of our major industrial competitors—Germany, Japan, the United
Kingdom or France—use the classical system. These nations, along with Canada
and a number of other industrial countries, utilize either a split-rate or an
imputation system. Both methods tax business profits at lower overall rates
than the classical system and thus make corporate stocks a more attractive
investment.
Split-rate system. This system taxes retained profits at a higher rate than
those which are distributed. In theory, the tax rate on distributed profits could
be as low as zero. In practice, however, it is somewhat larger. The maximum
rate in Japan, for example, is 40 percent for undistributed profits and 28 percent
for distributed profits or an effective 34 percent rate assuming dividend distribu
tion of one half of earnings. Advantages of split rate are the reduced taxation
at the corporate level, its flexibility for modifying tax policy, and incentives for
distribution of earnings.
Imputation system. Under this system, the shareholder receives a direct
credit against personal tax liability for the taxes paid at the corporate level.
Generally, the credit is the portion of the corporate taxes applicable to the
distributed earnings, typically less than 100 percent of the corporate tax. The
U . K . , for instance, has enacted a basic corporate tax rate with a credit to
the shareholder equal to about one half of dividend distributions. This means
the shareholders, as a group, would get a credit of about 50 percent of the tax
paid by the corporation if all after-tax profits were distributed. As in most
imputation systems, the "dividend income" of the shareholder includes the tax
credit allowed, in addition to the cash received. For example, if a cash dividend
of $100 is received and a tax credit of $50 is allowed, the shareholder will
gross-up the two amounts and report dividend income of $150.
Dividend deduction method. Another and differing system, the dividend
deduction method, is considered by many as the best suited to the U.S. Under
this method, dividends paid, or a percentage thereof, are deductible in computing
the paying corporation's taxable income. Although closely related to the end
result of the split-rate method (the overall effective tax rate is reduced by
dividend distributions), the concept and technical aspects differ considerably.
Even though it is not used by any of the major countries, it is the avenue
through which many believe relief from double taxation may most likely be
achieved in the U.S.
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Assuming the same basic tax rate—50 percent, for example—all four of the
systems impose the same tax burden on the funds retained. The split-rate,
imputation, and dividend-deduction systems, however, pass to the shareholder a
bigger after-tax share of dividends than the U.S. classical system.
Dividend Taxation Proposed for U.S.
The Administration has recommended to the House Ways and Means
Committee a combination system of dividend deduction and stockholder credits.
As proposed, the plan would be phased in over several years to lessen the
impact of tax revenue reduction. In the ultimate application of the plan, a
corporation would pay the normal tax on earnings less a deduction equal to
50 percent of dividends paid to stockholders. The stockholders would gross up
their cash dividend received, by the amount of such 50 percent corporate deduc
tion, and take a direct tax credit equal to such amount. The net effect would
be an elimination of double tax.
The Administration's proposal arrives at the right solution. However, some
experts believe the procedures involved in the combination of dividend deduc
tion and tax credit would be extremely complex for the millions of shareholders
involved. Their recommendation is for initiating only the dividend deduction
system at the corporate level.
Regardless of the form of business organization, individuals' taxes would be
levied on income received. The choice of corporate financing, whether debt or
equity, would also be neutralized, thus removing the present bias from a tax
viewpoint toward debt financing. Most important politically is the neutrality
achieved among individual taxpayers. Dividends received would be fully taxable
to recipients at their respective rates. This is not to say that the deduction system
has no disadvantages. It does tend to penalize the developing corporation which
needs to retain funds for expansion and would likely encourage a higher level of
dividend payment for other corporations. However, it can be argued that such
a system would increase the total supply of savings or capital for reinvestment
by the individual. For those interested in reviewing the differing systems of
eliminating double taxation on dividends, the AICPA's Statement N o . 3 of
Tax Policy contains a comprehensive discussion of the subject.
Tax Policy and Flow of Capital Funds
There are hopeful signs that both Congress and the Administration recog
nize the need for rethinking tax policies on a long-term basis if we are to
increase sharply the flow of capital funds. The major areas to be considered, in
addition to the basic tax rate and deductibility structure, should be capital
recovery allowances, bearing in mind the escalating costs of replacement; elim
ination of double taxation on dividends; direct investment and savings incentives
(such as initiated in a limited way with Employee Stock Ownership Plans)
and modification of capital gains tax. Whatever the political realities at the
moment, this country's taxation policies need to be redirected if we want to
improve the availability and flow of capital investment.
Accounting and Disclosure Policies
Now to turn to comments on the impact of accounting policies on invest129

ment. Accounting wields an important influence in our country because of its
significance, among other things, in determining corporate profits and taxation
revenues—key factors in the economic climate. It seems clear that a funda
mental goal both of the private sector and government is to achieve reasonable
economic and social stability and smooth out, or at least minimize, those
disruptive cyclical swings characteristic of our economy. This goal should be
considered in the formulation of accounting objectives and policies and effort
made to avoid unnecessary or unrealistic distortions in periodic income measure
ment. The credibility and utility of accounting policy will be largely tested not
by reference to its theoretical niceties but by how well it reflects the substance of
business planning and operation.
Anyone who doubts the influential role of accounting in our country need
only be reminded of the imminent Congressional hearings by Senator Metcalf's
subcommittee. These hearings are intended to probe into the activities and
structure of the accounting profession as a whole, the Big Eight firms, the
A I C P A , the FASB, and several relevant government agencies. At stake may be
whether accounting principles will continue to be set in the private sector.
The financial reporting system in the U.S. is generally regarded today as
without equal in the world. The wealth and depth of financial information
available for a publicly held company in the U.S. is simply tremendous. Much
of this vast disclosure lode (some spell it one way, others differently) followed
the Securities Acts legislation of the early thirties. Before that the profession
and notably the New York Stock Exchange struggled hard to improve re
porting, and there were improvements in those days—initiation of published
quarterly earnings, increased incidence of annual audits, expanded disclosure of
accounting policies and valuation bases. The Bulletin "Uniform Accounting"
prepared by members of the accounting profession and banking industry and
published by the Federal Reserve in 1917 was one milestone in those earlier days.
The report, "Audits of Corporate Accounts," by the Committee on Cooperation
with Stock Exchanges was another early effort by the private sector which
contributed to strengthening the reporting and the auditing processes.
Nevertheless, the tidal waves resulting from the stock market crash and the
great depression so completely overran confidence and credibility in financial
reporting that there was little effective resistance to the new securities legislation
and the new reach of government regulation. In fact, in many ways, this period
was the foundation of the super-regulatory era we have today.
It would be easy and popular to put down the regulatory process in financial
reporting. Some knowledgeable people have devoted a great deal of study and
writing to advancing the hypothesis that the flood of disclosure dictated by the
Securities Acts and by the SEC, for example, may not really have enhanced
reliability or aided performance by investors. These views challenge the
effectiveness of the regulator and assert the need for more careful analysis to
underpin new proposals and to check on the efficacy of existing regulations.
I must say I cannot accept conclusions that indicate little or no benefit from
the regulatory process. I include in this process both government and the
private sector. I believe that while there have been setbacks and abuses, for the
most part developments in financial reporting have been supportive of investor
confidence and new capital formation. Beyond the continual refinement and
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expansion of legal and accounting disclosure following adoption of the Securities
Acts, the regulatory aspects have generally created a heightened awareness and
incentive on the part of the security issuer and the seller for a diligent and careful
presentation of financial information.
We only need turn to the municipal securities market at the present time to
note the clamor for prospectuses and disclosure along the lines we have become
routinely accustomed to in corporate offerings. Recognizing that someone may
be able to demonstrate twenty years from now that the investor was no better
off with additional disclosure of a municipality's finances probably does not
sound very convincing at the moment to those holding New York City bonds
or notes.
Whether or not we believe this burgeoning disclosure process has helped the
investor and capital formation, there are limits, nevertheless, beyond which
additional disclosure requirements can be viewed as unreasonable and unneces
sary. Those critics of the disclosure process are on target with this point. Exten
sion of disclosure requires sound and tested justification rather than novel theories
of the regulator. Much of today's problem with expanding disclosure stems
from the duplicative effort and expense to present information calculated under
alternative accounting bases—the "as if" type of accounting. Apart from the
confusion of differing sets of data, it is frequently not feasible to place such
alternative information on a fair and complete basis because earlier underlying
business decisions might well have been different if the new assumptions or
accounting requirements had been applied contemporaneously. It is a cardinal
rule of pro forma presentations, caveats notwithstanding, that pro formas can
be misleading if all conditions and assumptions are not taken into account.
Problems of European Companies
Based on recent discussions with officials of several large European com
panies, it seems some of them have lost interest in stock listing or public security
issues in the U.S. Most commonly cited as impediments are the generally uni
lateral and inflexible positions of the relevant agency and the effort and expense
to contend with elements of U.S. generally accepted accounting principles in
addition to local principles for reporting. The new requirements, for example,
relating to foreign currency translation, replacement cost accounting data and
auditor review of interim statements are viewed as imposing unnecessarily costly
conditions. It is somewhat ironic that at the time these companies were pointing
out their disenchantment, the New York Stock Exchange had just released its
more liberal requirements to encourage foreign issuers to list on the Exchange.
Multinational Company Problems
Certainly the multinationals, wherever located, are not ranking very high at
the moment in the "favorite person" poll. Many government organizations,
domestic and international, are crawling over each other to devise and mandate
sanctions, codes, and disclosure requirements to suit the purposes of each special
interest. The O E C D (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop
ment) comprising the U.S. and 23 other industrialized nations, is probably in
the vanguard. Its proposed guidelines are expected to be voted upon by the
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member countries next month. The kind of published financial data they want
may not seem earthshaking to us in view of existing U.S. practice, but I can
tell you their relatively modest disclosure proposals have created considerable
controversy and debate over the past year among the O E C D members and their
advisory groups.
It is also obvious that demands in other quarters are increasing for informa
tion on multinational companies. Some demands are for much more detailed
data than proposed by the O E C D . Within the past: few weeks, for example,
legislation has been introduced in Congress that calls for the reporting by U.S.
companies to the federal government of operating results and other data. A l 
though the requirements are similar to the type of information contemplated by
the O E C D , unfortunately the legislation would require such data to be pro
vided separately "by each foreign affiliate, by country and by activity." In
addition to the substantial cost burden, the questionable utility of such details,
and the concern over risks of exposing sensitive information to competitors,
there are other difficulties inherent in the mass of information proposed for
disclosure under this kind of legislation. To start with, it may not be possible
for the multinational to obtain the necessary detailed data on some foreign
"affiliates" since they are defined on the basis of 10 percent or more ownership.
(U.S. accounting requirements for recognition of affiliated company earnings
in the financial statements of the enterprise start generally at the 20 percent
ownership level.)
A pervasive problem also relates to the many differences in accounting and
taxation principles from country to country. In many foreign countries, financial
reporting closely follows taxation rules. It frequently is not useful to compare
statutory financial filings of a company in one country with filings of another
company in a different country. N o valid comparison can be made due to
variations, for example, in allowable depreciation methods, inventory valuation
and other valuation reserves, and write-offs. Additional confusion, suspicion and
criticism may result from attempting to compare results of local operations as
measured by the enterprise's accounting policies with the results measured on a
statutory basis. Nor would separate financial statements of the many subsidiaries
and affiliates prepared on the enterprise's accounting basis necessarily provide
clearcut resolution of the problem. There are usually significant consolidation
adjustments that would require arbitrary allocation as well as the most funda
mental question of all—do financial statements in local currency amounts, or
after translation for the parent company's consolidation, provide the more useful
presentation?
In any event, I believe that those parties clamoring for special multinational
reporting should be adequately served by the substantial amount of information
presented in annual reports to shareholders and to the SEC. These reports
would include some reasonable geographical grouping of operating results and
other key data such as proposed in the FASB draft on segment reporting and
in the O E C D guidelines. There should also be more widespread publication in
local language of a company's annual report within those countries where sig
nificant operations or interests are involved. I believe the extensive financial
information on a U.S. company presently available is not generally appreciated
in the U.S., let alone in other countries.
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The European Economic Community has recognized the problem of diverse
accounting among its member states. Its current proposals are intended to aid
the standardizing of financial statement content and disclosure for reports by
companies operating in the E E C . The U . N . is also active. It has established a
Research and Information Center to collect, analyze and present information
concerning businesses operating internationally. The developments in this pro
gram should be followed closely.
Inequities in the Regulatory Process
The O E C D and E E C proposals have been based on an elaborate process of
exposure and study, including acceptance of the views of outsider advisors. I
think the F A S B also can take credit for its study and deliberation process
followed—even if we don't always like the answers produced. Most times in
this country, however, the federal regulatory process is quite narrowly based
and dictatorial. In fact, some wide-reaching requirements may often result from
advocacy by a single member of a regulatory body, or even by a single person
on the staff. It is true that administrative proceedings require a public exposure
and comment period, but if one were to view the SEC in recent times, for
example, it is questionable how effective this exposure period has been for
private sector interests. Within the last few weeks, for instance, the Commission
has announced its new requirements for disclosure of replacement cost data as
supplemental information to financial statements. Companies will soon need to
incur substantial costs to develop the information on a new and completely
different accounting basis in addition to that regularly applied.
Much can be said in highly inflationary periods to support an accounting
model that reveals the impact on operations and investment from inflation as
contrasted with displaying solely the effects of historical amounts. There is no
question the accounting profession here and elsewhere in the world is in tune
with this general objective. Its methodology and implementation requires resolu
tion. In my view, however, the SEC's recent action is precipitous and unjustified.
Many comments received in the exposure process urged the need for a coordi
nated program of study and experimentation for such radically new concepts
in order to preserve some degree of comparability among companies. Sub
stantive comments were furnished to the SEC by many demonstrating the in
completeness of its requirements to reflect properly inflation effects on the
enterprise. (By way of contrast, the FASB in its inflation accounting study has
been able to enlist a large number of major companies for testing out the
proposed concepts.)
Concerns and criticisms have also been voiced in the United Kingdom over
the Sandilands committee recommendation for adoption of current cost ac
counting. At least two years will be available there for study and experimentation
before any requirement might be imposed. Because of the SEC's crash pro
gram, I think we may have missed a great opportunity to join all the issues on
an international accounting basis. It would seem the U . K . situation and the
emerging Netherlands disclosure could have offered real possibilities for broadscale resolution. Instead we are faced with the probability of new conflicts and
differences among national groups and accounting requirements, not to mention
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the additional burden placed on those companies which must comply with the
differing requirements of more than one jurisdiction.
A great deal more could be said of the regulatory impositions on reporting
companies. The principal point, however, is that the agency or the government
must find a better way of assessing need for and the benefits to the public of
their proposed programs. Applying intuition and motivation of a few regula
tory officials has resulted in piling disclosure upon disclosure. As Professor
Stegler says in his "The Citizen and The State": "Each year the appropriations
of each regulatory body grow about 8% on average: 1% for population, 5% for
prices and 2% for growing evil. The momentum of events is awesome." You
also may have noted the finding of two Stanford University professors in a
recent study. They say we have now reached the milestone of having over
one-half of the U.S. work force engaged in some form of information gathering
and processing.
It may be that those agencies primarily concerned with the financial re
porting process should maintain advisory committees, with representatives drawn
from the private sector, in order to help achieve a balanced and objective view
point in the development of new proposals as well as subsequent periodic review
of existing regulations. There needs to be greater involvement of those parties
being affected by the regulatory requirements. Agencies tend to follow the
concept of "let the private sector prove our proposal is wrong" rather than
the agency's shouldering the burden of proof that a proposal is really needed
and can be cost/benefit justified. Then, of course, under the agency's approach
of "prove us wrong," it is less than fair that the agency acts alone as judge and
jury in reviewing the evidence submitted by the private sector.
Moreover, after a regulation is issued, new interpretations by the agency
creep in resulting in further unjustified requirements. The comprehensive study
of the entire corporate disclosure system recently announced by the SEC may
be an encouraging sign. While its objectives may be more broadly based, I
hope the study might also stimulate a challenging look at Regulation S-X
and other rules which have not had a good sifting out of trivia in years—for
example, the endless details of stock option information and the SEC's anti
quated policy for separate parent statements in addition to the consolidated
statements. Let there be a truly objective assessment of how much disclosure
is needed by the "average prudent investor," short of drowning in confusion
from overly technical material and alternative presentations of financial details.
Role of the Private Sector
It is equally essential that the private sector continue to take an ever-diligent
role in constructively evaluating and articulating its views as to the usefulness
and practicality of new proposals. This contribution cannot be effectively made
by mere protest. The role of business and other groups in the development of
financial reporting must recognize the differing views and needs of the various
parties at interest. Response to proposals needs to be supported by hard evi
dence which in many cases can only be achieved by actual experimentation and
display of the reasonableness or the impracticability of the proposal.
It often will be advisable to communicate these views to members of gov
ernment apart from a particular agency that may be involved, and also to the
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financial and business community at large. It will take a highly organized and
skilled approach to maintain the financial reporting process on a basis pro
viding reasonable benefits to all segments of the community.
Conclusion
Evidence and commentary point to serious concerns with the availability of
capital for desired investment goals in the next decade. A leading investment
banker, for example, has estimated that to arrest deterioration in the quality of
corporate credit, for some years there will have to be a net increase in equity
financing of more than $20 billion annually. This compares with half or less
than that amount achieved in the past two years.
The significance of accounting policy and disclosure should not be under
estimated. The current interest in multinational operations underscores the lack
of understanding concerning the differences and limitations in accounting prin
ciples and financial reporting. Indeed, more apparent than ever is the need for
international standards of accounting and a better balanced program for gov
ernment's regulatory process.
Finally, the reassessment of U.S. tax policies is critical to an effective pro
gram for stimulating capital formation and equity financing. As Secretary
Simon stated in his presentation to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress:
First and foremost we must have a much greater understanding on the
part of the public on the basic concepts of capital. Capital is the corner
stone of increased productivity, of higher real wages, of greater job
opportunities, of a strong competitive position internationally, and of
holding down the rate of inflation.
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